Gregory v. Loose

• Decision Date: 12 July 1898
• Parties: GREGORY v. LOOSE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

54 P. 33

19 Wash. 599

GREGORY v. LOOSE.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 12, 1898

Appeal from superior court, Snohomish county; John C. Denney, Judge.

Action by L. E. Gregory against U. K. Loose, doing business as the Riverside Shingle Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Reversed.

Bell &amp Austin, for appellant.

Headlee & Allen and J. B. Ault, for respondent.

ANDERS, J.

On and prior to February 5, 1895, the Riverside Shingle Company was the owner of a shingle mill at Machias, in Snohomish county and on or about that day it conveyed all of its property including the shingle mill, to the Snohomish National Bank in payment of its indebtedness to the bank. The mill was thereafter known and designated as the Riverside Shingle Mill. Soon after the transfer the bank started up the mill, under the general supervision of appellant, Loose, who was the bank's cashier, and proceeded to manufacture shingles from bolts furnished by other parties having them for sale. One R. P. Mathews was employed to operate the mill, with authority to contract for and estimate shingle bolts, subject to the approval of the appellant. In September or October, 1895, said Mathews employed one C. R. Gregory to construct a logging road to some timber which appellant had contracted for, and which was to be cut either by appellant or his vendors, and removed within five years from the date of the contract, which contract was in writing. Said Gregory, by the direction or consent of Mathews, employed the respondent and several other persons to labor on the road. As superintendent of construction, said Gregory kept the time of the men employed, and on or about October 25, 1895, demanded from Mr. Loose the amount alleged to be due them respectively for their labor. Payment was refused on the ground that the making of the road had not been authorized by appellant, and that neither appellant nor the bank had any knowledge that it was being constructed. This action was thereupon instituted to recover the amount claimed to be due respondent and others, whose claims were assigned to him, for labor performed in the construction of the road. It is not claimed that either the respondent or any of his assignors was personally requested or authorized by Mr. Loose to perform the labor for the value of which this action is waged, but the contention is that Mathews was appellant's agent to construct the road, and as such agent was authorized to bind appellant for the payment for the labor performed thereon. And it cannot reasonably be claimed that Mathews' act in authorizing Mr. Gregory to construct the road was ratified by the appellant, for we discover no evidence of such ratification in the record. If, therefore, Mathews was the agent of appellant for the purpose claimed, it was either because appellant held him out to the public as such agent, or because what he did in that regard was within the authority which appellant had actually given him, or within the apparent authority which he knowingly and without dissent permitted him to assume. 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 988, 989. The actual authority, as we have said, which was delegated to Mathews, was authority to operate the Riverside Shingle Mill, and to contract for shingle bolts, and estimate the value thereof, subject to the approval of appellant. The bolts were paid for in every instance by appellant at the bank, and generally, if not always, by checks signed: "Riverside Shingle Mill. U. K. Loose, Agent." During Mathews' employment at the mill, he sometimes gave orders on merchants for the delivery of limited quantities of groceries or other merchandise to men who were furnishing shingle bolts or working in the mill. The amount of the respective orders was reported to appellant by Mathews, and was generally deducted from the sum due to the person who received the goods, and paid to the drawee, although it appears that in several instances such payment was refused. Respondent introduced evidence at the trial to the effect that Mathews negotiated a contract for timber for appellant with certain designated persons, but the contract was finally executed by appellant himself, and contained no provision whatever for the building of a logging road; and this, too, notwithstanding the fact that the witness C. R. Gregory testified that Mathews, when negotiating for the timber, said to the vendors thereof, who were insisting that a...