Gregory W. Entsminger v. Aranas
| Decision Date | 24 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:16-cv-00555-MMD-WGC |
| Parties | GREGORY WEST ENTSMINGER, Plaintiff, v. ROMEO ARANAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Pro se Plaintiff Gregory West Entsminger brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb (ECF No. 311), recommending the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 278 (“Motion”)), deny Entsminger's request to defer ruling on Defendants' Motion under Fed.R.Civ.P 56(d), and find that Defendant Juliette Roberson (Robison)[1] should remain dismissed from this action. Entsminger filed an objection to the R&R. (ECF No. 314 (“Objection”).) As further explained below, the Court will adopt in part and reject in part the R&R and overrule in part Entsminger's Objection. First, Defendant Roberson was previously dismissed from this action (ECF No. 21 at 20) and should remain dismissed. Second, the Court will not defer ruling on the Motion because Entsminger has not met his burden under Rule 56(d). Third, the Doe Defendants should be dismissed without prejudice because Entsminger failed to identify them by the discovery deadline. Fourth, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion as to Entsminger's legal mail violations claim against Hollman and his Eighth Amendment claim for his fractured wrist because Entsminger has not exhausted his administrative remedies or shown that the remedies were unavailable to him. Fifth, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion as to Entsminger's conspiracy claim because he failed to show that there was a meeting of the minds or agreement by Defendants to violate his constitutional rights. Finally, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion as to Entsminger's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against VanHorn because the claims are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, there is still a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether VanHorn was deliberately indifferent, and VanHorn is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court incorporates by reference and adopts the background Judge Cobb provided in the R&R and does not restate that background here. (ECF No. 311 at 1-5.)
This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party fails to object to a magistrate judge's recommendation, the Court is not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). The Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, Advisory Committee Notes (1983). Where a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, then the Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court's review is thus de novo because Entsminger filed his Objection. (ECF No. 314.)
“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable factfinder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Court first addresses the parts of Entsminger's Objection that it overrules, including the dismissal of Defendant Roberson, the deferral of ruling on the Motion under Rule 56(d), the dismissal of the Doe Defendants (Count I(a) and I(b)), his legal mail violations claim against Defendant Hollman (Count I(b)), his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for his fractured wrists (Count III), and his conspiracy claim (Count V). The Court then addresses the part of Entsminger's Objection that it sustains, which is his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant VanHorn (Count IV). As to the remaining portions of the R&R that Entsminger did not object to, the Court will adopt Judge Cobb's recommendations.
To start, Entsminger objects to Judge Cobb's recommendation that Defendant Roberson should remain dismissed from this action. (ECF Nos. 311 at 20, 314 at 12.) In the R&R, Judge Cobb noted sua sponte that the Attorney General's (“AG”) Office accepted service for Roberson, but she was already dismissed without prejudice from the action in the second screening order. (ECF No. 311 at 2.) Entsminger objected to Judge Cobb's recommendation because there was a footnote in the screening order to add Roberson as a Defendant in this action. (ECF No. 314 at 12.)
Entsminger correctly notes that Roberson was added as a Defendant in the screening order. (Id.) However, Roberson was added for administrative purposes and should have been immediately terminated thereafter because she was dismissed without prejudice from this action by the Court in the very same order. (ECF No. 21 at 20.) Instead, she was erroneously served. (ECF No. 114.) To the extent the Court was not clear before, Roberson should remain dismissed from this action. The Court therefore adopts Judge Cobb's recommendation and overrules Entsminger's Objection as to this issue.
Entsminger objects to Judge Cobb's recommendation that the Court should not defer ruling on Defendants' Motion under Rule 56(d) because Entsminger did not meet his burden under the rule.[2] (ECF Nos. 311 at 7-8, 30, 314 at 13.) Entsminger argues that deferral is proper because discovery is missing, Defendants have withheld evidence, and they have used this lack of evidence against him in their Motion. (ECF Nos. 307 at 10, 314 at 13.).
Entsminger has failed to satisfy his burden under Rule 56(d). Specifically, Entsminger fails to specify what the allegedly missing records may reveal and how those particular facts would help him in his opposition to Defendants' Motion. See Stevens v. Corelogic, 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) () (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court adopts Judge Cobb's recommendation and overrules Entsminger's 56(d) objection.
Entsminger next objects to Judge Cobb's recommendation that the Court dismiss the Doe Defendants in his denial of access to the courts claim (Count I(a)) and his legal mail violations claim (Count I(b)). (ECF No. 314 at 12.) In their Motion Defendants primarily argue that the Court should dismiss the Doe Defendants because Entsminger never revised his second amended complaint (“SAC”) to identify them, as ordered by the Court, and discovery has ended. (ECF No. 278 at 23-24.) In the R&R, Judge Cobb agreed with Defendants, finding that Entsminger never identified the Doe Defendants.[3] (ECF No. 311 at 10, 13.) In his Objection, Entsminger counters that he diligently tried to obtain the Doe Defendants' names, but there were delays by Defendants and they provided him documents with the...
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