Greig v. Metzler

• Decision Date: 17 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 5385-3-II,5385-3-II
• Parties: Gary GREIG, Respondent, v. Lew METZLER, Ray Green, and Alan Engstrom, in their capacity as Civil Service Commissioners; and the Cowlitz County Civil Service Commission; and Les Nelson, Sheriff of Cowlitz County, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 223

33 Wn.App. 223

653 P.2d 1346

Gary GREIG, Respondent, v. Lew METZLER, Ray Green, and Alan Engstrom, in their capacity

as Civil Service Commissioners; and the Cowlitz

County Civil Service Commission; and

Les Nelson, Sheriff of Cowlitz

County, Appellants.

No. 5385-3-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 2.

Nov. 17, 1982.

Henry Dunn, Pros. Atty., Gordon W. Sivley and David R. Koss, Deputy Pros. Attys., Kelso, for appellants.

James E. Warme, Longview, for respondent.

PETRICH, Judge.

The Cowlitz County Civil Service Commission and Cowlitz County Sheriff appeal from a judgment setting aside the Commission's ruling upholding the demotion of respondent Gary Greig from sergeant to deputy. We reverse.

The stipulated findings establish that on May 17, 1976, Greig was appointed sergeant for the Cowlitz County Sheriff's Department, which is a classified position under the Civil Service for Sheriff's Office Act. RCW 41.14.070. On July 1, 1980, Gary Waddell, who had been employed by the Sheriff's Department in an unclassified position, elected to return to his former classified position as sergeant. There were no vacant sergeant positions at that time. To create a position for Waddell, Greig was demoted from sergeant to deputy. It is undisputed that Greig's demotion was undertaken solely to create a position for Waddell and was in no way based upon Greig's performance as sergeant.

Greig's demotion is authorized by the Cowlitz County Civil Service Commission Rule 10.15 which provides that when a person then serving in an unclassified position elects to return to his formerly held classified position, he may do so. If no vacancy exists upon his return, a position shall be created by removing the least senior incumbent from the same position. This rule was promulgated after Greig was appointed sergeant.

Greig timely appealed the demotion to the Cowlitz County Civil Service Commission. Treating the action as reduction in force and demotion, the Commission ruled the demotion was valid and in accordance with applicable statutes and rules. On appeal the trial court reversed concluding that RCW 41.14.290 and Cowlitz County Civil Service Commission Rule 10.15, both enacted after his appointment to sergeant, do not apply to Greig, and that it was not demonstrated that budgetary or other legitimate administrative reasons required Greig's demotion.

The Commission's primary argument on appeal is that the tenure of a civil service worker can be affected by considerations other than misconduct and that Rule 10.15 applies to Greig and authorizes his demotion. It is Greig's position he can only be removed for cause which is limited to misconduct, and that those portions of Rule 10.15 which allow the sheriff to demote him are void as exceeding the Commission's rule-making authority.

We first set out the standard of review to guide us in our resolution. The judiciary's role in reviewing action taken by the Commission is severely limited. RCW 41.14.120 provides that an appeal to the superior court is a summary matter. Review is "confined to the determination of whether the order of removal, suspension, or demotion made by the commission, was or was not made in good faith for cause, and no appeal shall be taken except upon such ground or grounds." The Court of Appeals reviews the same record considered by the trial court and must exercise independent judgment to determine whether the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law. Benavides v. Civil Service Comm'n, 26 Wash.App. 531, 613 P.2d 807 (1980); Eiden v. Snohomish Cy. Civil Service Comm'n, 13 Wash.App. 32, 533 P.2d 426 (1975).

When the trial court reviews an administrative record and does not itself take evidence, findings of fact are not necessary. King Cy. Water Dist. 54 v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wash.2d 536, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976). Although here the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, our review remains that of the record considered by the trial court and not the findings of the superior court. Spokane Cy. Fire Protection Dist. 8 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 27 Wash.App. 491, 618 P.2d 1326 (1980). The record presented to the trial court was scant, consisting of stipulated facts with exhibits including the letter of demotion and the Commission's ruling upholding the demotion with minutes of the meeting at which the decision was made.

The first issue we examine is whether a classified employee employed pursuant to RCW 41.14 can be demoted for reasons other than misconduct. We hold that under RCW 41.14, he can.

The question before us is primarily one of statutory construction of the Civil Service for Sheriff's Office Act, RCW 41.14. Certain established principles of statutory construction apply. First, RCW 41.14 must be construed as a whole and effect given to all the language used. All of the sections of the Act must be "considered in their relation to each other and, if possible, harmonized to insure proper construction of each provision." Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wash.2d 321, 326, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977). Second "[c]onsiderable judicial deference is given to the construction of legislation by those charged with its enforcement." Keller v. Bellingham, 92 Wash.2d 726, 731, 600 P.2d 1276 (1979); State ex rel. Swartout v. Civil Service Comm'n, 25 Wash.App. 174, 605 P.2d 796, review denied, 93 Wash.2d 1021, cert. denied 449 U.S. 992, 66 L.Ed.2d 288, 101 S.Ct. 527 (1980). With these precepts in mind we examine the statutory scheme.

RCW 41.14.120 provides that no permanent employee in a classified civil service position can be removed, suspended, or demoted, except for cause upon written accusation. "Cause" is not defined in the Act. Reasons for demotion and other action relating to misconduct are set forth in RCW 41.14.110 which provides in part:

Tenure--Grounds for deprivation. The tenure of every person holding an office, place, position, or employment under the provisions of this chapter shall be only during good behavior, and any such person may be removed or discharged, suspended without pay, demoted, or reduced in rank, or deprived of vacation privileges or other special privileges for any of the following reasons: ...

The statute lists seven reasons limited to malfeasance and misfeasance. It does not suggest that budgetary or other administrative reasons may provide a basis for demoting an employee. But, reading RCW 41.14 as a whole, it is clear that misconduct is not the only basis upon which one may be demoted. That budgetary or other administrative reasons may provide a basis for demotion is evidenced by RCW 41.14.060 which provides in relevant part:

It shall be the duty of the civil service commission: (1) To make suitable rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such rules and regulations shall provide in detail the manner in which examinations may be held, and appointments, promotions, reallocations, transfers, reinstatements, demotions, suspensions, and discharges shall be made, and may also provide for any other matters connected with the general subject of personnel administration, and which may be considered desirable to further carry out the general purposes of this chapter, or which may be found to be in the interest of good personnel administration.... (Italics ours.)

* * *

(6) To provide for, formulate, and hold competitive tests to determine the relative qualifications of persons who seek employment in any class or position and as a result thereof establish eligible lists for the various classes of positions, and provide that persons laid off, or who have accepted voluntary demotion in lieu of layoff, because of curtailment of expenditures, reduction in force, and for like causes, head the list in the order of their seniority, to the end that they shall be the first to be reemployed or reinstated in their former job class.

Contrary to the respondent's position, the Act clearly contemplates that the tenure of an employee may be affected by reasons other than those listed in RCW 41.14.110. We hold that in...