Greiger v. Pye

• Decision Date: 04 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 32724.,32724.
• Citation: 210 Minn. 71,297 N.W. 173
• Parties: GREIGER et al. v. PYE et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

297 N.W. 173

210 Minn. 71

GREIGER et al. v. PYE et al.

No. 32724.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 4, 1941.

Appeal from District Court, Rice County; A. B. Gislason, Judge.

Action by Norbert A. Greiger and others against William W. Pye and another to determine adverse claims to realty. The named defendant's motion for amended findings or new trial was denied, and he appeals.

Order affirmed.

William W. Pye, of Northfield, pro se.

Kopple Hallock, of Faribault, and Moonan & Moonan, of Waseca, for respondents.

JULIUS J. OLSON, Justice.

In an action to determine adverse claims to certain real estate in Rice county, the court made findings that plaintiffs and defendant Pye are the owners in fee of the property, an undivided one-half belonging to plaintiffs, the remaining half to Mr. Pye. Pye's blended motion for amended findings or new trial was denied, and he appeals.

The facts may be thus summarized: In October, 1934, Pye recovered a personal judgment against his codefendant, Amanda L. Greiger, for some $3,000, duly entered and docketed in that county. On March 26, 1938, Wilhelmine Sprain and defendant Amanda L. Greiger became the owners of the premises here in question as joint tenants, subject to the life estate of Wilhelmine, who had come into such estate theretofore as the surviving spouse of the original owner. On April 6, Mrs. Greiger and husband conveyed all interests in the property to Wilhelmine. On the next day, Wilhelmine conveyed the property to plaintiffs, subject only to her life estate. All these conveyances, said the court, "appear to have been made in good faith and for a valuable consideration." Next, on May 7 (as found by the court) or April 29 (as shown by the death certificate), Wilhelmine Sprain died, thus eliminating her life estate. On March 30, while Pye's judgment was in full force and effect, an execution was issued thereon resulting in an execution sale on July 2 to Mr. Pye. No redemption was made.

Mr. Pye's position is thus stated "Under the statute defendant's [Pye's] judgment became a lien on all the right, title, and interest in the real estate and this included a potential right to an estate in fee if Mrs. Greiger survived her co-tenant. At the time of the execution sale, due to Mrs. Sprain's death, this potential right had become an absolute fee title."

Therefore, so it is said, his title is one in fee of the whole thereof.

The court was of opinion, as stated in its memorandum, that "the judgment against the joint tenant binds the transferee to the extent of the interest conveyed by such judgment debtor. Before the conveyance by Mrs. Greiger, the rights of the joint tenants in the remainder were equal and reciprocal. By her conveyance the joint estate was severed, so her conveyance was in effect a conveyance by a tenant in common of a one-half interest in the remainder and subject only to the life estate of Mrs. Sprain, who died a month later thereby wiping out the life estate. By the execution sale, the defendant Pye became the owner of the one-half interest so conveyed by Mrs. Greiger to her mother. Pye ever since has been the owner of that undivided half interest and no more. I cannot understand on what theory the defendant can claim that Mrs. Greiger retained any right or interest in the premises after her conveyance to her mother. The right of a joint tenant to transfer his interest in an estate is, I think, unquestioned."

The correctness of that view is the problem presented here.

1. That the general rule is as stated by the court cannot be doubted. It is thus stated in Annotation, 129 A.L.R. 814, Joint Tenancy, II, Conveyance: "The courts are virtually unanimous in agreeing that a joint tenant may, at his pleasure, dispose of his share and convey it to a stranger, and that such conveyance will result in a severance or termination of the joint tenancy."

The cases are there cited and many of them annotated, so citation need not be repeated here. The rule is also stated in 33 C.J., Joint Tenancy, p. 907, [§ 10] F, and cases cited, and 3 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed., § 4952. That was also the view we adopted and applied in Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130, 280 N.W. 183, where (under subdivision 3 of the opinion, 203 Minn. 133 to 136, 280 N.W. 184-186) the problem was discussed and determined. There the trial court had found (203 Minn. 132, 280 N.W. 184) "that the parties intended to create a joint tenancy but that through mistake the plaintiff * * * conveyed an undivided one-half of the property so as to make the parties tenants in common instead of joint tenants." We said, as the reason for holding the trial court in error (Id., 203 Minn. 135-136, 280 N.W. 185):

"A joint tenancy was not only inappropriate to effect but would have defeated the intention of the parties by granting a vested estate in praesenti instead of a contingent estate in futuro, and by incidents thereof which would have enabled Miss Tillman [the grantee] to defeat the survivorship. Any one of the [joint] tenants can destroy the other's right of survivorship by conveyance to a third person. * * * `In general it is advantageous for the joint-tenants to dissolve the jointure * * *.' Plaintiff did not intend to place it in the power of Miss Tillman to defeat the survivorship and change the nature of the estate granted. Where the intention of the parties is to create an estate by survivorship at all events, a joint tenancy does not effectuate that intention. * * *

"Since the only intention of...