Greiman v. Hodges

• Decision Date: 15 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 4:13–cv–510.,4:13–cv–510.
• Citation: 79 F.Supp.3d 933
• Parties: Blair J. GREIMAN, Plaintiff, v. John HODGES, in his official capacity as Chair of the Iowa Board of Parole; the Iowa Board of Parole; John R. Baldwin, in his official capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections; and the Iowa Department of Corrections, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

79 F.Supp.3d 933

Blair J. GREIMAN, Plaintiff

v.John HODGES, in his official capacity as Chair of the Iowa Board of Parole; the Iowa Board of Parole; John R. Baldwin, in his official capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Corrections; and the Iowa Department of Corrections, jointly and severally, Defendants.

No. 4:13–cv–510.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed Jan. 15, 2015.

John B. Whiston, College of Law, Iowa City, IA, for Plaintiff.

William A. Hill, John R. Lundquist, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Iowa Board of Parole (“IBOP”), John Hodges, in his official capacity as Chair of the IBOP, the Iowa Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), and John R. Baldwin, in his official capacity as Director of the IDOC (collectively “Defendants”). Clerk's No. 2. Blair J. Greiman (“Plaintiff”) filed a resistance to the Motion. Clerk's No. 7. Defendants did not file a reply. The Court held a hearing on the matter (Clerk's No. 15) and it is now fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1982, a jury convicted Plaintiff of first degree kidnapping, a Class A felony, in violation of Iowa Code §§ 710.1(3) and 710.2. See Pet. (Clerk's No. 1–1) ¶ 11. At the time of the offense, Plaintiff was sixteen years old. Id. On October 4, 1982, Plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, which at the time was the mandatory sentence for all persons convicted of Class A felonies. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Iowa Code § 902.1 ).

On May 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the “Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ; Pet. ¶ 13. Specifically, the Court held that while a “State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to such an offender,” it nonetheless “must impose a sentence that provides some meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”Graham, 560 U.S. at 50, 130 S.Ct. 2011 ; Pet. ¶ 14. On October 15, 2010, relying on Graham, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence in the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County. Pet. ¶ 17. In December 2010, the Iowa Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Graham, Iowa Code § 902.1 was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles to the extent it mandated life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide Class A felonies. Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–02 (2010) ; Pet. ¶ 15. In July 2011, the Iowa legislature amended § 902.1 to provide that a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment for a Class A felony shall be eligible for parole after serving a minimum of twenty-five years confinement. Iowa Code § 902.1 ; Pet. ¶ 16. On February 20, 2012, a state judge of the second judicial district determined that Plaintiff's sentence of life without parole for a nonhomicide offense was unconstitutional under both federal and Iowa law. Id. ¶ 18. The judge granted Plaintiff's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, vacated Plaintiff's sentence of life without parole, and resentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. Id.

Because Plaintiff had already spent more than twenty-five years in custody, he was eligible for parole immediately upon his resentencing. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. On June 26, 2012, the IBOP reviewed Plaintiff's case and denied parole, concluding that “[i]n view of the seriousness of the crime for which you were convicted, the Board believes that a parole at this time would not be in the best interest of society.” Id. ¶ 21. In September 2012, Plaintiff was again considered for parole and was again denied on the same basis. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff appealed the September 2012 denial of parole, but his appeal was denied. Id. ¶ 22.

Plaintiff contends that the IBOP failed to provide him a “meaningful opportunity for parole” when the IBOP summarily denied him parole based solely on the seriousness of his offense and failed entirely to “take into account [Plaintiff's] youth and demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation as required under the new constitutional and statutory mandates.” Id. ¶¶ 20, 23–25. Plaintiff also complains that the IDOC has a policy that requires him to take sex offender classes before he can be released on parole, but only permits inmates with less than two years before discharge to take such classes. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Thus, since Plaintiff does not have a defined discharge date, he has been denied permission to enroll in sex offender classes, and in turn, cannot fulfill the necessary steps to obtain parole. Id. ¶ 29–31 (“Mr. Greiman, who has a life sentence with eligibility for parole, is effectively placed [by virtue of not being eligible for sex offender classes] in the same situation as he was previously—a juvenile offender serving life sentences without eligibility for parole.”).

Plaintiff filed a Petition against Defendants in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Iowa on November 22, 2013, asserting that Defendants' actions deprived him of due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions. See generally Pet. Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) issue a declaratory judgment that Defendants' actions violate the Federal and Iowa Constitutions; (2) order the IDOC to provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity for parole by permitting him to take sex offender classes to become parole eligible; (3) order the IBOP to provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity for parole by requiring it to consider in its parole decision Plaintiff's youth at the time of the offense and his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation; (4) order the IBOP to provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity for parole by requiring it to develop and implement policies that appropriately take into account in parole decisions youth at the time of offense and demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation; (5) order the IBOP to recognize distinctions between children and adults that have been identified by case law as relevant to parole determinations; (6) retain jurisdiction over the case until all unconstitutional practices and polices have been remedied; (7) award Plaintiff costs and fees; and (8) order such further relief as the Court deems proper.Id. at 9–10. Defendants timely removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa on December 23, 2013. Clerk's No. 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing a complaint, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” and must draw “all reasonable inferences ... in favor of the plaintiff.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

A viable complaint must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a ‘sheer possibility.’ It is not, however, a ‘probability requirement.’ ” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

The Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, described a “two-pronged approach” for evaluating complaints challenged under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. First, a court should divide the allegations between factual and legal allegations; factual allegations should be accepted as true, but legal allegations should be disregarded. Id. Second, the factual allegations must be parsed for facial plausibility. Id.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ”

Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

The “parsing” process requires careful examination of the plaintiff's allegations, however, “the complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Braden, 588 F.3d at 594. Indeed, “[r]equiring a plaintiff to rule out every possible lawful explanation for the conduct he challenges would invert the principle that the complaint is construed most favorably to the nonmoving party, and would impose the sort of probability requirement at the pleading stage which Iqbal and Twombly explicitly reject.” Id. at 597 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A court will “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” when determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, the Court may consider other, more likely explanations for the acts described in the complaint when determining whether the pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937....