Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut

• Decision Date: 16 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-232,93-232
• Citation: 857 P.2d 730,260 Mont. 60
• Parties: Samuel J. GRENZ, Petitioner and Appellant, v. FIRE AND CASUALTY OF CONNECTICUT, Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 730

857 P.2d 730

260 Mont. 60

Samuel J. GRENZ, Petitioner and Appellant, v. FIRE AND CASUALTY OF CONNECTICUT, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 93-232.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 5, 1993.

Decided Aug. 17, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1993.

[260 Mont. 61] Samuel J. Grenz, Pro Se.

Terry Spear, Matovich, Addy & Keller, P.C., Billings, for respondent and respondent.

GRAY, Justice.

Claimant Samuel Grenz appeals from an order of the Workers' Compensation Court dismissing his petition for workers' compensation benefits. We affirm.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in concluding that the one-year statute of limitations barred Grenz' workers' compensation claim for disabilities allegedly resulting from a series of microtraumas.

In 1984, Samuel Grenz injured his right elbow while working for the American Stud Company (American Stud) in Flathead County, Montana. He continued his employment with American Stud until 1985. American Stud's insurer, Fire and Casualty of Connecticut (F & C), paid disability and medical benefits for the bumped elbow until 1991.

With the 1984 injury began a seemingly endless stream of litigation that has resulted in multiple appeals to this Court and innumerable proceedings in the Workers' Compensation Court. For purposes of this opinion, we need address only the recent procedural and factual history of this case.

In 1991, this Court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Court's determination that Grenz was not permanently totally disabled as a result of his 1984 elbow injury. Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut (1991), 250 Mont. 373, 380, 820 P.2d 742, 746 (hereafter Grenz I, although it was not, in fact, the first Grenz appeal). We concluded that Grenz had failed to prove the causal connection between his degenerative arthritis and the 1984 elbow injury. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746.

In Grenz I, Grenz also attempted to argue on appeal that his degenerative arthritis was caused by a series of "microtraumas" associated with the heavy lifting, jarring, and vibrations of the machinery at his employment; these microtraumas, he asserted, were suffered subsequent to and separately from his 1984 elbow injury. We refused to consider this argument as Grenz had not raised in it the Workers' Compensation Court. To the contrary, Grenz had steadfastly maintained that the 1984 elbow injury was his only basis for compensation. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746.

Following Grenz I, Grenz filed a new claim for workers' compensation benefits, asserting that his arthritis was caused by microtraumas, separate and apart from, and subsequent to, the 1984 elbow injury. F & C moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Grenz' claim was barred by res judicata or, alternatively, by the one-year statute of limitations of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Workers' Compensation Court granted F & C's motion on the basis of res judicata. Grenz appealed.

In Grenz v. Fire and Cas. of Connecticut (1992), 255 Mont. 121, 124, 841 P.2d 494, 496 (Grenz II ), we reversed the Workers' Compensation Court's determination that his microtrauma claim was barred by res judicata, and remanded with limiting instructions:

Reversed and remanded with instructions to the Workers' Compensation Court to proceed to a determination of the insurer's alternative basis for its motion to dismiss, namely, that Grenz's latest claims are time barred.

On remand, the hearing examiner determined that Grenz had not filed his new claim within one year after he had stopped working for American Stud in 1985 and, therefore, he had not complied with § 39-71-601, MCA (1983). Thus, the hearing examiner ordered the dismissal of Grenz' new claim. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted the hearing examiner's order on April 21, 1993. Grenz appeals.

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that the one-year statute of limitations barred Grenz' workers' compensation claim for disabilities allegedly caused by a series of microtraumas?

Grenz raises several interrelated challenges to the Workers' Compensation Court's application of the statute of limitations. In reviewing conclusions of law of the Workers' Compensation Court, we determine if the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 745; Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603.

The statute of limitations which governs this issue provides as follows:

(1) In case of personal injury or death, all claims shall be forever barred unless presented in writing to the employer, the insurer or the division, as the case may be, within 12 months from the date of the happening of the accident, either by the claimant or someone legally authorized to act for him in his behalf.

....

Section 39-71-601, MCA (1983). The statute unequivocally requires that claims be presented in writing within twelve months of the accident. Grenz concedes that his microtrauma "accidents" occurred during his period of employment with American Stud, employment which ended in 1985. He did not file his claim for benefits until 1992. Thus, it is undisputed that Grenz failed to comply with the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act's statute of limitations. We turn, therefore, to his various arguments against the application of § 39-71-601, MCA (1983), to his situation.

REPORTING OF ARTHRITIS TO EMPLOYER

Grenz first claims that he reported his work-related microtrauma injuries to his employer within the statutory period. He asserts that he reported pain in his other joints to his treating physician in 1984, who, in a note to Grenz' employer, recommended that Grenz perform lighter work because of his degenerative arthritis. Grenz points to two other situations in which he claims he informed his employer that he was suffering from arthritis or that his work was aggravating his degenerative condition.

Grenz' actions do not satisfy the requirements of the statute of limitations. Section 39-71-601, MCA, requires the claimant to present the claim in writing within the one-year time period; nowhere does Grenz allege that he completed any type of paperwork concerning this independent injury until 1992.

Second, during the time in question, Grenz steadfastly maintained that his arthritis was caused by, and derivative from, his elbow injury of August 1984. Indeed, in Grenz' statement of facts to this Court, he states that "the different way he performed his work in order to compensate for the bumped elbow may have been the cause of these other joint problems." In Grenz I, we quoted from Grenz' trial testimony in which he stated:

"Q. Your injury occurred in 1984?

"A. Right.

"Q. That's the only industrial injury you claim; is that right?

"A. Right ..."

Grenz I, 820 P.2d at 746. Therefore, although Grenz may have "informed" his employer that he was suffering from arthritis within the one-year period, he does not point to any evidence by which he informed his employer that he was suffering from arthritis caused by microtrauma injuries separate and apart from the elbow injury. He continuously maintained that the bumped elbow was the source of his arthritis.

The requirements of § 39-71-601, MCA, are mandatory, and compliance with the time limits is essential to the action. Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co. (1985), 215 Mont. 309, 315-16, 697 P.2d 909, 913. We conclude that Grenz did not satisfy § 39-71-601, MCA (1983), by informing his employer that he was suffering from degenerative arthritis caused by microtrauma injuries separate from and subsequent to his right elbow injury.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

Grenz next argues that F & C should be equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations, citing Scott v. Utility Line Contractors (1987), 226 Mont. 154, 734 P.2d 206, and Weigland v. Anderson-Meyer Drilling Co. (1988), 232 Mont. 390, 758 P.2d 260. Scott and Weigland are inapplicable to the case before us.

In both cases, the claimant failed to present his claim within the one-year statutory period but assisted the employer in preparing the Employer's First Report within the time period. Scott, 734 P.2d at 208; Weigland, 758 P.2d at 262. We concluded in both cases that the Employer's First Report contained ample information to inform the employers of the nature and basis of the workers' potential...