Gress Lumber Co v. Coody

• Decision Date: 23 April 1894
• Citation: 94 Ga. 519,21 S.E. 217
• Parties: GRESS LUMBER CO. v. COODY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

21 S.E. 217

94 Ga. 519

GRESS LUMBER CO.

v.COODY.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 23, 1894.

Deeds—Sufficiency of Description — Trespass —Evidence.

1. A deed which conveys 134 acres on the north side of a lot of land, described by its num-ber, district, and county, the lot being by statute a square, is sufficiently certain to embrace such a parallelogram as would result from drawing a line across the lot, parallel with its northern boundary, so as to cut off 134 acres.

2. A lease which specifies that it is to embrace as many as 50 lots of land within certain described boundaries may be applied by parol evidence to particular lots within those boundaries, notwithstanding the boundaries may comprehend more than 50 lots; the assignee of the lessee having entered under the lease upon the premises now in controversy, and the lessor, so far at appears, not contesting his right so to enter.

3. Deeds and other writings applicable to the matter in issue, and broad enough in their terms to comprehend the premises in dispute, though not describing them specifically, were admissible in evidence in connection with the parol testimony offered therewith.

4. Had the defendant proved that the plaintiff's predecessor in title had, before the plaintiff purchased, sold and conveyed the timber upon the premises, the plaintiff's knowledge of the fact at that time would have been relevant testimony; but for lack of this preliminary evidence it was irrelevant when offered.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Dodge county; C. C. Smith, Judge.

Action in trespass by S. B. Coody against the Gress Lumber Company. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

The following is the official report:

Coody sued the Gress Lumber Company in an action for trespass alleged to have been committed from December 1, 1886, to August 2, 1887, the date of bringing suit, by cutting and carrying away the pine timber on 134 acres of lot of land 174 in the Twentieth district of Dodge county. Verdict and judgment for $268 in favor of the plaintiff were rendered on January 10. 1893, and the defendant excepted to rulings of the court at the trial.

Plaintiff introduced a deed to himself from Elijah Jones, dated December 4, 1885, and recorded in the same month, for "one hundred and thirty-four acres of land on the north side of lot number one hundred and seventy-four." Defendant objected, on the ground that this description was insufficient, but the objection was overruled. Plaintiff testified: "I went in possession of the land mentioned in the deed before I bought it. Was in possession under this deed. Put a clearing on it. Also a barn and dwelling, in January, 1886. Had ten or twelve acres cleared in spring of 1886. Moved on it in October, 1886. Had tenant in possession after February, 1886. Gress cut the timber in December, 1886. Began after Chirstmas, and finished about the time this suit was brought. The timber they cut on my 134 acres was worth $300, and I was damaged that much by their cutting it. They cut it without my consent. I bought it specially for the timber. No one else on the land. I was in possession when Gress cut the timber. I notified the hands, and afterwards Gress, not to cut it, but they did so. I notified them to stop." Handley swore that he knew the land and timber on the 134 acres claimed by plaintiff on lot 174, and the timber defendant cut and carried therefrom was worth from $250 to $275. Defendant moved for a nonsuit, and the motion was overruled.

Defendant offered in evidence a lease contract between McAuthur & Griffin and A. B. Steele & Co., dated September 20, 1881, reciting that McAuthur & Griffin, in consideration of $400 per lot for all timber suitable for the manufacture...