Gressman v. State

• Citation: 745 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,323 P.3d 998
• Decision Date: 18 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20110965.,20110965.
• Parties: Jed A. GRESSMAN, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

323 P.3d 998

745 Utah Adv. Rep. 24

Jed A. GRESSMAN, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20110965.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 18, 2013.

Douglas G. Mortensen, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

John E. Swallow, Att'y Gen., Nancy L. Kemp, Patrick B. Nolan, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant.

INTRODUCTION

Justice DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 The State appeals from the district court's order posthumously declaring Jed Gressman factually innocent of the crimes he was convicted of in 1993 and awarding his widow financial assistance payments under the Post–Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). The State argues the district court erred by (1) finding that Mr. Gressman's claims under the PCRA survived his death; (2) determining Mr. Gressman to be factually innocent as a matter of law based on the prior vacatur of his conviction; and (3) awarding prejudgment interest on the financial assistance payments.

¶ 2 We find that Mr. Gressman's PCRA claims did not abate upon his death and that the district court properly substituted his widow as the plaintiff in this suit. The district court erred, however, when it found that the vacatur of Mr. Gressman's conviction conclusively established his factual innocence, as defined by the PCRA. Finally, we hold that the version of the PCRA relevant to this case does not permit the district court to award prejudgment interest. We therefore reverse for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Mr. Gressman was accused of rape and aggravated sexual assault after he and his co-defendant, Troy Hancock, offered a woman a ride in Mr. Hancock's truck. The woman claimed that during this ride, Mr. Gressman and Mr. Hancock began to fondle her, over her protests, and that they ultimately forced her out of the truck at a secluded location, where Mr. Gressman raped her, aided by Mr. Hancock. At trial, the State presented the testimony of the alleged victim and a DNA expert, who testified that DNA testing of semen recovered from the alleged victim could not exclude Mr. Gressman as the source of the semen.

¶ 4 Mr. Gressman was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a term of five years to life. In 1996, after Mr. Gressman had served thirty-nine months of that sentence, he and the Juab County Attorney jointly moved the district court to dismiss all charges against him based on newly-discovered evidence. Most importantly, more advanced DNA testing established that semen recovered from the victim did not come from Mr. Gressman. Reasoning that this newly-discovered evidence would have materially influenced the jury's deliberations, the district court vacated Mr. Gressman's conviction and granted him a new trial. The State chose not to file new charges against Mr. Gressman, and no trial occurred.

¶ 5 In 2009, Mr. Gressman filed suit under the PCRA, seeking to establish his factual innocence and obtain financial assistance payments under that statute. Mr. Gressman died during the pendency of the suit, so counsel moved to substitute his widow. The State moved to dismiss, claiming that Mr. Gressman's claims abated upon his death. Ultimately, both sides moved for summary judgment on Mr. Gressman's factual innocence petition. The district court, in a single order, granted the motion to substitute Mr. Gressman's widow, denied the State's motion to dismiss, denied the State's motion for summary judgment, and granted Mr. Gressman's widow's motion for summary judgment. This latter decision was premised on the notion that Mr. Gressman's factual innocence had already been determined when his conviction was vacated. After so ruling, the district court awarded Mr. Gressman's widow PCRA assistance payments—including prejudgment interest. The State appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 The appellate briefing raises two issues of statutory interpretation: (1) whether Mr. Gressman's claims survive his death and (2) whether the district court properly awarded prejudgment interest on the assistance payments it awarded. Because the answer to both of these questions turns upon our interpretation of the PCRA and Utah's survival statute, we afford no deference to the district court. See Vorher v. Henriod, 2013 UT 10, ¶ 6, 297 P.3d 614 (The interpretation of a statute is a legal question reviewed de novo.). We likewise review de novo the district court's summary adjudication of Mr. Gressman's factual innocence. See Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 1059 (“We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness....” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

ANALYSIS

I. MR. GRESSMAN'S PCRA CLAIMS SURVIVED HIS DEATH

A. Mr. Gressman's Claims Would Abate Under the Common Law

¶ 7 At common law, personal tort actions abate upon the death of either the claimant or the tortfeasor, while tort claims for property damage or conversion survive. Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, 781–82 (1943); see Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 796, 796 (Utah Terr.1890) (“In the case of injuries to the person, whether by assault, battery, false imprisonment, slander, or otherwise, if either party who received or committed the injury die, no action can be supported either by or against the executors, or other personal representatives.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The rationale for this distinction is

that the reason for redressing purely personal wrongs ceases to exist either when the person injured cannot be benefited by a recovery or the person inflicting the injury cannot be punished, whereas, since the property or estate of the injured person passes to his personal representatives, a cause of action for injury done to these can achieve its purpose as well after the death of the owner as before.

Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchs. Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir.1942).

¶ 8 Mr. Gressman's statutory claim for compensation upon a showing of factual innocence is not a claim for injury to property that would survive a claimant's death at common law. None of the injuries associated with imprisonment of a factually innocent person are in any way associated with the kinds of property claims that survived a claimant's death at common law. Such claims typically involved damage to or destruction of tangible personal property. See, e.g., Morrison, 140 P.2d at 782 (holding that an action for recovery of damages to an automobile caused by a collision survived death).

¶ 9 A factual innocence claim, rather, is essentially a claim for injury to the person, which abated at common law. The closest analogues at common law appear to be claims for false imprisonment and for malicious prosecution, both of which were subject to abatement. See Mason, 24 P. at 796 (false imprisonment does not survive death); State ex rel. Crow v. Weygandt, 170 Ohio St. 81, 162 N.E.2d 845, 848 (1959) (“A cause of action for malicious prosecution did not survive the death of its owner at common law.”) These claims are comparable to a factual innocence claim in the nature of the harm (false imprisonment) and the wrong (malicious prosecution) they vindicate. And they were both personal claims that abated at death under the common law.

¶ 10 Because Mr. Gressman's claims would abate upon his death under the common law, his suit may only survive under the aegis of a statutory provision. We therefore examine whether the PCRA or Utah's general survival statute operate to preserve Mr. Gressman's claims.

B. The Relevant Version of the PCRA does not Provide for the Survival of Mr. Gressman's Claims

¶ 11 When a cause of action is created by statute, we look first to that statute for an indication of survival or abatement. The survivability of the factual innocence claim under the PCRA implicates two subsidiary questions. First is which version of the PCRA applies—the 2012 amendment, which speaks explicitly to survivability,¹ or the prior version of the statute, which does not. Second is the proper construction of the statute—whether it can be read to provide for survivability or whether it preserves the common-law rule of abatement.

1. The Preamendment Version of the PCRA Applies

¶ 12 The Utah Code articulates a general presumption against retroactivity. Utah Code § 68–3–3. By statute, “ ‘a provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly declared to be retroactive.’ ” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 11, 251 P.3d 829 (quoting Utah Code § 68–3–3). In this case, there is no expression of retroactivity in the 2012 amendments, and no other basis for applying the amended provisions exists. Accordingly, we find the preamendment version of the statute controls.

¶ 13 Under our case law, “the parties' substantive rights and liabilities are determined by the law in place at the time when a cause of action arises,” while their procedural rights and responsibilities are governed by “the law in effect at the time of the procedural act” at issue. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if survivability is a matter of substance, then that question is governed by the law in place when Mr. Gressman's claim arose. If it is a procedural matter, on the other hand, then subsequent enactments (like the 2012 amendments) could be deemed to apply.

¶ 14 We view the 2012 amendments in question as clearly substantive. The amended provisions foreclose postjudgment interest for financial assistance payments and cut off such payments altogether after the death of the defendant-petitioner. SeeUtah Code §§ 78B–9–402(14), –405(8) (2012). They accordingly “enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights” and do not merely dictate “the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.” Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore hold that Mr. Gressman's petition is governed by the...