Gretillat v. Care Initiatives

• Decision Date: 30 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-1738.,06-1738.
• Citation: 481 F.3d 649
• Parties: Connie M. GRETILLAT, Appellant, v. CARE INITIATIVES, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

481 F.3d 649

Connie M. GRETILLAT, Appellant, v. CARE INITIATIVES, Appellee.

No. 06-1738.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 19, 2006.

Filed: March 30, 2007.

Timothy M. Sweet, argued, Reinbeck, IA (Sara A. Nelson, on the brief), for appellant.

Michael R. Reck, argued, Des Moines, IA (James R. Swanger, Tricia A. Johnston, and Christopher McDonald, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Connie Gretillat alleged that her employer, Care Initiatives, forced her to retire or be terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). The district court¹ granted summary judgment to Care Initiatives, holding that Gretillat was not disabled under the ADA and therefore not entitled to its statutory protection. Gretillat appeals, arguing that not only was she disabled, but that she was otherwise qualified for the job as long as she was provided reasonable accommodations for her disability and that Care Initiatives knew of her disability and forced her to depart because of it. We affirm.

I.

Gretillat started working as a Dietary Services Manager for the Valley View nursing home in 1990. Care Initiatives operated the nursing home. In 1993, Care Initiatives issued a job description for her position, which Gretillat signed. Essential functions of the Dietary Service Manager, as enumerated in the job description, included performing "any food service task necessary [for the] provision of meals according to schedule and standards of practice" and "[covering] for absent staff if unable to find a replacement." The document also specified stooping, kneeling crouching, and crawling as physical activities associated with the job.²

Gretillat covered full shifts as a cook through the mid-1990s because the leanly staffed kitchen could not otherwise prepare necessary meals. When Valley View's resident population increased, more cooks were hired. From that point on, Gretillat covered two—to three-hour kitchen shifts only on occasion. Sometime in 1999, Gretillat began experiencing severe pain in her right knee which was later diagnosed as osteoarthritis. At that time, her supervisor, Monte Priske, observed Gretillat having trouble walking long distances. He thereafter excused her from making rounds of the facility—a task not considered an "essential function."

Gretillat underwent knee-replacement surgery in September 2003. In November 2003, Gretillat's physician, Dr. Margaret Fehrle, released Gretillat to return to work. The restrictions form completed by Dr. Fehrle and given to Care Initiatives indicated that Gretillat was released without restriction.³

As the nursing home population decreased, Care Initiatives likewise had a reduced need for dietary care planning services. Instead of cutting her staff's hours, Gretillat reduced her own hours. At some point after her surgery, Gretillat asked Priske for additional dietary care planning hours. Priske indicated that because of the declining resident population no additional dietary care planning work was required, and that if Gretillat intended to return to full-time hours, she would have to work in the kitchen. In December 2003, after receiving a request for a restriction from Gretillat, Dr. Fehrle faxed to Care Initiatives a new form restricting Gretillat from standing on her right knee for more than an hour without rest. All other restrictions on this updated form remained unchecked.

Gretillat was seen by Dr. Fehrle on February 17, 2004. After examining Gretillat's right knee, Dr. Fehrle concluded that she was doing well and could return to work and "do whatever she wishes." That same day, Gretillat covered for absent staff in the kitchen. After working for three-and-a-half hours of a four-hour shift, Gretillat was unable to walk, was limping, and was experiencing a good deal of pain. She declared that she "[couldn't] take it anymore" and that she was unable to work the full kitchen shift. Priske then asked Gretillat to participate in a fitness-for-duty examination (FFD).

Wendy Paca, a nurse practitioner, conducted the FFD examination. Paca asked Gretillat to squat, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but Gretillat refused to cooperate. Paca's FFD report stated that Gretillat would not attempt the requested tasks, cited Gretillat as having said that attempting the tasks would be contraindicated given the recency of her knee surgery, and conveyed Gretillat's contention that she could not complete the tasks on that day even were she to try.

After having had an opportunity to review Paca's report, Priske told Gretillat that she would be expected to work in the kitchen two to three days a week. Since Gretillat could not do this, Priske allowed her to choose between termination and resignation. Gretillat resigned effective March 26, 2004.

Thereafter, Gretillat brought this action, alleging that by requiring her to perform full kitchen shifts, Care Initiatives removed a reasonable accommodation previously provided to her and thereby discriminated against her because of her disability. In granting Care Initiatives' motion for summary judgment, the district court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that as a matter of law Gretillat could not succeed in her claims because she was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir.2003). In so doing, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and we will affirm if the record indicates no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Gretillat's claim alleges disability discrimination under the ADA and ICRA. Where, as here, the parties do not dispute the application of federal analysis, disability claims under the ICRA are generally analyzed in accord with the ADA. See McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Iowa 2005); see also Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 842 n. 2 (8th Cir.2005); Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 n. 3 (8th Cir.2005).

The ADA prohibits employer "discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). The core of every ADA disability definition involves a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006); see also Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 843 (defining disability). A "physical impairment" includes "any physiological disorder or condition [affecting the] musculoskeletal [body system]." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2005). The condition affecting Gretillat's right knee qualifies as "physical impairment" a under the ADA.

The terms "major life activities" and "substantial limitation" must be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled . . . ." Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002); accord Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm., 370 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2004). Major life activities include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006). More generally, they include "activities that are of central importance to daily life." Williams, 534 U.S. at 197, 122 S.Ct. 681. A court should consider the nature, severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impairment when deciding whether that impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Wood, 339 F.3d at 685 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2002) and Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1088 (8th Cir.2001)). The impairment must be of an extended or permanent duration, Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, and should be considered substantially limiting only if "an individual is `[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which . . . the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.'" Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir.2002) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Furthermore, merely demonstrating that an impairment prevents one from performing job functions in the absence of accommodations does not suffice to demonstrate a disability. Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 842.

A. Limitations Known to Care Initiatives

The district court considered only the walking and standing limitations of which Care Initiatives had knowledge. Walking and standing are major life activities. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir.1999); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 912-13 (8th Cir.1999); Williams, 534 U.S. at 195, 122 S.Ct. 681. Nevertheless, nothing presented by Gretillat concerning her walking and standing limitations suggests to us that she was substantially limited in these activities. We find, as did the district court, our analysis in Wood instructive for the present case. The plaintiff in Wood similarly alleged walking and standing limitations: he could walk no more than a quarter of a mile without rest, frequently made use of a cane, experienced numbness in his left leg and foot, and suffered from a leg that would occasionally collapse beneath him. Wood, 339 F.3d at 685. With respect to the severity of his walking limitation, we acknowledged Williams's heightened standard in addition to our own precedent and "categorize[d] Wood's walking limitations as moderate, not substantial, for ADA purposes." I...