Grey v. Jaddou

• Docket Number: 9:18-cv-01764-DCN
• Decision Date: 29 August 2023
• Parties: FABIAN GREY, Plaintiff, v. UR JADDOU, Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and UNITED STATES CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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FABIAN GREY, Plaintiff,
v.
UR JADDOU, Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and UNITED STATES CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendants.

No. 9:18-cv-01764-DCN

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division

August 29, 2023

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following matter is before the court on plaintiff Fabian Grey's (“Grey”) motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 104, and defendants Ur Jaddou and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' (“USCIS”) (together, “defendants”) motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 105. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' motion and denies Grey's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of Grey's application for naturalization. Grey is a Jamaican citizen who first entered the United States on a work visa on November 30, 2005. On February 2, 2006, Grey married a United States citizen, Trinia Smalls (“Smalls”), and Smalls petitioned for a marriage-based green card for Grey. Based on this petition, Grey became a conditional lawful permanent resident in January 2007. About two years later, Grey and Smalls petitioned to have the condition on Grey's residency removed, which USCIS granted, making Grey a lawful permanent resident. On February 17, 2016, Grey filed an application for naturalization, also called a “Form N-400.” On his Form N-400,

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Grey disclosed one prior criminal conviction from 2009 for simple assault and battery. ECF No. 70-1 at 15.

On September 7, 2017, USCIS conducted Grey's naturalization interview, which was led by an immigration service officer (“ISO”). At his interview, Grey disclosed a second arrest, which related to an incident that took place on February 18, 2016 (the “February 2016 incident”), just after Grey filed his application. Id. According to the ISO's notes, Grey stated at his naturalization interview that he was arrested for filing a false police report after he called 9-1-1 “to report a fight.” Id. at 16. The day after the interview, USCIS ran a “Law Enforcement Report” on Grey, which revealed his February 2016 arrest for “misprision of a felony,” a state charge that was later reduced to “filing a false police report.” ECF No. 95-2 at 1; ECF No. 70-6, Grey Dep. 57:13-60:13. However, USCIS failed to pursue Grey's February 2016 arrest as a ground for denying his application for almost three years, until defendants deposed Grey for this case in August 2020.

After a substantial delay in hearing back about his application, Grey filed this suit on June 27, 2018, asking the court to declare him eligible for naturalization and order USCIS to naturalize him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b).^[1] On August 3, 2018, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny to Grey, indicating that it intended to deny Grey's naturalization application based on marriage fraud and providing Grey with thirty days to respond with evidence that his application should not be denied. USCIS then filed a

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motion to remand Grey's application for naturalization to USCIS for adjudication, which the court denied. ECF No. 26.

On August 28, 2020, defendants took Grey's deposition, during which Grey gave a more detailed recounting of his February 2016 arrest. According to defendants, Grey's “characterization of his misprision of a felony charge at his August 28, 2020 deposition lacked credibility and led USCIS to seek further information about the charge.” ECF No. 93 at 3. In their subsequent investigation, on September 17, 2020, defendants obtained a police report detailing the circumstances of Grey's February 2016 arrest from the Beaufort County Solicitor's Office (the “2016 Police Report”). ECF No. 70-4. On October 28, 2020, defendants obtained more evidence from the Beaufort County Solicitor's Office concerning Grey's February 2016 arrest in the form of audio and video recordings of police interviews with Grey conducted shortly after his arrest (the “2016 Audio/Video Recordings”). ECF Nos. 87-1, 87-2, 87-3. Defendants supplemented their first motion for summary judgment with the 2016 Police Report and the 2016 Audio/Video Recordings, suggesting that USCIS was formally revising their basis for denying Grey's application based on the February 2016 arrest. See generally ECF No. 87.

On April 8, 2021, the court dismissed the parties' respective motions for summary judgment until Grey had an opportunity to conduct his own discovery on the newly-obtained 2016 Police Report and the 2016 Audio/Video Recordings. ECF No. 97. In February 2023, the parties indicated that such discovery had concluded, and the court entered an amended scheduling order. ECF Nos. 101, 102.

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On March 2, 2023, Grey filed his motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 104. On March 29, 2023, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, which doubled as a response to Grey's motion. ECF Nos. 105, 106.^[2] On April 21, 2023, Grey filed his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, which doubled as a reply in support of Grey's own motion. ECF No. 110. On May 1, 2023, defendants replied in support of their motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 113. On August 23, 2023, the court held a hearing on both motions. ECF No. 117. As such, the motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the

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evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

Both parties move for summary judgment on Grey's claim that he is eligible for naturalization. Before turning to the parties' arguments, the court provides a brief overview of the law governing naturalization claims and a federal court's role in resolving them.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides an applicant for naturalization an avenue to seek judicial review after his or her application has been denied.^[3] Pursuant to the statute:

A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied . . . may seek review of such denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person resides in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application.

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Courts have long confirmed that judicial review of a naturalization application is “always available and is de novo.” Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2002). Because its review is de novo, “the [c]ourt is not limited to the facts

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in the administrative record, and in fact is permitted to engage in its own de novo fact finding.” Nesari v. Taylor, 806 F.Supp.2d 848, 867 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citation omitted).

The INA sets out the requirements a lawful permanent resident must satisfy to naturalize. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The parties generally^[4] agree that to qualify for naturalization, an applicant must:

1. Be 18 years of age or older at the time of filing Form N-400;

2. Be lawfully admitted for permanent residence;

3. Be a lawful permanent resident for at least 5 years at the time of filing Form N-400;

4. Demonstrate good moral character for at least 5 years prior to the Form N-400 filing date, and during the period leading to administration of the Oath of Allegiance;

5. Have resided continuously in the United States for at least 5 years as a lawful permanent resident before filing Form N-400;

6. Have resided for at least 3 months in the State or USCIS District where residence is claimed before filing Form N-400;

7. Have resided continuously in the United States from the date of filing Form N-400 up to the time of administration of the Oath of Allegiance;

8. Be physically present in the United States for a least 2½ years at the time of filing Form N-400;

9. Demonstrate a basic knowledge of U.S. history and government;

10. Demonstrate the ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language; and

11. Establish an attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution and be disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.

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ECF No. 8-9 (citing INA § 316 and 8 U.S.C. § 1427) (emphasis added).

The good moral character requirement (emphasized above) is the only requirement at issue here; defendants do not contest Grey's ability to meet the remaining requirements. An applicant may be naturalized only if he “has been and still is a person of good moral character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). The “good moral character” requirement applies with respect to the five-year period immediately preceding the applicant's filing and continues to the...