Greyhound Corp. v. Division 1384 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America

• Decision Date: 03 June 1954
• Docket Number: No. 32712,32712
• Citation: 44 Wn.2d 808,271 P.2d 689
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: GREYHOUND CORP. (Northwest Greyhound Lines Division), v. DIVISION 1384 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET, ELECTRIC RY. AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.

Page 808

44 Wn.2d 808

271 P.2d 689

GREYHOUND CORP. (Northwest Greyhound Lines Division), v. DIVISION 1384 OF AMALGAMATED ASS'N OF STREET, ELECTRIC RY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA et al.

No. 32712.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 3, 1954.

Macbride, Matthews & Hanify, Seattle, for appellant.

Edgar R. Rombauer, Seattle, for respondents.

FINLEY, Justice.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment.

The Greyhound Corporation (Northwest Greyhound Lines Division), hereinafter referred to as Greyhound, and Division 1384 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America (an unincorporated association), hereinafter referred to as the Union, are parties to a collective bargaining agreement.

The preamble of the agreement states:

'The purpose of this Agreement is to provide a working understanding between the COMPANY and its employees covered hereby, through their duly accredited representatives, affecting hours of labor, wages and basic working conditions, and to establish a means of settling any and all grievances, disputes and controversies arising hereunder between the COMPANY and such employees and pursuant to said purpose the parties hereto agree as follows:' (Emphasis supplied.)

The agreement contains an arbitration provision, reading in part as follows:

'The Company agrees to meet and treat with the duly accredited officers and committees of the Association on all questions relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement, and should any diferences arise between them which cannot be mutually adjusted, the same shall be submitted at the written request of either party to a Board of Arbitration to be elected forthwith in the manner following:' (Emphasis supplied.)

The agreement also contains several provisions (discussed hereinafter) concerning wages and working conditions of bus drivers employed by Greyhound in the operation of its facilities in the northwest.

Greyhound issued certain instructions which, as apparently conceded by the parties, required certain changes in the work or duty to be performed for the company by certain of its bus drivers. These changes will be described hereinafter.

The Union raised certain objections, apparently claiming that the changes in the duties or working conditions of the bus drivers, contemplated by Greyhound's instructions, were unauthorized and prohibited by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The Union demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. Greyhound refused to arbitrate and commenced this lawsuit, asking that the trial court enter a declaratory judgment to the effect, (a) that provisions of the collective bargaining agreement clearly permitted the action contemplated by the company; (b) that the objections of the Union to the changes contemplated by Greyhound were without merit; an lastly, (c) that no debatable question or arbitrable matter existed between the parties. The Union demurred to Greyhound's complaint and interposed a motion apparently based upon provisions of the state arbitration act, asking for a stay of the declaratory judgment proceedings and an order directing that the matter be submitted to arbitration for a determination of the rights of the parties. The Union's motion to submit to arbitration was denied, but the trial court sustained the Union's demurrer and dismissed Greyhound's complaint with prejudice. Greyhound has appealed from the trial court's action on the demurrer. The Union has cross-appealed from the denial of its motion by the trial court.

The basic purpose of arbitration is the settlement of disputes by extrajudicial means. The history of arbitration shows that, for a variety of reasons which we need not detail here, it has not been uniformly accepted and approved by the courts of our country, or elsewhere. In fact, a majority of the state courts, from an early date in the history of arbitration, adhered to the restrictive common law rule, that parties by agreements to arbitrate cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction and that such agreements were revokable at the will of the parties thereto. In a number of states the restrictive common law rule has been modified by legislative action. At an early date in our state, apparently the concept of arbitration was regarded favorable by the territorial legislature and was given positive recognition in the enactment of § 264 of the Code of 1881, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 420 et seq. This early enactment was superseded by the arbitration act of 1943, Ch. 138, Laws of 1943, Rem.Supp.1943, § 430-1, et seq. Section 1 of our 1943 act, Rem.Supp.1943, § 430-1, stated:

'Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this act, any controversy which may be the subject of an action existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or they may include in a written agreement a provision to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between them out of or in relation to such agreement. Such agreement shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of any agreement.

'The provisions of this act shall not apply to any arbitration agreement between employers and employees or between employers and associations of employees, unless such agreement specifically provides that it shall be subject to the provisions of this act.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In Sullivan v. Boeing Aircraft Co., 29 Wash.2d 397, 187 P.2d 312, 174 A.L.R. 566, apparnetly a question was raised in the trial court as to whether the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement were valid. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed on other grounds and the question of the validity of the arbitration provisions was left unanswered. Apparently at the time, numerous then existing collective bargaining agreements contained arbitration clauses which may not have referred to the state arbitration act in a manner to remove all doubt as to the validity of such arbitration clauses. At the next legislative session (1947) the second paragraph of § 1 of the arbitration act of 1943 was amended to read, RCW 7.04.010:

'The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any arbitration agreement between employers and employees or between employers and associations of employees, and as to any such agreement the parties thereto may provide for any method and procedure for the settlement of existing or future disputes and controversies, and such procedure shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revocation of any agreement.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Perhaps the purpose of the 1947 amendment was to remove the doubts occasioned by the action of the trial court in the Sullivan case, supra, as to the validity of the arbitration clauses in the then existing collective bargaining agreements. At any rate, it appears to us that the 1947 amendment clearly accomplished such a result. In other words, under our reading of the 1947 amendment, the parties to collective bargaining agreements still have an option to provide by specific agreement that the procedures of the act of 1943 shall be applicable and available to them in applying or enforcing the provisions of arbitration clauses; or they may agree upon arbitration procedures other than those under the act. But, irrespective of election by agreement to use or not to use the procedures provided in the act, arbitration clauses agreed upon by the parties and inserted in collective bargaining contracts are not subject to the common law rule permitting revocation at the will of the parties. Arbitration clauses are valid, binding and enforceable by appropriate action of the parties in our state courts. The arbitration practice or procedure to be followed by the parties to a collective bargaining contract is simply a matter for them to work out by agreement in drawing up the arbitration clause of such agreements, and they will be bound by the terms of their agreements. This analysis of § 1 of the state arbitration act, as amended in 1947 by the legislature, is consistent with the view taken by this court in a rather impressive line of cases, beginning with Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Construction & Engineering Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 P. 129, 131, and ending with In re Arbitration Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Company v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 1 Wash.2d 401, 96 P.2d 257, 259.

In the Dickie case, supra, we said:

'Much confusion has been brought into our arbitration practice by common-law doctrines and decisions under statutes of other states, nor have the opinions of this court been entirely harmonious. * * *'

In the Lake Washington case, supra, we said:

'Contrary to the practice and procedure in the vast majority of the states, this jurisdiction does not recognize or permit common law arbitration, one of the distinguishing features of which is that an agreement for such arbitration is revocable. In this state, the proceeding is wholly statutory and the rights of the parties thereto are governed and controlled by statutory provisions. Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Construction & Engineering Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 P. 129; Suksdorf v. Suksdorf, 93 Wash. 667, 161 P. 465; Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Frye, 142 Wash. 166, 252 P. 546; Smith v. Department of Labor and Industries, 176 Wash. 569, 30 P.2d 656; Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. United States, 9 Cir., 17 F.2d 232. Compare, Gord v. F. S. Harmon & Co., 188 Wash. 134, 61 P.2d 1294.'

We shall now consider the action of the trial court in denying the Union's motion, (a) for a stay of the lawsuit started by Greyhound in the superior court, and (b) the application of the Union for an order directing Greyhound to submit the particular controversy to arbitration. As pointed out hereinbefore, and in...