Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 14 November 1979
• Citation: 98 Cal.App.3d 604,159 Cal.Rptr. 657
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 27 UCC Rep.Serv. 897 GREYHOUND LINES, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent, Sherry OLSEN, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 47194.

Page 657

159 Cal.Rptr. 657

98 Cal.App.3d 604, 27 UCC Rep.Serv. 897

GREYHOUND LINES, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent Sherry OLSEN, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 47194.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 14, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1979.

Hearing Denied Jan. 24, 1980.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Richard B. McDonough, John K. Stewart, San Francisco, for petitioner Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Peter G. Samuelson, Gassett, Perry, Frank & Bondelie, San Jose, for petitioner James Hurson.

Jacques M. Adler, San Francisco, for real party in interest.

SCOTT, Associate Justice.

Petitioners, Greyhound Lines, Inc. and James Hurson, sought to compel the performance of an oral settlement agreement made by real party in interest, Sherry Olsen, at a judicial settlement conference. After a full evidentiary hearing as approved in Gregory v. Hamilton (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 213, 142 Cal.Rptr. 563, the petition was denied. We granted Greyhound's petition for an alternative writ of mandamus to review the trial court's order.

Real party Olsen filed an action against Greyhound Lines and James Hurson for injuries sustained when a Greyhound bus collided with Hurson's car, in which Olsen was a passenger. Settlement conferences were conducted before Judge Edward Cragen on several days in March of 1979. On the last day of these conferences, immediately prior to trial, Greyhound agreed to pay Olsen $30,500 and Hurson agreed to pay $9,000, for a total "package" settlement of $39,500. Olsen's attorney agreed to the settlement, telephoned Olsen and obtained her acceptance of the offer, which fact was communicated to counsel and the court. A minute order was made, indicating "this cause settled this day in conference."

Thereafter, Greyhound and Hurson sent releases and settlement drafts to Olsen's attorney. Olsen, however, dismissed her attorney and refused to sign the releases or accept the agreed upon settlement. A new attorney was substituted. He returned the unsigned releases and drafts to petitioners' attorney, indicating that the terms of the settlement were unacceptable, without specificity as to which terms were unacceptable.

Nearly two years later, at the time of the hearing on petitioners' motion to compel performance of the settlement agreement, Olsen cited certain "hold harmless" provisions in the release agreement as being provisions upon which she had not agreed. It is also obvious from Olsen's contentions made below, as well as in opposition to petitioners' petition here, that she had second thoughts on the amount of the settlement and considered the amount to be grossly inadequate and unfair.

In its minute order denying the petitioners' motion the trial court stated: "The sole basis for the Court's decision centers on certain language contained in the Releases submitted to the plaintiff for execution and the effect of that language on the monetary agreement which had been reached by the parties on March 7, 1977. The Court, after full hearing, after weighing the conflicting testimony and documentary evidence, after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and judging their credibility, determined that plaintiff SHERRY OLSEN was fully aware of the amount of the settlement ($39,500), had agreed to accept that amount, and was fully cognizant of the fact that that sum was a final settlement of all her claims, now and in the future, arising out of the accident concerned.

"However, it is equally clear and established by the evidence, that as a condition of the settlement the plaintiff was required to execute a release in favor of the defendants. Paragraph 5 of the release prepared and submitted by defendant HURSON and Paragraph 4 of the release submitted by the defendant GREYHOUND LINES, INC., contains language which imposes a potentially substantial obligation on the plaintiff. Prior to the time that the releases were submitted to her for signature, the subject matter of the two paragraphs referred to had not been discussed with her and she had no prior knowledge of this imposed condition. Counsel for GREYHOUND states that 'Paragraph 4 of the release is a standard clause contained in releases which is applicable only in the event that there is an outstanding worker's compensation claim or a lien asserted by organizations such as Medi-Cal . . ..' The Court is of the opinion that the language of the paragraphs alluded to is subject to a much broader interpretation than that which counsel describes.

"The testimony of defense counsel PETER SAMUELSON to the effect that there would not have been a settlement without releases, and defendants having submitted releases which contained a material condition which had not been agreed to by the plaintiff, the defendants cannot now complain that plaintiff should be held to the terms of a bargain to which she did not agree."

Our function is to determine if there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's order. Neither party contends that there is not...