Gribble v. Cox

• Decision Date: 09 September 1977
• Citation: 349 So.2d 1141
• Parties: William L. GRIBBLE et al. v. John COX et al. SC 2355.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1141

349 So.2d 1141

William L. GRIBBLE et al. v. John COX et al.

SC 2355.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 9, 1977.

Francis H. Hare, Birmingham, for appellants.

Jack B. Porterfield, Jr., Birmingham, for appellees.

EMBRY, Justice.

This is a joint appeal by plaintiffs William Leonard Gribble and wife Joan Gribble from separate judgments in favor of defendants John Douglas Cox and Arthur Anderson and Company in separate actions by the Gribbles against Cox and Arthur Anderson and Company that were consolidated for purposes of trial. The amount sued for by each of the Gribbles was in excess of ten thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, therefore the joint appeal to this court will lie.

The action of Gribble was for damages on account of personal injuries and property damage and that of Mrs. Gribble was for the loss of consortium and services of her husband on account of his injuries; claimed to be a result of the negligence of Cox when he ran into the rear of Gribble's auto while the latter was stopped for a traffic light.

For the reasons we will state, the judgments must be reversed and the actions remanded.

The issues tried below were correctly summarized in defendants' counsel's opening statement to the jury:

" * * * Mr. Gribble had stopped by the light and we don't deny he was there on that occasion and we don't deny the front of Mr. Cox's car struck the rear of Mr. Gribble's car but we deny the nature and extent of the injuries that Mr. Gribble says that he has suffered as a result of this accident."

The contention of Gribble was that he suffered serious and permanent injury and disability as a result of his auto being struck from the rear by Cox's auto. He presented expert medical testimony to support his claim; from that testimony it can fairly be said, without disagreement, that prior quiescent physical conditions of Gribble were awakened and became symptomatic or prior ailments were aggravated. Undisputed proof was offered by Gribble of a small amount ($214) of damage to his auto.

Defendants contend that Gribble suffered no injury whatsoever as a result of the accident; either by the awakening of quiescent conditions, aggravation of prior existing debilities, or otherwise. No expert medical evidence was offered to support this other than by cross-examination of plaintiff's experts and a showing that on the day of the accident Gribble made no complaint of injury. The principal thrust of defendant's case was that Gribble was a malingerer, motivated to be disabled and remain so, in order to receive a pension from his employer together with Social Security disability benefits. In support of their theory of Gribble's motive to be disabled, defendants caused to be admitted, over objection, evidence that Gribble was receiving disability payments from collateral sources: his employer and the Social Security Administration.

The issues presented for review by this appeal are:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that Gribble received payments from a collateral source.

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Gribble's motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence as to liability of defendants and as to Gribble suffering bodily injury as a result of the accident.

Admission of Evidence of Collateral Benefits Payments

Defendants agree with plaintiff about the collateral source rule stated in 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 206:

" * * * (A)s a general rule, the fact that the plaintiff received gratuitous medical care, continued salary or wage payments, proceeds from insurance policies, or welfare and pension benefits, will not be taken into account in computing damages. * * * "

Defendants attempt to distinguish this court's decision in Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So.2d 297. There it was said:

" * * * Appellants concede that proof that an insured has been compensated for a loss by an indemnity insurer is generally not material and is inadmissible but appellants here urge it should be admissible as having a direct bearing upon the issue of appellee's injuries, especially since appellee allegedly may be malingering or faking illness. While this argument is somewhat ingenious, we cannot deviate from the settled rule in our jurisdiction and declare this to be a proper purpose to enable admission into evidence of the fact of indemnity insurance. Sturdivant v. Crawford, 240 Ala. 383, 199 So. 537; Long v. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co., 170 Ala. 635, 54 So. 62. A strong analogy supporting this conclusion is found in Phoenix Ins. Co. of New York v. Leonard, 270 Ala. 427, 119 So.2d 217. The same contention was there made but rejected. To accede to appellants' argument would tend to either emasculate the rule or render it unworkable." (emphasis added)

Defendants say that benefits received from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer should not be taken into account in computing plaintiff's recoverable damages; such evidence is not relevant, its existence renders neither more probable nor...