Gribble v. Pioneer Press Co.

Decision Date08 December 1885
Citation34 Minn. 342
PartiesEDWIN GRIBBLE <I>vs.</I> PIONEER PRESS COMPANY.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Upon the trial before Wilkin, J., and a jury, in the district court for Ramsey county, the court admitted in evidence, against defendant's objection, proof that plaintiff had been admitted to practice as an attorney, and also two other publications in defendant's newspaper, referring to plaintiff. Plaintiff had a verdict for $1,000, and defendant appeals from an order refusing a new trial.

W. D. Cornish, for appellant.

J. B. Brisbin and E. Gribble, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is, and for more than 10 years has been, a practising attorney and counsellor-at-law in this state, and that defendant, with intent to injure him in his good name and in his said profession, published of and concerning him a false and malicious libel, (set out in the complaint,) charging him, among other things, with being a "shyster;" thereby charging and meaning to be understood that plaintiff "was guilty of dishonest practices in the practice of his profession." The answer generally and specifically denies that plaintiff is or ever has been an attorney-at-law, and expressly avers that his general reputation for ability and "professional standing" is "properly described" in the alleged libel.

The word "shyster" — defined in Webster to mean "a trickish knave," "one who carries on any business, especially a legal business, in a dishonest way" — is evidently capable of having reference to the professional character and standing of a lawyer. Bailey v. Kalamazoo P. Co., 40 Mich. 251. The issue made in the pleadings as to whether the plaintiff was a lawyer was therefore material, and hence evidence to show that he was a lawyer was in point.

The libel which is the subject of this action was published August 17, 1882. For the purpose of showing actual malice, the plaintiff introduced, over defendant's exception, two articles published by defendant, one May 28, 1876, the other August 24, 1882, in both of which plaintiff's professional character is assailed, and in both of which he is called, directly or by intimation, a "shyster." The trial court was of opinion that this evidence was admissible solely for the purpose, by proving actual malice, of thereby aggravating the damages recoverable for the libel set up in the complaint, and so instructed the jury; especially cautioning them against giving damages for the libels (if any there were) contained in the two publications thus introduced in evidence. While there is some contrariety of opinion on the subject, the very great weight of authority, both in this country and England, is with the ruling of the learned trial judge. It is true, as was properly charged, that the words used in the libel sued for are actionable per se, as sounding, in the phrase of Lord Holt, "to the disreputation of the person" of whom they were spoken. And hence the law implies malice, and it was therefore unnecessary to prove actual malice merely to make out a cause of action. But for the purpose of showing the animus, or, as it is sometimes called, "the intention and spirit," of the publication sued for, and thereby enhancing the exemplary damages allowable in actions of this character, evidence of actual malice is admissible, according to all the authorities, and for the most obvious...

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