Grider v. McKenzie

• Decision Date: 27 May 1994
• Citation: 659 So.2d 612
• Parties: Evon GRIDER v. Lowell McKENZIE and Susan McKenzie, individually and d/b/a McKenzie Hosiery. AV93000146.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 612

659 So.2d 612

Evon GRIDER v. Lowell McKENZIE and Susan McKenzie, individually and d/b/a McKenzie Hosiery.

AV93000146.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

May 27, 1994.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1994.

Certiorari Quashed April 21, 1995

Alabama Supreme Court 1931585.

John T. Robertson IV and Kimberly H. Skipper of Henslee, Bradley & Robertson, P.C., Gadsden, for appellant.

James W. McGlaughn and F. Michael Haney of Inzer, Stivender, Haney & Johnson, P.A., Gadsden, William D. Scruggs, Jr. and E. Allen Dodd, Jr. of Scruggs, Jordan & Dodd, Attorneys, P.A., Fort Payne, for appellees.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Between August 1989 and January 1991, Evon Grider was employed as a knitter by Lowell McKenzie and Susan McKenzie, d/b/a McKenzie Hosiery. When Grider reported for work on the morning of December 19, 1989, the stairway used by the employees to enter and exit the building was icy. Alan McKenzie, another McKenzie Hosiery employee, was warning incoming employees about the icy condition of the stairway. Grider carefully made her way up the steps in order to enter the building without falling.

In the early afternoon, Randy Trotman, the Chief of Police of the Town of Henagar, arrived at McKenzie Hosiery and entered the building where Grider was working to serve her with a warrant for her arrest on a charge of theft of an automobile. After Trotman took Grider into custody, he did not handcuff or otherwise restrain her as he escorted her off the premises. Grider walked quickly ahead of Trotman and out the employees' door. Although Trotman warned Grider that the stairway outside the employees' door (the same stairway by which she had entered the building earlier that morning) was icy, Grider slipped and was injured on the ice.

Grider posted bond and returned to work the following day. She continued working, except during the Christmas break when the plant was closed, until mid-January. She then quit, claiming that the injury from her fall had caused numbness in her leg and ongoing back pain, which prevented her from lifting the yarn required for her job.

On May 8, 1991, Grider filed a complaint in the DeKalb County Circuit Court against Susan McKenzie and Lowell McKenzie, both individually and doing business as McKenzie Hosiery (collectively "McKenzie"), seeking workmen's compensation benefits, or, in the alternative, damages based upon wantonness and/or negligence.

In June 1992, McKenzie filed motions for summary judgment as to both the claim for workmen's compensation benefits and the claim for damages based on negligence and wantonness. On October 9, 1992, the trial court entered an order granting McKenzie's motion for summary judgment as to the workmen's compensation claim, stating, in pertinent part:

"The applicable law appears to be that the employee is entitled to workman's compensation benefits for an injury which occurs when entering or exiting the place of employment provided the acts are naturally related and incidental to the course of employment....

"The court concludes, however, that leaving the premises of one's employment in the custody of a police officer is not an act naturally related and incidental to one's course of employment and that the injury in question is not covered by the Workman's Compensation Act."

In April 1993, the case proceeded to trial before a jury on the claim for damages based on negligence and/or wantonness. At the close of Grider's case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence, McKenzie orally moved for a directed verdict as to Grider's claim for damages based on negligence and wantonness. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of McKenzie on the theory of wantonness and submitted the claim to the jury on the theory of negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of McKenzie.

On May 5, 1993, Grider filed a motion for a new trial and/or to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment as to her claim for workmen's compensation benefits, for damages based on the theory of wantonness, and as to the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding the defense of assumption of the risk. The trial court denied Grider's motion on June 17, 1993.

Grider appeals, contending (1) that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment against her on the claim for workmen's compensation benefits; (2) that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against her on the wantonness claim; and (3) that the trial court erred in charging the jury as to the defense of assumption of the risk.

We first address whether the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment against Grider on her claim for workmen's compensation benefits. A reviewing appellate court employs the same standard utilized by the trial court when reviewing an entry of summary judgment. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 540 So.2d 732 (Ala.1989). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala.R.Civ.P. Further, the moving party bears the burden of proof. Jones v. Newton, 454 So.2d 1345 (Ala.1984). Like the trial court, the appellate court views the evidence and resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Specialty Container Mfg., Inc. v. Rusken Packaging, Inc., 572 So.2d 403 (Ala.1990).

Section 25-5-31, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"When personal injury or death is caused to an employee by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which injury the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause, he, or in case of death, his personal representative, for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin, shall receive compensation by way of damages therefor from the employer."

Thus, to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the injury to the employee "must arise out of and in the course of employment." Kennedy v. Cochran, 475 So.2d 872, 873-74 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). The phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" are separate prerequisites, both of which must be satisfied in order for the injured employee to recover. Alabama Power Co. v. Mackey, 594 So.2d 1238 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). The phrase "arising out of" refers to the causal relationship between the employment and the injury, while the phrase "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Young v. Mutual Sav. & Life Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 24 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).

In order to meet the "arising out of" requirement, the employee must show a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Mackey, supra. More specifically, the injury must be rationally traceable to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not otherwise. Id. The causal connection must be definite; a showing "that the injury would not have occurred 'but for' the employment" is insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. Pope v. Golden Rod Broilers, Inc., 539 So.2d 313, 315 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).

"In the course of employment" includes " 'the movement of the employee in entering at the appropriate time ... and [leaving] the premises at an appropriate time after the completion of [her] actual service.' " Hayes v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 242 Ala. 148, 152, 5 So.2d 624, 627 (1942) (quoting Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Thomas, 220 Ala. 686, 688, 127 So. 165, 166 (1930)). An injury occurring...