Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.
Decision Date | 23 February 1987 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 85271 |
Citation | 155 Mich.App. 484,400 N.W.2d 653 |
Parties | Michelle GRIEB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALPINE VALLEY SKI AREA, INC., d/b/a Alpine Valley Ski Resort, Defendant-Appellee. 155 Mich.App. 484, 400 N.W.2d 653 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[155 MICHAPP 485] Schurgin, Rundell & Rosenberg by Curtis G. Rundell, II, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.
Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler, Fiott & Asher, P.C. by Michelle A. Thomas, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before HOOD, P.J., and WAHLS and ELLIOTT, * JJ.
This action arises out of a skiing accident. Plaintiff, Michelle Grieb, was injured when she was struck from behind by an unknown skier while skiing on a slope at defendant Alpine Valley Ski Resort (Alpine). Plaintiff brought suit against defendant. The trial court granted a motion for accelerated judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116 on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action against Alpine was precluded under the Ski Area Safety Act, 1962 P.A. 199, M.C.L. Sec. 408.321 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 18.483 et seq. Plaintiff appeals as of right and presents two issues with respect to this statute, its interpretation, and its constitutionality.
M.C.L. Sec. 408.342(2); M.S.A. Sec. 18.483(22)(2) provides as follows:
[155 MICHAPP 486] A statute is not open to construction by the Courts unless the language used in the statute is ambiguous or where reasonable minds may differ. Sam v. Balardo, 411 Mich. 405, 418, 308 N.W.2d 142 (1981); Lansing v. Lansing Twp., 356 Mich. 641, 649, 97 N.W.2d 804 (1959). The standard of review is easily summarized in Cliffs Forest Products Co. v. Al Disdero Lumber Co., 144 Mich.App. 215, 222, 375 N.W.2d 397 (1985):
We have reviewed the above statutory section and find that it clearly and unambiguously provides that an injury resulting from a collision with another skier is an obvious and necessary danger assumed by skiers.
The statute says that a skier accepts the obvious and necessary dangers of the sport. The statute goes on to list examples of obvious and necessary dangers. One example is a collision with another skier. Our interpretation is supported by the words "Those dangers include, but are not limited to ... collisions ... with other skiers...." [155 MICHAPP 487] Further, this construction is consistent with the Legislature's intent of promoting safety, reducing litigation and stabilizing the economic conditions in the ski resort industry. Senate Legislative Analysis, SB49, Second Analysis, April 17, 1981.
Given our construction of this section of the statute it is necessary to consider the constitutional issues raised.
The Michigan Constitution secures the same right of equal protection (Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 2) and due process (Const.1963, Art. 1, Sec. 17) as does its counterpart in the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Am. XIV). Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978) reh. den., 403 Mich. 958 (1978), cert. den., 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 303 (1979). Fox v. Employment Security Comm., 379 Mich. 579, 588, 153 N.W.2d 644 (1967). There are two principal considerations in any judicial review under either the equal protection or due process clause: the role of the courts in constitutional adjudication and the test to be applied. Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 665-666, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975). This Court must be mindful that certain areas are reserved to the legislative branch. However, all agree that the power of the Legislature is not limitless.
As is well established, to ensure that those limits are not exceeded, the courts are entrusted with the responsibility to review legislative acts and, if necessary, to nullify those which are repugnant to the constitution. Therefore, it is fair to say that the Legislature sets policy through statutes and the courts ensure their constitutionality. In this delicate balance between the branches, it is always important to remind oneself that a legislative statute's appearance of undesirability, unfairness, or unjustness does not in itself empower this Court to override the Legislature and substitute its [155 MICHAPP 488] own solution, thereby acting as a "super-legislature." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661-662, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1346, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 631 (1969); Manistee Bank & Trust Co., supra, 394 Mich. at 666-667, 232 N.W.2d 636. Finally, statutes are presumed valid; the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the person challenging the statute. Shavers, supra, 402 Mich. at 614, 267 N.W.2d 72.
There is a two-tiered approach used in equal protection cases. Manistee Bank & Trust Co., supra, 394 Mich. at 668-669, 232 N.W.2d 636. Where the legislation discriminates against a "suspect class" or impinges on a "fundamental right," courts examine it with "strict scrutiny" to identify whether a compelling state interest exists which justifies the classification. Where neither a "suspect class" nor a "fundamental right" is involved, such as with social or economic legislation, the "rational basis" test is applied. Id. Under this level of scrutiny, the legislative classification will only be found invalid where persons are treated differently on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute. Id. Our inquiry is limited to the issue of whether any state of facts, either known or which could be reasonably assumed, afford support for the statute. Dandridge, supra, 397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161-1162; Eastway v. Eisenga, 420 Mich. 410, 420, 362 N.W.2d 684 (1984); Manistee Bank & Trust Co., supra, 394 Mich. at 668, 232 N.W.2d 636.
We have extensively reviewed the legislative history of the act, in particular the 1981 amendment presently in question. The Legislature perceived a problem with respect to the inherent...
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