Griepentrog v. Griepentrog
| Citation | 419 N.W.2d 573,142 Wis.2d 943 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. In re the Marriage of: VICKI J. GRIEPENTROG, Petitioner-Respondent, v. RONALD D. GRIEPENTROG, Appellant. 86-1645. |
| Decision Date | 19 November 1987 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
Circuit Court, Columbia County
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded for further proceedings
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Columbia county: Earl J. McMahon, Judge.
Before DYKMAN, J., EICH, J., and SUNDBY, J.
Ronald Griepentrog appeals from a judgment of divorce. The issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) holding maintenance open for a period of two years from the date of trial; (2) ordering an equal property division; and (3) requiring Griepentrog to contribute to his wife's attorney fees. We conclude that the court abused its discretion with respect to maintenance and attorney fees and that its valuation of Griepentrog's pension interest was not supported by any evidence in the record. We are also satisfied that the court did not err in valuing the couple's real estate and in dividing their property equally. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Vicki and Ronald Griepentrog were married in 1980. The action was commenced in December, 1984, and the divorce was granted after trial and backdated to December 9, 1985. The parties had two primary assets--an undivided one-fourth interest in a farm and Ronald's interest in an employee pension plan. The trial court valued Ronald's interest in the farm at $14,526.25 and the pension plan at $7,100. Maintenance was not an issue at trial and none was awarded. However, the court's memorandum decision states that 'maintenance . . . shall remain open for a period of two years' from the date of trial. The court also ordered Ronald to contribute $250 toward Vicki's attorney fees. Other facts will be discussed below.
Maintenance awards are left to the 'sound discretion' of the trial court. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis.2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1982). We will not find an abuse of discretion if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised and we can perceive a reasonable basis for the trial court's action. Howard v. Duersten, 81 Wis.2d 301, 305, 260 N.W.2d 274, 276 (1977). A discretionary decision is the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and the law relied on are stated and considered together to achieve a reasoned and reasonable decision. In re Marriage of Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis.2d 372, 386, 376 N.W.2d 839, 846 (1985). The complete failure to exercise discretion is, of course, an abuse of discretion, for the term is not synonymous with mere decisionmaking; it contemplates a process of reasoning which 'must depend on facts that are of record . . . and a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards.' McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971). In some cases where the trial court offers inadequate reasons for its decision, we will undertake our own examination of the record to determine whether discretion was in fact exercised, Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis.2d 461, 471, 326 N.W.2d 727, 732 (1982). However, we 'need not search a record to uncover reasons that might have occurred to a trial judge for a result he or she reached where there is no explanation of how or why the result was reached.' Marriage of Steinke, 126 Wis.2d at 386, 376 N.W.2d at 846.
As we have noted, maintenance was neither sought nor awarded in this case. However, the trial court's decision, findings, and judgment expressly left the issue 'open' for two years, offering no reason for doing so. We believe that a decision to leave maintenance open beyond the date of the judgment is no less a decisional act--and thus no less a discretionary act--than an outright grant or denial. We note, for example, that in the absence of such a reservation of jurisdiction, all rights to maintenance would be barred by the judgment. Sec. 767.32(1), Stats. When the trial court decided to reserve maintenance jurisdiction, but remained wholly silent as to the reasons for so ruling, it abused its discretion.
Division of a divorcing couple's assets, like maintenance, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, Bahr, 107 Wis.2d at 77, 318 N.W.2d at 395, and is subject to all of the rules just discussed. As indicated, the parties' property was divided equally. Ronald argues, however, that the court nonetheless abused its discretion because: (1) it overvalued his interest in the family farm and the pension fund; and (2) it erred as a matter of law when it failed to exclude from the marital estate the value of 'property [Ronald] brought into the marriage.'
The trial court valued the farm at $90,000 and, subtracting the outstanding land contract balance of $26,293, arrived at a net value of $63,707. Since Ronald owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the property, the court divided that amount by four and further subtracted $1,400 to compensate Ronald for the fact that he purchased the property four years before the marriage and that he held only a fractional interest. It therefore valued his interest at $14,526.75.
Valuation of marital assets is a finding of fact which we will not upset unless it is clearly erroneous. Peterson v. Peterson, 126 Wis.2d 264, 265-66, 376 N.W.2d 88, 89 (Ct. App. 1985); sec. 805.17(2), Stats. Our task on review is to search the record for evidence to support the findings that were made, rather than those which may have been made but were not. Blackhawk Credit v. Chicago Title Ins., 135 Wis.2d 324, 331, 400 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1986).
Ronald argues first that it was improper to value his one-fourth interest at one-fourth the net value of the entire farm since it would be difficult to sell his fractional share. However, the trial court expressly recognized this factor when it reduced the net value by $1,400. Ronald contends, however, that we still must reverse because the court failed to explain its reasons for selecting the $1,400 figure. We reject the argument. The court's action was favorable to Ronald. He does not challenge the gross valuation of the farm at $63,707, or the court's division by four to arrive at the value of his one-fourth interest. Thus, the only evidence on the issue supports a finding that the net value of Ronald's interest was $15,926.75, yet the court further reduced that figure by $1,400 to Ronald's benefit. Ronald is challenging a beneficial ruling, and it is well settled that a person must be aggrieved by a judgment in order to have standing to appeal. Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koenigs, 110 Wis.2d 522, 526, 329 N.W.2d 157, 159 (1983).
Ronald's expert testified that the farm did not appreciate in value during the marriage. As a result, Ronald contends that its value should be set at $6,000--representing the amount of 'marital funds' expended on land contract payments during that time. However, assets are not valued by simply adding up the total payments made toward them during the marriage. Rather, they are valued at their fair market value as of the date of the divorce. Corliss v. Corliss, 107 Wis.2d 338, 345, 320 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Ct. App. 1982). There is expert testimony in the record to support the court's determination of value. It is not clearly erroneous.
As to Ronald's pension, the exhibit establishing its value at $10,153.22 was admitted into evidence without objection. The exhibit indicates a vested interest of sixty percent, or $6,091.94, as of December 31, 1984, approximately one year prior to trial. Ronald included the same figure on his financial disclosure form, which also was received in evidence. The court, however, set the value at $7,100, stating that the pension was seventy percent vested. While Ronald adopts these figures in his brief, the record is silent as to why they differ from the uncontradicted evidence. We therefore reverse on this issue and remand with directions to the trial court to adjust the figure accordingly to reflect the amount shown in Exhibit 4. And, to the extent the court may wish to alter the 'equalization payment' of $9,035.87, it may do so. 1
Finally, Ronald argues that the court abused its discretion in dividing the parties' property because it proceeded on an erroneous theory of law by failing to credit each party with assets brought into the marriage. While it is true that a court abuses its discretion when the exercise of that discretion is based upon an error of law, State ex rel. North v. Goetz, 116 Wis.2d 239, 245, 342 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Ct. App. 1983), we see no error here.
Ronald's argument is based on the supreme court's decision in In Matter of Marriage of Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis.2d 59, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982), which he characterizes as imposing a two-step procedure for dividing a divorcing couple's property--first returning to or crediting each party with all property owned prior to the marriage, and then dividing the remaining property (the assets acquired during the marriage) pursuant to appropriate legal guidelines. Jasper establishes no such rule or process.
While the trial court in Jasper returned to each party all assets brought into the marriage, that ruling was not challenged on appeal, and the supreme court never considered the question. Indeed, imposition of such a general rule would be contrary to well-established law.
Marriage is a partnership, a 'shared enterprise,' in which each partner contributes to the acquisition and preservation of marital assets according to his or her ability. Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis.2d 36, 47, 49, 260 N.W.2d 658, 664, 665 (1978). And when couples divorce, the procedure is wholly statutory. Chase v....
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