Grier v. Cuyahoga Cnty.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-1919 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | GRANT GRIER, PLAINTIFF, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, et al., DEFENDANT. |
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Cuyahoga County (the “County”). (Doc No. 24.) Plaintiff Grant Grier (“Grier”) filed a brief in opposition (Doc. No. 27) and the County filed a reply (Doc. No. 29).[1] For the reasons discussed herein, the County's motion is granted and this case is dismissed.
On August 27, 2020, Grier filed a complaint against the County, Armond Budish, Clifford Pinkney, Eric Ivey, and two John Does alleging facts and claims relating to his encounter on August 27, 2018 with two Euclid City Jail correctional officers following his arrest for traffic violations. (Doc. No. 1.) On November 19, 2020, with leave of Court, Grier filed an amended complaint, retaining as defendants only the County and the two John Does. (Doc. No. 11.) In his amended complaint, Grier asserted a Monell[2] claim against the County, a fourth amendment claim of excessive force against all defendants, and three state law claims (willful/wanton/reckless conduct; assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress).
The gravamen of Grier's claims is that, around 11:30 a.m. on August 27, 2018, he was arrested for various traffic-related offenses[3] and transported to the Euclid City Jail where he encountered two correctional officers. Grier claims he sought, but was denied, medical treatment for head, neck, and back pain. Grier further claims that, despite cooperating with the officers and posing no threat to them, without provocation and while Grier was handcuffed behind his back, Doe 1 officer, assisted by Doe 2 officer, pressed against Grier's throat-rendering him unable to breath-and smashed his head into the wall. Grier acknowledges that the entire encounter was captured on the jail's cameras.
On December 4, 2020, following the Case Management Conference where all parties were represented, this Court issued the Case Management Plan and Trial Order (“CMPTO”) required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), substantially adopting the dates and deadlines proposed by the parties. (See Doc. No. 14; see also Doc. No. 13, Report of Parties' Planning Meeting.) On June 30, 2021, on plaintiff's motion, a non-document amended CMPTO extended the case management dates and deadlines.
It is undisputed that Grier never conducted any discovery, nor did he attempt to further amend his complaint to substitute names for the “John Does, ” although he timely came to know their identities (Michael McClelland and Robert Love) and could have done so. The County deposed Grier on June 1, 2021 and filed the deposition transcript in support of the instant motion. (See Doc. No. 23.)
It is also undisputed that, as already alluded to, the entire incident alleged in the amended complaint was recorded by a combination of dashboard and back seat cameras in the police cars , plus surveillance cameras at the jail , copies of which were filed in support of the instant motion.
When a party files a motion for summary judgment, it must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In reviewing summary judgment motions, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus, in most civil cases the Court must decide “whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict[.]” Id. at 252.
“Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.” Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rely solely on the pleadings but must present evidence supporting the claims asserted by the party. Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ().
Moreover, conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). In other words, to defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present affirmative evidence to support his or her position; a mere “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient. Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rule 56 further provides that “[t]he court need consider only” the materials cited in the parties' briefs. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); see also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the County submitted not only Grier's deposition and several affidavits (including official incident reports), but also the video recordings already referenced. Grier does not challenge these recordings in any way and, in fact, states that he “stands on the video evidence” to establish that there are genuine facts in dispute. (Doc. No. 27 at 2.)
Grier conducted no discovery. The “statement of undisputed facts” in his opposition brief consists of a series of numbered paragraphs with conclusory statements completely unsupported by any citation to the record (much less the pinpoint citations required by this Court's Initial Standing Order). (See id. at 2-5.) In fact, this statement of “facts” is almost a verbatim recitation of the allegations in Grier's amended complaint, which is entirely insufficient under the summary judgment standard cited above.
Although in evaluating defendant's motion for summary judgment the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Grier, where, as here, there exists in the record a videotape capturing the events in question, the Court must also “view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); see also Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
It is undisputed that Grier was arrested during a traffic stop in Euclid, Ohio on August 27, 2018 and transported to the Euclid City Jail (the “Jail”). Grier has not sued over any part of the arrest and transport; therefore, the County's recitation of those facts, although providing some context, [5] is extraneous and need not be considered in the Court's analysis of the summary judgment motion.
Grier claims that he was subjected to excessive force by two John Doe correctional officers at the Jail. But Grier has never identified either officer by name, only claiming they were County employees. Grier argues in passing on the final page of his opposition brief that he should be permitted to amend his complaint (again) to name those officers. (Doc. No. 27 at 13.) But this does not constitute a proper motion for leave to amend. Smith v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 756 Fed.Appx. 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2018) ().[6] Moreover, it is too late for Grier to amend his complaint because the two-year statute...
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