Griffey, In re

• Citation: 873 S.W.2d 600
• Decision Date: 22 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 75473,75473
• Parties: In re Robert A. GRIFFEY, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 600

873 S.W.2d 600

In re Robert A. GRIFFEY, Respondent.

No. 75473.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

March 22, 1994.

John E. Howe, Sam S. Phillips, Jefferson City, for informant.

Robert B. Langworthy, Kansas City, for respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

HOLSTEIN, Judge.

Respondent Robert A. Griffey, a licensed attorney, was charged by information filed by the chief disciplinary counsel with several violations of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, the Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Griffey is alleged to have violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, relating to competent representation, 1.3, relating to diligence in representing clients, 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed, 1.15(a), relating to safeguarding of his client's property, 1.15(b), requiring prompt notice to a client or third party upon receiving money or property belonging to that person, and 8.4, forbidding lawyers from committing a criminal act, dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or committing acts detrimental to the administration of justice. All of the violations arose out of Mr. Griffey's employment by Laura Jean Alexander (Jean) to represent the estate of Laura Roberta Alexander, Jean's deceased mother. Honorable Michael Maloney was appointed master to hear the evidence. He filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find that Mr. Griffey violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and he is ordered disbarred.

I.

The master's findings, conclusions and recommendations are helpful in determining disposition in a particular case but, ultimately, this Court examines the evidence and makes the necessary factual determinations. In re Randall B. Kopf, 767 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Mo. banc 1989). Since this is a disciplinary proceeding, guilt must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Elliott, 694 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Mo. banc 1985). The record is reviewed with these principles in mind.

Mr. Griffey was first contacted by Jean about a week after her mother died in late October of 1991. Jean executed two documents that day, one entitled "Contract for Employment of Attorneys Hourly" and one entitled "Designation of Representative." Jean told Mr. Griffey that her mother died leaving two heirs, Jean and her brother, Richard Stephenson Alexander (Steve). Jean believed that her mother had executed a will and that Steve might have the will. She indicated some concern about Steve's temper and indicated he would not be cooperative if asked to produce the will. However, Jean also stated she thought she and Steve could work together to settle their mother's estate. Mr. Griffey told her not to communicate with Steve.

Mr. Griffey opened an estate account at the bank in his office building to receive estate funds and pay estate bills. Jean delivered a social security check payable to the decedent. She explained to Mr. Griffey that the check must be returned because it covered a time after her mother had died. Mr. Griffey nonetheless took the check. He also directed Jean to pay him for reimbursement of expenses with a check drawn on the estate account, although there were no funds in the account. Soon after, Mr. Griffey deposited the social security check into the estate account.

On December 31, 1991, Mr. Griffey submitted a bill for $2,329.50. This bill was submitted to Jean along with a check on the estate checking account that Mr. Griffey had opened, made out by and payable to him in the sum of $2,329.50. A notation on the check indicated it was for expenses of administration and attorneys fees. Jean signed the check and mailed it back to Mr. Griffey. At that point in time, no one had been appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate and no approval of the probate court was obtained for this payment. Letters of administration were not issued until January 17, 1992.

Between November 1 and November 4, 1991, Mr. Griffey sent letters both to Steve and to several insurance companies indicating that he had been designated as the representative of the estate and that proceeds of life insurance and other documents should be sent to him. In fact, letters of administration were not sought until December of 1991 and, as noted above, not issued until January 17, 1992.

In response to the letters, the decedent's former employer sent two retirement checks to respondent, one for approximately $8,300 payable only to Jean, and the other for approximately $8,800 payable only to Steve. At Mr. Griffey's suggestions, Jean agreed to deposit her check in the estate account. He also advised Jean to deposit Steve's check in the estate account. Following Mr. Griffey's directions, Jean endorsed Steve's check "For deposit only" and it was deposited into the estate account. Mr. Griffey did not notify Steve he received the check or tell Steve the check had been deposited in the estate account.

Both Steve and Jean signed papers permitting Jean to obtain proceeds of a lost life insurance policy issued by National Fidelity Life Insurance Company (NFLI). In December 1991, NFLI sent two $500 checks to Mr. Griffey; one payable to Jean and the other payable to Steve. Mr. Griffey had neither written nor oral authority to endorse these checks. Nevertheless, he forged the signatures of the payees and deposited the checks into his office operating account on December 31, 1991. Jean asked respondent in January and February of 1992 if he had received any money or correspondence from NFLI. Mr. Griffey stated he had not heard from the company and surmised that NFLI just did not want to pay the proceeds.

From late January to mid-February, Jean received two letters from the probate court notifying her the estate was subject to sanctions because the necessary paperwork had not been filed. She discharged Mr. Griffey on February 13, 1992, and retained another attorney to handle her mother's estate. Notably omitted from the file delivered to the subsequent attorney were all references to the NFLI policies. Upon calling NFLI, Jean discovered the two $500 checks payable to her and her brother had been sent to respondent and cashed in December, 1991. When Griffey was confronted regarding the checks, he repaid Jean and Steve the $1,000 life...