Griffin Grocery Co. v. Thaxton
Decision Date | 17 December 1928 |
Docket Number | (No. 66.) |
Parties | GRIFFIN GROCERY CO. v. THAXTON. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Sebastian County; J. Sam Wood, Judge.
Action by B. J. Thaxton against the Griffin Grocery Company. From the judgment, defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals. Affirmed.
Malcolm E. Rosser, of St. Louis, Mo., and Daily & Woods, of Ft. Smith, for appellant.
Warner & Warner and Cravens & Cravens, all of Ft. Smith, for appellee.
Appellee had, for many years, been in the employ of appellant, and, on October 1, 1927, at the time he was discharged, was a director, vice president, and manager of the Ft. Smith branch house of appellant company. He had been the manager of this branch house since its establishment. During the year 1926, he was paid a salary of $300 per month, and was given a bonus of $530, consisting of five shares of preferred stock in appellant company, and $30 in cash. No new contract was made with the company for his services in 1927, appellee testified, until the latter part of April, when Mr. J. T. Griffin, president of appellant, was in Ft. Smith, and agreed with him that his salary for 1927 should be the same as for 1926, except that, if the company made net earnings of $75,000 or more for that year, he would be paid an additional sum of $1,400 as salary. After returning to his home in Muskogee, Okl., and on May 3, 1927, Mr. Griffin wrote appellee the following letter confirming their agreement:
Mr. Griffin and appellee had, for years, been the best of friends, but early in September, 1927, they became estranged, which grew out of reciprocal caustic criticisms in frequent and lengthy letters written by each to the other, finally resulting in the discharge of appellee on October 1, 1927. Appellee brought this suit to recover his salary for October, November, and December, $900, and for the bonus or additional salary of $1,400; the net earnings for the year being in excess of $75,000. There was a verdict and judgment for $1,400 only, and the case is here on an appeal and cross-appeal.
Appellant's first contention for a reversal is that the court erred in denying its request for a directed verdict on the ground that the undisputed evidence justified appellee's discharge. The undisputed evidence referred to consists very largely of the correspondence between appellee and Griffin heretofore referred to, which is too lengthy to be set out in this opinion. We have read these letters carefully, and have reached the conclusion that the letters of appellee constituting the alleged acts of insubordination and insolence were provoked in a measure by letters from appellant's president. At least we do not think the court would have been justified in directing a verdict. The court properly submitted this question to the jury under instructions not complained of, which were perhaps more favorable to appellant than the situation in this case justified. These instructions told the jury, in substance, that it was the duty of the employee to refrain from acts or conduct of insubordination and the use of disrespectful language towards his employer, and that a violation of such duty would justify his discharge, unless reasonably provoked or...
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