Griffin v. Anderson Motor Service Co.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1933
• Docket Number: No. 17817.,17817.
• Citation: 59 S.W.2d 805
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. ANDERSON MOTOR SERVICE CO. et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

59 S.W.2d 805

GRIFFIN v. ANDERSON MOTOR SERVICE CO. et al.

No. 17817.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 3, 1933.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1933.

Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Thos. J. Seehorn, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Ruth Griffin for the death of her husband, Fred Griffin, claimant, opposed by the Anderson Motor Service Company, employer, and the Great American Indemnity Company, insurer. From judgment affirming award of Workmen's Compensation Commission, the employer and the insurer appeal.

Affirmed.

Morrison, Nugent, Wylder & Berger and Douglas Stripp, all of Kansas City, for appellants.

Robert F. McKinstry, of Kansas City, for respondent.

SHAIN, Presiding Judge.

This is an action under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act.

The record discloses that on and prior to March 5, 1932, Fred Griffin, deceased, was in the employ of the appellant Anderson Motor Service Company, a corporation, operating and doing business at the northeast corner of Missouri avenue and Oak street, Kansas City, Mo.

The evidence discloses that one of the duties of the deceased was to attend to changing oil and greasing the trucks of his employer. The evidence further discloses that next door and across the alley, to the west from the Anderson Company's place of business, was a separate building in which George T. Schaeffer operated what is known as the M. & S. Truck Repairing Company. It is disclosed that Schaeffer, in this separate building, did the repairing of the Anderson Company's trucks and, under an arrangement between the parties, Schaeffer heated his building by means of a homemade oil burner, and the drainage oil obtained from the Anderson Company's trucks was used for fuel. It is shown that the oil was drained from the trucks, both in the Anderson Company's place and in the Schaeffer place of business. It is shown by the evidence that the deceased, in the performance of his duty, performed labor in the Anderson Company building or in the Schaeffer building, as occasion dictated. It appears from the evidence, that the oil was drained in buckets and was frequently carried to the Schaeffer building, there to be used for fuel. On the morning of March 5, 1932, the deceased went over to the Schaeffer place for a bucket, used in draining oil from a truck. George T. Schaeffer was, at that time, in his place of business and had just started a fire in the furnace by the use of kindling, as he says was the custom. The deceased picked up a bucket that he desired. The bucket appeared to contain a quantity of dark looking oil. It appears that Schaeffer had been using this bucket in washing auto parts and it contained gasoline, and he testifies that the contents were real dark and thick; that he (deceased) didn't know that "I had changed and put gasoline in it, and the fire wasn't burning very good; he picked it up, opened the door, and threw it in there to empty it, I guess. Next thing, I heard a scream. He looked like a human torch when I saw him next."

From the accident thus occurring, the deceased employee received his injuries.

The employee, Fred Griffin, on April 29, 1932, filed his claim for compensation before the Workmen's Compensation Board; testimony was taken in the case before he died.

On June 15th, the employee died and on June 21, 1932, this claim for compensation was filed by Mrs. Ruth Griffin, wife of the deceased, respondent herein.

The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded compensation totaling $4,889.32. On appeal to the circuit court, the award was affirmed, and this case is before us on appeal from the circuit court.

The appellants make but one assignment of error, to wit: "The Circuit Court of Jackson County erred in affirming the award of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission because there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award of compensation in this case."

The sole contention of the appellants is that there is no evidence in the case that the deceased was injured by accident arising out of the course of his employment.

In support of the above contention, the appellants cite sections 3301 and 3305, R. S. Mo. 1929 (Mo. St. Ann. §§ 3301, 3305), together with several Missouri decisions and fifty-three decisions from foreign jurisdictions, without comment. The appellants in their presentation, by way of argument, have seen fit to embrace some excerpts from some of these decisions, but in the main have indirectly complimented this court with the presumption that we will peruse the substantive law from the presentations arguendo and otherwise as found in these authorities and glean therefrom the matter particularly directed to the subject in hand. This we have done to the best of our ability and have concluded, as have the appellants, that the sum and substance of all of these authorities are as is stated by the appellants, to wit: "An injury arises `out of' the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury; and that an injury to an employee arises `in the course of his employment when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental thereto." Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co. et al., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S.W.(2d) 128, 130.

Appropos to the above and as a condition precedent to our inquiry into the facts of this case, we quote section 3374 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Rev. St. 1929 [Mo. St. Ann. § 3374]), as follows: "Sec. 3374. Law to be liberally construed.—All of the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare and a substantial compliance therewith shall be sufficient to give effect to rules, regulations, requirements, awards, orders or decisions of the commission, and they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature in respect thereto."

As a further reminder of the limitation of power vested in us in reviewing the case, we quote from State ex rel. Buttiger v. Haid et al. (Mo. Sup.) 51 S.W.(2d) 1008, loc. cit. 1010, as follows: "Section 3342, (Mo. St. Ann. § 3342) provides the duty of the circuit court, as follows: `Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and in the absence of fraud the findings of fact made by the commission within its powers shall be conclusive and binding.'"

Section 3305(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Mo. St. Ann. § 3305(b) defines the word "accident," as follows: "The word `accident' as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury." (Italics ours.)

Paragraph (c) of section 3305 (Mo. St. Ann. § 3305(c) is as follows, to wit: "(c) Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause, `personal injuries arising out of and in the course of such employment,' it is hereby declared not to cover workmen except while engaged in, or about the premises where their duties are being performed, or where their services require their presence as a part of such services."

It is evident from the evidence that the deceased went to the building of Schaeffer, where he received his injury, for a purpose connected with his business as an employee. It appears that it was the duty of the deceased to get the bucket used to catch the oil drained from the trucks and, incident thereto, to dispose of its contents for re-use. We must therefore conclude that the accident occurred within the period of employment and at a place where the deceased was reasonably situated while fulfilling his duties, and that he was doing something, in getting the bucket and emptying same, that was incidental to his duties. There is no evidence, from which it can be inferred, that the deceased had ever been instructed by his employer as to the method of disposing of the oil drained from the trucks or that the deceased was violating any rule or command of his employer touching said matter. There is nothing in the evidence from which it can be inferred that the deceased was not about...