Griffin v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1911
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

72 S.E. 463

89 S.C. 547

GRIFFIN v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 1, 1911

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; George E Prince, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by T. N. Griffin against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mark Reynolds and Lucian W. McLemore, for appellant. Thos. G McLeod, for respondent.

JONES C.J.

This action was for the recovery of damages for the destruction by fire of certain cotton belonging to plaintiff, while upon the platform of the defendant company within the limits of its right of way. There was evidence to the effect that notice had been given to the plaintiff that the defendant assumed no risk for cotton so placed, unless same was tendered for immediate shipment, but that such cotton would be entirely at the owner's risk. The evidence also showed that the cotton in question was placed upon such platform, subsequent to the giving of such notice and without any tender thereof for immediate shipment, and was subsequently destroyed by fire originating within the limits of defendant's right of way. There was also testimony which is claimed by plaintiff as tending to show that notwithstanding such notice, the cotton in question was placed upon said platform "with the consent" of the defendant, within the meaning of section 2135 of the Civil Code.

At the conclusion of the entire testimony in the case, the defendant moved for a direction of a verdict in its favor, upon the ground that the evidence admitted of no other inference but that the cotton was placed upon the defendant's platform either without its consent, or if with its consent, then upon the understanding between the parties that it was so placed at the entire risk of the plaintiff himself. This motion was refused by the presiding judge, it being held by him that, while the evidence showed that the cotton was so placed upon the platform after such notice given by the defendant, there was still testimony to go to the jury upon the question of waiver by the defendant of the terms and requirements of such notice. The appeal questions the correctness of this refusal to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Substantially the question presented for determination is whether there was evidence to go to the jury upon the issue as to the defendant's consent to placing of the cotton upon the platform as cotton intended for shipment.

If the cotton was accepted for shipment, whether such shipment was intended to be immediate or remote, the placing of the same upon the platform would render the defendant responsible for any damage thereto from any fire originating within the right of way, unless the plaintiff had released the defendant from such liability. The defendant could waive its own rule...