Griffin v. Bozeman

• Decision Date: 15 April 1937
• Docket Number: 2 Div. 97
• Citation: 173 So. 857,234 Ala. 136
• Parties: GRIFFIN et al. v. BOZEMAN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

173 So. 857

234 Ala. 136

GRIFFIN et al. v. BOZEMAN.

2 Div. 97

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 15, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court, Choctaw County; A.S. Johnson, Judge.

Action for trespass by J.L. Bozeman against Griffin & Dabbs, a partnership composed of J.L. Griffin and W.E. Dabbs. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

W.J Dansby, of Butler, for appellants.

D.M Boswell, of Butler, for appellee.

FOSTER Justice.

This suit was tried on count 1, claiming damages for a trespass to realty, and count 4 for the statutory penalty for cutting trees. The court gave for defendant the general charge on count 4, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Appellants on the trial, appearing specially for that purpose, moved the court to dismiss this cause under authority of section 7222, Code, for the failure to pay the costs of a former suit which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant in it. The court overruled the motion, and defendants excepted. The suit was by this plaintiff against Bolinger for trespass on the same land, and involving, as the evidence on the motion showed, the same cutting of timber as that charged in the instant suit. In the former suit, it was sought to hold Bolinger liable for participating in the acts of defendants in the instant suit, or otherwise accountable for them, as the evidence tends to show. Bolinger claimed the land on which the trespass was alleged to have been committed. The evidence on this motion tended to show that the agent of Bolinger "had" these defendants cut the timber, on a sale of it to them for $6 per thousand, and pointed out to defendants the land on which to cut the timber. It later appeared on this trial to have been a boundary dispute between plaintiff and Bolinger. The suit against Bolinger was in trespass and statutory penalty counts.

Section 7222, Code, relied on, requires the plaintiff whose suit was dismissed to pay into court costs incurred in that suit at the time of filing another suit involving the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies; and on a failure to do so, that the suit be dismissed on motion; but it authorizes the court to allow ten days in which to pay the costs on good cause shown. Ex parte Canada Life Assur. Co., 217 Ala. 210, 115 So. 244.

Defendants pursued the proper course under the statute by its terms. The court denied the motion, and made no allowance for ten days as he could have done on good showing.

This question is reduced to the inquiry of whether these defendants were shown to be privies of Bolinger in respect to the cause of action here involved. They do not, in this motion and for its purposes, deny the commission of the acts constituting the trespass, but assert that they stand in the right of Bolinger as his privies in respect to the cause of action. By pleas A and B, they set up those facts as res judicata, and the two aspects of the contention may be treated together, and illustrate each other. For a judgment in favor of defendant is also conclusive in favor of the privies of defendant.

We are barred from directly reviewing any supposed ruling on the pleas because there is no sufficient judgment sustaining the demurrer to them, Long v. Holley, 157 Ala. 514, 47 So. 655; Webb v. French, 225 Ala. 617, 144 So. 818; 2 Alabama Digest 419, Appeal and Error, k123, and because the bill of exceptions does not show an exception to the action of the court in sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike them since section 9459, Code, was not followed.

But they serve to illustrate the motion to dismiss for nonpayment of the costs of the former suit. If the judgment in favor of Bolinger in that suit operated to the benefit of these defendants, they had a right as privies of Bolinger to the benefits of section 7222, Code.

It is the rule in Alabama that the liability of two or more persons who jointly engage in the commission of a trespass is joint and several, and suits against them separately may be prosecuted to judgment, with but one satisfaction. Huey v. Dykes, 203 Ala. 231, 82 So. 481; Steenhuis v. Holland, 217 Ala. 105, 115 So. 2; Bradford v. Carson, 223 Ala. 594, 137 So. 426; Chambers v. Cox, 222 Ala. 1, 130 So. 416; Smith v. Gayle, 58 Ala. 600; Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764.

But if the joint liability results not from joint participation in the wrongful act, but because one is responsible for the wrong done by the other under the rule of respondeat superior, the suit may be joint or several, but a judgment exonerating the servant will relieve the master. Southern R. Co. v. Lockridge, 222 Ala. 15, 130 So. 557; Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 214 Ala. 492, 108 So. 388; Supreme Lodge v. Gustin, 202 Ala. 246, 80 So. 84.

But it does not follow in all cases that a judgment favorable to the master would exonerate the servant. The court may have found that the relation of master and servant did not exist, and that the master did not actively participate in the wrongful act, as well as because, it may be, that no trespass was committed. And for like reason, it does not always follow that a vendee is not liable because his vendor is exonerated. 63 Corpus Juris 934, § 77; Granade v. United States L. & C. Co., 224 Ala. 185(5), 139 So. 409.

The general rule is that since the liability of joint tort-feasors is also several a favorable verdict for one is no defense to the others. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159(35), 89 N.E. 193, 40 L.R.A.(N.S.) 314; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper M. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, 56 L.Ed. 1009, Ann.Cas.1913E, 875; Three States Lumber Co. v. Blanks, 118 Tenn. 627, 102 S.W. 79; Nelson v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 98 Miss. 295, 53 So. 619, 31 L.R.A.(N.S.) 689. This is upon the principle that the parties are not the same, and that the estoppel must be mutual; that is, that if the judgment for Bolinger is conclusive against the plaintiff for these defendants, ordinarily, a judgment for plaintiff against Bolinger should also be conclusive against these defendants who were not parties, and did not in that suit have their day in court.

But it is said that there is an apparent exception to the requirement of mutuality of estoppel when the liability of defendant is altogether dependent upon the liability of one who was exonerated in the prior suit. "The unilateral character of the estoppel of an adjudication in such cases is justified by the injustice which would result in allowing a recovery against a defendant for conduct of another, when that other has been exonerated in a direct suit. The cases in which it has been enforced are cases where the relation between the defendants in the two suits has been that of principal and agent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee." Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper M. & S. Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S.Ct. 641, 642, 56 L.Ed. 1009, Ann.Cas.1913E, 875; Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence (C.C.A.) 158 F. 63, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 677; 15 R.C.L. 956, § 432, notes 12 and 13; State v. Parker, 72 Ala. 181; Emma Silver Mining Co., Ltd., v. Emma S. Mining Co. of N.Y. (C.C.) 7 F. 401; Cressler v. Brown, 79 Okl. 170, 192 P. 417. This exception is also stated in 2 Black on Judgments, § 781, as follows:

"In actions of tort, where the wrong is joint and several, and the plea of one of the defendants is such as shows that the plaintiff could have no cause of action against any of them, if the plea is found against the plaintiff, it operates to the benefit of all the defendants. But of course it would be otherwise where one defendant, sued separately, obtained a verdict on a defense purely personal to himself."

It is similarly stated in 34 Corpus Juris 982, 988. The basis of the rule creating the exception as to mutuality is a just public policy which has not been extended to certain situations where that policy does not exist, and the question was only incidentally decided, illustrated in Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 228 Ala. 210, 153 So. 427, and Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Robertson, 136 Ala. 379, 34 So. 933. A leading case in this country is Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326, 63 Am.Dec. 627, which was trespass quare clausum against one who acted under the directions of his father. In the prior action by plaintiff against his father for the same act, the father, who admitted that the son acted under his directions, had been acquitted, and it was held that the son was entitled to the benefit of that adjudication. See, also, Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520; Lawson v. Alabama Warehouse Co., 73 Ala. 289.

The evidence on the motion is that these defendants, in cutting the timber, were acting solely under authority of Bolinger by virtue of his claim to own the land on which it was situated. If in a suit between plaintiff and Bolinger the question is directly presented, and it is adjudged in substance and effect that the...