Thompson v. Southtrust Bank
| Decision Date | 12 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | 2050078. |
| Citation | 961 So.2d 876 |
| Parties | William D. THOMPSON v. SouthTRUST BANK, R. Larry Turner, and Terri Nicholson. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Phillip A. Gibson, Huntsville, for appellant.
Robert C. Gammons of Stephens, Millirons, Harrison & Gammons, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees.
William D. Thompson appeals from a summary judgment that the Madison Circuit Court entered in favor of SouthTrust Bank ("SouthTrust"), R. Larry Turner, and Terri Nicholson. We affirm.
In April 2002, Thompson entered into a contract with Tifton's Corner, Inc., whereby Thompson obtained an option to purchase from Tifton's Corner, Inc., the Villa Madrid Apartments ("the apartments") for $1,600,000.1 In exchange for the option, Thompson was required to pay $5,000 to Tifton's Corner, Inc., each month until the option expired in December 2002.
In August 2002, Thompson entered into a contract to sell the apartments to Randy Campbell for $1,900,000. The contract was contingent on Campbell's obtaining a loan for that amount, and on Campbell's providing proof to Thompson by September 5, 2002, that a loan in that amount for the purchase of the apartments had been approved by a lender.
Campbell applied to SouthTrust for a loan for the purchase price of the apartments. As part of the application process, Campbell provided a copy of the apartment-purchase contract to Terri Nicholson, an employee of SouthTrust. On August 15, 2002, Nicholson provided to Campbell a letter addressed "to whom it may concern," in which she stated that Campbell had requested a loan from SouthTrust and that it was SouthTrust's "intention to provide funding in support of the contract, subject to further property data review including appraisals and full underwriting analysis." At some point in August 2002, during an inspection of the apartments, Nicholson stated to Thompson's real-estate agent, Patsy Rentz, that the contract to purchase the apartments was "a done deal" and that "[w]e don't know what the appraisal will be, but Mr. Campbell has sufficient other collateral if the appraisal is not enough, and he will put additional collateral up to buy this property."
On September 4, 2002, Nicholson sent a letter to Campbell indicating that SouthTrust would loan him up to 80% of the appraised value of the apartments. On September 5, 2002, Campbell contacted Nicholson, asking for a letter indicating that SouthTrust had approved a loan to him for the purchase of the apartments. On that same day, Nicholson prepared and forwarded to Thompson a letter that stated: "Please be advised that SouthTrust Bank has approved a loan to Randy Campbell for the purchase of Villa Madrid Apartments, located at 3902 Cobb Road, Huntsville, AL."
On September 18, 2002, in an addendum to the purchase contract, Campbell received an extension on the closing date from September 19, 2002, to September 30, 2002. The addendum indicated that SouthTrust had approved a loan to Campbell.
At some point, David Frederick, Campbell's real-estate agent, learned that Thompson had an option contract to purchase the apartments for only $1,600,000. He contacted Rentz and told her that Campbell would not pay $1,900,000 for the apartments, given the lower amount for which Thompson was purchasing the apartments. Frederick indicated that, by not consummating the transaction with Thompson, Campbell stood to lose only the $10,000 earnest money he had provided under the contract and that he could purchase the apartments directly from Tifton's Corner, Inc., once Thompson's option contract expired. Frederick stated that "[i]f Mr. Thompson wants to be so greedy, he might wind up with zippo."
On September 26, 2002, an appraisal on the apartments was completed; it indicated that they had a value of $1,970,000. Campbell testified that because SouthTrust had agreed to loan him only 80% of the appraised value of the apartments, he did not have sufficient financing to complete the transaction. On the same day, Campbell sought to amend the contract to reflect a new purchase price of $1,820,000 and a closing date of October 7, 2002. Thompson rejected this amendment. Campbell did not purchase the apartments. Thereafter, Thompson's option contract on the apartments expired without Thompson having exercised the option to purchase the apartments.
In 2002, Thompson sued SouthTrust, Campbell, and various fictitiously named persons and entities — but not Turner or Nicholson — in the Madison Circuit Court ("the 2002 lawsuit"). The 2002 lawsuit asserted claims of fraud, negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy against SouthTrust in connection with the failed transaction involving the apartments. SouthTrust moved the trial court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on all of Thompson's claims against it. On October 7, 2004, the trial court granted SouthTrust's motion and entered a summary judgment in its favor.
After the trial court certified the summary judgment in favor of SouthTrust in the 2002 lawsuit as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ.App., Thompson appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court, which, in turn, transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7, Ala.Code 1975. This court affirmed the summary judgment in SouthTrust's favor without a published opinion on September 9, 2005. See Thompson v. SouthTrust Bank, [Ms. 2040509, Sept. 9, 2005] 954 So.2d 5 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (table) (consolidated with Thompson v. Campbell, [Ms. 2040508, Sept. 9, 2005] 954 So.2d 5 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (table)).2
On September 7, 2004, while his claims were still pending against SouthTrust in the 2002 lawsuit, Thompson filed a separate lawsuit in the Madison Circuit Court against SouthTrust, Turner, and Nicholson relating to the same failed transaction involving the apartments ("the 2004 lawsuit"). Thompson asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, fraud, and fraud in the inducement against all three defendants. He also asserted a claim of negligent and/or wanton supervision and training against Turner, who was Nicholson's supervisor, and against SouthTrust. Thompson alleged that SouthTrust was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees.
On May 24, 2005, SouthTrust, Turner, and Nicholson filed a motion for a summary judgment in their favor. SouthTrust contended that Thompson's action against it was barred by the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata; Turner and Nicholson contended that Thompson's action against them was barred by the affirmative defense of res judicata. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of all three defendants on July 15, 2005. Thompson appealed to the Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12-2-7(6).
A motion for a summary judgment calls into question whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether one or more of the parties are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. We review de novo the entry of a summary judgment, applying the same standard the trial court applied. Stewart v. Brinley, 902 So.2d 1, 8 (Ala. 2004). If the party moving for a summary judgment bears the burden of proof at trial on the matter for which a summary judgment is sought, the movant bears the burden at the summary-judgment stage and must provide substantial evidence in support of the motion. Id. "Otherwise, the burden of production does not shift to the nonmovant, and the movant cannot prevail on the motion." Id.
Thompson contends that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in the defendants' favor on their affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel because, he argues, they failed to prove several of the elements of each of those defenses. As set forth below, we conclude that the summary judgment in favor of all three defendants is due to be affirmed.
SouthTrust was a defendant in Thompson's 2002 lawsuit, which, like the present action, arose from the failed transaction involving the apartments. The trial court entered a summary judgment in SouthTrust's favor in the 2002 lawsuit, and we affirmed that judgment.
The elements of res judicata are "(1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both actions." Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala.1998). On appeal, the only element of res judicata Thompson argues is not satisfied as to SouthTrust in this case is the fourth element. He asserts that his present cause of action is different than the cause of action that was at issue in the 2002 lawsuit. Specifically, he argues that the claims he asserted against SouthTrust in the 2002 lawsuit did not include one for negligent and/or wanton supervision or training by SouthTrust.
In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Lanier, 790 So.2d 922 (Ala.2000), our Supreme Court discussed the same-cause-of-action element of res judicata:
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