Griffin v. Clay County

• Decision Date: 25 April 1884
• Citation: 19 N.W. 327,63 Iowa 413
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. CLAY COUNTY
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

19 N.W. 327

63 Iowa 413

GRIFFIN v. CLAY COUNTY

Supreme Court of Iowa, Dubuque

April 25, 1884

Appeal from Clay District Court.

THE plaintiff was treasurer of Clay county for four successive terms, commencing on the 1st day of January, 1872, and ending on the 2d day of January, 1880. On the 2d day of January 1883, he commenced this action against the county, claiming a balance due him for salary for each year that he performed the duties of the office. The claim was made in the petition in the form of a bill or open account against the county.

The defendant moved that the plaintiff be required to separate his causes of action, so that the petition would show defendant's liability for each separate term of plaintiff's official administration in a distinct count or division. The motion was sustained, and, in compliance therewith, the petition was amended by making a separate count for each term of office. There was a demurrer to the petition as amended, which was sustained, and plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Parker & Richardson and Ainsworth & Hobson, for appellant.

E. E Snow and Hubbard & Hughes, for appellee.

OPINION

ROTHROCK, CH. J.

I. The demurrer to the first, second and third counts of the petition was upon the ground that the causes of action therein set forth were barred by the statute of limitations. It is not disputed that the limitation of five years provided by statute is applicable to the claims made, but it is claimed by appellee that these are not separate causes of action, and that the whole claim is in the nature of an open account. The plaintiff is in no position to make this question now. He submitted to the ruling of the court requiring him to divide his causes of action, and thereby waived the right to present his whole claim in one count or cause of action. Besides, it is very plain that each term for which plaintiff was elected was a separate service or employment, so to speak, and his compensation is not in the nature of an account. The demurrer was properly sustained as to the first three causes of action upon the ground above stated. More than five years had elapsed from the time the last claim in the third count accrued, and before the commencement of the action. It is averred in the petition that this term ended January, 1, 1878.

The action was commenced January 2, 1883. It is urged by counsel for appellee that the cause of action did not accrue until the meeting of the board of supervisors in January, 1878, which was some days after the first of the month. If, however, the plaintiff had any claim against the county, he could have filed the same at the expiration of his term of office. There was no need that he should delay until the meeting of the board to file his claim. And, indeed, it appears to us that, as plaintiff claims that a certain salary was allowed him by the board, the allowance must have been made before the expiration of the term. If so, he could have compelled the auditor to issue a warrant for his allowance. The plaintiff,...