Griffin v. Feeney

• Decision Date: 02 July 1932
• Citation: 181 N.E. 710,279 Mass. 602
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. FEENEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

279 Mass. 602

181 N.E. 710

GRIFFIN

v.FEENEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 2, 1932.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Edward F. Hanify, Judge.

Action by Annie M. Griffin, administratrix of the estate of Frank O. Griffin, deceased, against Thomas F. Feeney. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.Richard J. Walsh, of Boston, for plaintiff.

William A. Thibodeau and Thibodeau, Yont & Martin, all of Boston, for defendant.

DONAHUE, J.

The plaintiff's intestate Frank O. Griffin, aged seventy-four, while crossing Chelsea street, Charlestown, near its intersection with Medford street at about 6:45 p. m. on the evening of December 23, 1928, was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant receiving injuries which resulted in his death. The plaintiff's declaration contained counts for the recovery of damage for conscious suffering of the decedent and for his death. There was a verdict for the plaintiff on both counts. The defendant's exception to the failure of the trial judge to direct a verdict for him on each count are here considered.

On the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff the jury were warranted in finding that Chelsea street, which runs north and south, is forty or fifty feet wide and bears two street railway tracks located approximately in the center of the street; that Medford street which enters Chelsea street from the west is thirty feet wide; that the intersection of the two streets was well lighted, the streets were dry and the night was clear; that the defendant, who was thoroughly familiar with the locality both by day and night, was driving an automobile northerly on Chelsea street; he was one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty feet away from the place of the collision and proceeding at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour when Griffin and one Gordon, who together had left the curb near the southwesterly corner of the two streets and were proceeding easterly to cross Chelsea street, had arrived and stopped at a point fifteen feet or so from the curb at or near the westerly rail of the nearer of the two street railway tracks; that the left wheels of the defendant's automobile were traveling in the easterly rail of the easterly track and there was an unobstructed area of eleven feet between the right side of the defendant's automobile and the easterly curb of the street; that the defendant as he approached had no difficulty in seeing the street for quite a distance ahead of him, there was nothing to obstruct his view of the two pedestrians if he had looked; that he did not see either of them until he saw Griffin right in front of him; that he made no change in the speed or course of his automobile until he had gone fifteen feet or more from the point where the left front of it had struck Griffin; and that he finally came to a stop at least thirty-five feet from the point of the collision.

The evidence warranted the jury in finding that the defendant was negligent. He should have showed down because he was approaching pedestrians in the street. St. 1928, c. 166; Donovan v. Mutrie, 265 Mass. 472, 477, 164 N. E. 377. It might have been found that ‘having regard to traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public’ he was running his motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper at that time and place. G. L. c. 90, § 17; Rasmussen v. Whipple, 211 Mass. 546, 548, 98 N. E. 592;Di Rienzo v. Goldfarb, 257 Mass. 272, 280, 153 N. E. 784. Without reference to any statute it might have been found by the jury that the defendant violated the general obligation as to using care which the law put upon him. With one third of the entire width of the street to the east of the point where Griffin was struck free and unobstructed according to the defendant's testimony (Gauthier v. Quick, 250 Mass. 258, 261, 145 N. E. 436), and with no change in the course or speed of the automobile (Walsh v. Gillis [Mass.] 176 N. E. 802...