Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58 (OK 3/30/2004)
| Citation | 2004 OK CIV APP 58 |
| Decision Date | 30 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 98768 |
| Parties | JOHN W. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PAULINE FULLERTON FLEETWOOD GRIFFIN, Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, HONORABLE JOHN C. GARRETT, JUDGE.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Joel L. Wohlgemuth, William W. O'Connor, Lindsey E. Albers, Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler & Dowdell, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and James C. McMillin, Sheryl N. Young, Kymala B. Carrier, McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, And Robert Locke, Locke and Moore, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant,
D. D. Hayes, Hayes Law Office, Muskogee, Oklahoma, and J. Philip Adamson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee.
¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant John W. Griffin (Husband) seeks review of the trial court's order granting alimony in lieu of property division and support alimony to Defendant/Appellee Pauline Fullerton Fleetwood Griffin (Wife) in the parties' divorce action. In this proceeding, Husband complains the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the parties' antenuptial agreement. Having reviewed the record and argument, we hold the trial court indeed erred. Accordingly, the order of the trial court dividing property and awarding alimony must be reversed, and the cause remanded for entry of an order consistent with the parties' antenuptial agreement.
¶2 In anticipation of marriage, the parties agreed to execute an antenuptial agreement. At the time, Husband held an interest in significant trust assets,1 most of which were placed in trust for him at or soon after his birth. Wife was a college-educated business woman, with experience in the management of retail businesses.
¶3 After three weeks of negotiation and the exchange of at least two proposed drafts of the antenuptial agreement, the parties met, accompanied by their respective attorneys, and executed the agreement on February 28, 1991. According to the agreement, each party made financial disclosures and disclaimed any right in the other party's separate property, any income or gain therefrom. The parties also agreed that neither would seek nor be entitled to alimony, support, division of marital assets, costs, attorney fees, or any other money or property from the other, except as provided by the agreement.
¶4 The agreement also provided that, in the event of divorce, Husband would pay Wife a lump sum amount according to the length of the marriage. If the divorce occurred after five years but before ten years from the date of marriage, Husband would pay Wife $250,000.00; if divorce occurred after ten years but before fifteen years of marriage, he would pay her $500,000.00; if the divorce occurred after fifteen years of marriage, he would pay her $500,000.00, plus a percentage of his gross salary over a period of four years.
¶5 On March 9, 1991, the parties married. Of the marriage, three children were born. During the marriage, Husband worked in the management of the family businesses, and the assets of Husband's trusts appreciated.
¶6 Husband commenced the instant action for divorce in May 2000. Wife answered and counter-claimed for divorce, asserting misrepresentations in the antenuptial agreement.
¶7 At trial, the parties presented evidence concerning the events surrounding the negotiation and execution of the antenuptial agreement, including a video tape recording of the meeting. The parties also adduced evidence concerning the value of Husband's disclosed assets, in an exhibit to the antenuptial agreement clearly marked "Income Tax Basis," but referred to by Husband's attorney at the time of execution as "fair market value."
¶8 Upon consideration of the evidence, by order filed July 3, 2002, the trial court found the antenuptial agreement void and in violation of public policy as impermissibly proscribing a division of jointly acquired property. The trial court also found that the antenuptial agreement was void because of misrepresentations in Husband's financial disclosures. Additionally, the court found that the antenuptial agreement did not make fair and reasonable provision for Wife; that Husband did not make full, fair, and frank disclosure of his worth before the execution of the agreement; and that Wife did not have a generally accurate knowledge of his worth at the time the agreement was executed.
¶9 The trial court consequently held that Wife was entitled to one-half of the increase in value of the Husband's separate assets attributable to the joint efforts of the parties during the marriage, and awarded Wife alimony in lieu of property division and support alimony. Husband filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
¶10 In this appeal, Husband challenges the trial court's refusal to enforce the parties' antenuptial agreement, and the awards of alimony in lieu of division of property, support alimony and attorney's fees to Wife.2 We review the trial court's decision concerning enforcement of an antenuptial agreement under the traditional, clear-weight-of-the-evidence standard applicable in equity actions. In re Cobb's Estate, 1956 OK 299, ¶21, 305 P.2d 1028, 1033.
¶11 The trial court held "the antenuptial agreement violates public policy and is void insofar as it seeks to prohibit [Wife] from being awarded an equitable division of the property acquired by the parties during marriage as a result of the joint efforts of the parties." In Taylor v. Taylor, 1991 OK CIV APP 126, 832 P.2d 429, the Court of Appeals held an antenuptial agreement, divesting wife of a share in the increased value of the marital estate attributable to joint efforts, void as against the public policy expressed by 43 O.S. Supp. 1989 §121. The year following the decision in Taylor, the Oklahoma Legislature amended §121 to permit the waiver of the right to an equitable division of jointly acquired property by antenuptial agreement. See, 43 O.S. Supp. 1992 § 121 (eff. September 1, 1992).3 Consequently, there is no public policy bar to enforcement of the parties' antenuptial agreement, and the trial court erred in so holding.
¶12 Like most issues in this case, the parties do not agree on the allocation of the burden of proof. Wife asserts that the proponent of the antenuptial agreement bears the burden to demonstrate a full, fair and frank disclosure of the amount, character and value of the property was made. In re Cobb's Estate, 1956 OK 299, ¶16, 305 P.2d at 1032. Husband argues that because Wife seeks to avoid enforcement of the antenuptial agreement for misrepresentation, "[i]t is settled . . . that fraud is never presumed, and the party attacking the contract's validity must prove it [and] the proof of fraud must rise to the standard of `clear and convincing' evidence." Matter of Burgess' Estate, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, ¶17, 646 P.2d at 623, 626. The "burden [rests] upon [wife] to prove by satisfactory testimony her claim that [antenuptial agreement] was procured by fraud or duress." Leonard v. Prentice, 1935 OK 427, ¶5, 43 P.2d 776, 778.
¶13 The confusion concerning burden of proof arises primarily because antenuptial agreements, like contracts in general, "can be avoided by a showing of fraud, duress, coercion, overreaching, and the like." Burgess, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, ¶16, 646 P.2d at 626. However, an antenuptial agreement is a special kind of contract: "`The confidential relationship which generally, although not always, is deemed to exist between a prospective husband and wife requires the utmost good faith and a high degree of fairness.'" In re Cobb's Estate, 1956 OK 299, ¶15, 305 P.2d at 1032. (Emphasis added.) Because of the special nature of the relationship between a prospective husband and wife, the law imposes an additional burden upon the proponent of an antenuptial agreement to show either a "fair and reasonable provision made for the party opposing the contract," or, a "a full, fair, and frank disclosure of the other spouse's worth made before execution of the contract," or, "[i]f neither of the above, [that] the party challenging the contract in fact ha[d] a generally accurate knowledge of the other's worth." Burgess, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, ¶19, 646 P.2d at 626.
¶14 In allocating the burden of proof, the court should first look to the agreement itself. If the antenuptial agreement is "apparently unfair on its face, equity raises a presumption against the validity thereof, and casts the burden upon . . . those claiming the validity of the contract to show that a full and fair disclosure was made to [the other party] of the extent and value of the property before [the other party] signed it, or that [the other party] was aware to all intents and purposes of the nature, character and value of the estate which she was relinquishing if the marriage took place." In re Cobb's Estate, 1956 OK 299, ¶16, 305 P.2d at 1031-1032. (Citations omitted.) However:
If an agreement provides that full disclosure has been made, a presumption of full disclosure arises. If a spouse attempts to rebut this presumption through an assertion of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 570 (Pa. 2002).
¶15 In the present case, the antenuptial agreement recites that a full disclosure of all real and personal property had been made, and that both parties had reviewed, examined and understood the agreement and attached exhibits. Independent counsel for each party executed an "attorney's acknowledgment" in which both verified that the legal effect of the agreement was explained to their clients. This gave rise to a presumption of full disclosure, and consequently, validity of the antenuptial agreement. Since Wife attacked validity and enforcement of the antenuptial agreement on the basis of Husband's alleged...
To continue reading
Request your trial