Leary v. Livingston County
Decision Date | 10 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 06-2603.,No. 06-2604.,06-2603.,06-2604. |
Citation | 528 F.3d 438 |
Parties | Shaun LEARY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIVINGSTON COUNTY et al., Defendants, Scott Stone and Denis McGuckin, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John H. Dise, Jr., Dise & Associates, Southfield, Michigan, Thomas A. Matthews, Brighton, Michigan, for Appellants. Michael J. Kemnitz, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
John H. Dise, Jr., Gina U. Puzzuoli, Dise & Associates, Southfield, Michigan, Thomas A. Matthews, Brighton, Michigan, for Appellants. Michael J. Kemnitz, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: CLAY, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McKEAGUE, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. ___-___), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Not long after word spread at the Livingston County Jail that detainee Shaun Leary had been charged with raping a nine-year-old girl, several prisoners beat him up. At stake in this § 1983 action is, one, whether officer Scott Stone was deliberately indifferent to Leary's safety needs and, two, whether officer Denis McGuckin used excessive force against Leary when he hit him on the back of his neck while walking him to his cell. As to Stone, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity; as to McGuckin, we reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity because the force used was de minimis.
Just after noon on Friday, February 11, 2000, police arrested Leary on charges of criminal sexual conduct against a minor and brought him to the Livingston County Jail. During the intake process later that night, according to Leary, officer Denis McGuckin called Leary a "sick prick" and struck him on the back of the neck. JA 640. That same evening, according to Leary, officer Scott Stone "mention[ed] to [Leary] that once other inmates found out what he did that there would be no protection from anyone here at the jail," JA 391, and proceeded to tell other inmates that Leary "was in for raping a nine year old girl," JA 846. The inmates began harassing Leary about the child-rape charges on Sunday morning and beat him severely that evening. An ambulance took him to the hospital, where he was treated for facial fractures and a skull fracture.
Leary filed this § 1983 action against Livingston County, Stone and McGuckin. In ruling on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to Stone as to the deliberate-indifference claim against him and denied qualified immunity to McGuckin as to the excessive-force claim against him. Stone and McGuckin filed this interlocutory appeal.
To overcome a qualified-immunity defense in the setting of a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant violated a "constitutional right" and (2) that the right "was clearly established." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). We decide the first question before we reach the second one. Id. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
Before addressing the merits of Stone's appeal, we must consider a jurisdictional question. For some time now, it has been clear that we may entertain interlocutory appeals from government officials challenging a denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). But that jurisdiction does not extend to appeals that merely quibble with the district court's reading of the factual record, as opposed to appeals that challenge the legal premises of the district court's decision—such as what the relevant constitutional provision requires, whether plaintiff's record-supported allegations violate that constitutional guarantee and whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the underlying incident. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 404-05 (6th Cir.2008); Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir.2007).
Stone's appellate papers are not a model of clarity. Some of his arguments merely push back on the district court's reading of the record-supported factual allegations, including most conspicuously what the record says about Stone's knowledge of the risk of harm to Leary. If that were all Stone's appeal did, we would lack jurisdiction over it. See Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir.2005). But that is not all Stone's appeal does. Even after "taking the facts in the light most favorable to" Leary, Stone's appeal also presents "a series of strictly legal questions," Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 298-99 (6th Cir.2002): Did the conditions facing Leary pose an objectively "substantial risk of serious harm"? Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see Br. at 23 ( ). And was the alleged constitutional violation "so clearly established at the time of the events in question that a reasonable officer would have known" that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted? Phelps, 286 F.3d at 298; see Br. at 25-29 ( ); Reply Br. at 16 ( ); id. at 17 ( ); see also id. at 15 (). Because "these are the kind of questions that may be raised by interlocutory appeal ... [,] we have jurisdiction over this appeal." Phelps, 286 F.3d at 298-99; see also Livermore, 476 F.3d at 403.
To say that we have jurisdiction over Stone's appeal, however, is not to say that he should prevail. To raise a cognizable deliberate-indifference claim, an inmate must show that the alleged mistreatment was "objectively" serious and that the defendant "subjectively" ignored the risk to the inmate's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. On this record and at this stage of the case, Leary has satisfied these requirements.
Objectively, the harm facing Leary was "sufficiently serious." Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stone told two inmates, Duane Kimmel and Ross Hinchey, that Leary had been charged with raping a nine-year-old girl. McGuckin verified the risk of serious harm that Leary would face if the inmates learned of his charges: He "told [Leary] to keep his mouth shut about his charges ... [f]or his own safety" because he "fear[ed that someone might] assault[] him [for] a charge like that." JA 696-97. Stone's statement to Leary that "once other inmates found out what he did[,] there would be no protection from anyone here at the jail," JA 391, confirmed that the inmates' knowledge of such charges posed an objectively serious risk of harm.
Subjectively, Stone's own words show he was "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]" and that he "dr[ew] the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. "[O]nce other inmates found out what [Leary] did," Stone knew there was reason to believe that Leary would need "protection ... at the jail," JA 391, and he persisted in telling other inmates about Leary's charges despite that knowledge. Nor does the record offer any evidence that Stone took any reasonable steps to protect Leary from the known substantial risk of serious harm.
Not only has Leary established a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference, but he also has shown that the right was clearly established: "[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 834, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. It thus would have been "clear to a reasonable officer that [this] conduct was unlawful in the situation [Stone] confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The district court correctly rejected Stone's motion for summary judgment.
Because Leary is a pretrial detainee, he brings his excessive-force claim against McGuckin under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which "protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); see also United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir.2007). By contrast, convicted prisoners may bring excessive-force claims under the Eighth Amendment, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, and "free citizen[s]" may bring such claims under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865. While there is room for debate over whether the Due Process Clause grants pretrial detainees more protections than the Eighth Amendment does, see id. at 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, we need not resolve that debate here. Under either constitutional guarantee, an excessive-force claimant must show something more than de minimis force. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (Eighth Amendment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n. 21, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (Due Process Clause); Budd, 496 F.3d at 530-31; see also Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc).
The undisputed facts in this case show that Leary's single allegation...
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