Griffin v. Lewis, No. 2:11-cv-1358-JKS
Decision Date | 10 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 2:11-cv-1358-JKS |
Parties | DAVID GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. G. D. LEWIS, Warden, Pelican Bay State Prison, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
David Griffin, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Griffin is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison. Respondent has answered, and Griffin has replied.
Griffin was convicted by a jury in the Sacramento County Superior Court of one count of attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 664) and one count of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211), with a finding that in committing those offenses, a principal was armed with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(a)(1)).1 In July 2009 the trial court sentenced Griffin concurrently in connection with his conviction in another case to a consolidated, aggregate prison term of nineteen years and eight months. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Griffin's convictionand sentence in an unpublished decision,2 and the California Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on March 16, 2011. Griffin timely filed his Petition for relief in this Court on May 4, 2011.
Because the facts underlying Griffin's conviction are not germane to the issues raised in his Petition, they are not repeated here.
Griffin raises three grounds: (1) the trial court violated Batson-Wheeler,3 (2) the trial court erred in dismissing a seated juror for cause; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Griffin was at the apartment of a co-defendant's girlfriend at the time of a probation search. Respondent does not assert any affirmative defenses.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at the time the state court renders its decision or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."4 The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in§ 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."5 The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.6 Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'"7 When a claim falls under the "unreasonable application" prong, a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent must be "objectively unreasonable," not just "incorrect or erroneous."8 The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is "a substantially higher threshold" than simply believing that the state-court determination was incorrect.9 "[A]bsent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'"10 In afederal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state court criminal trial is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.11 Because state court judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality, the petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she merits habeas relief.12
The Supreme Court recently underscored the magnitude of the deference required:
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) ( ). It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no farther. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.13
In applying this standard, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court.14 State appellate court decisions that summarily affirm a lower court's opinion withoutexplanation are presumed to have adopted the reasoning of the lower court.15 This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court.16
During jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily excused seven prospective jurors, of which two were Hispanic, one was African-American, and one juror was either Asian or Pacific-Islander. Griffin contends that in ruling on his Batson-Wheeler motion the trial court failed to employ the proper procedure. Specifically, Griffin's argument is that: (1) the Court of Appeal did not make a prima facie showing of group bias, i.e., "people of color"; (2) the trial court improperly provided the race-neutral reasons instead of requiring the prosecutor to provide an explanation of a legitimate reason for excusing the jurors; and (3) the trial court failed to make a neutral determination of the believability of the prosecutor. The California Court of Appeal held:
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