Griffin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.
| Decision Date | 28 June 1932 |
| Citation | 279 Mass. 511 |
| Parties | PATRICK GRIFFIN v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
March 9, 16, 28 1932.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., CROSBY, WAIT & FIELD, JJ.
Negligence Employer's liability, Railroad. Jurisdiction. Pleading Civil, Replication, Denial of signature. Release. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof. Interstate Commerce. Practice, Civil, Election. Waiver.
Evidence for the plaintiff, at the trial of an action against a railroad corporation by one of its employees, a freight handler, for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff's leg went through the wooden floor of a freight car in which he was working and which was under the defendant's control, showing merely that there was no hole in the floor before the accident; that there was nothing about the floor at that place to attract attention; and that the floor "looked all right," did not warrant a finding of negligence on the defendant's part, even if the jury disbelieved evidence that the car was duly inspected, since it did not appear that the defective condition of the floor of the car could have been discovered and remedied by the exercise of reasonable care by the defendant: whatever inferences might have been drawn from the accident itself were overcome by the plaintiff's evidence, by which he was bound.
The defendant in the action above described having pleaded in its answer that the plaintiff had executed and delivered to it a release under seal of his cause of action, a replication filed by the plaintiff, wherein he denied "that he ever signed a release of the defendant," did not fulfill the requirements of a denial under G.L.c. 231, Section 29; and at the trial the plaintiff's signature on the release must be taken as admitted, although the signature was by the plaintiff's mark and he testified that he did not sign the release.
The burden was upon the plaintiff in the action above described to prove a further allegation in his replication that, if he ever signed the release, it was procured by false and fraudulent representations; and therefore, in the absence of evidence to support such allegation, the release was binding on him.
The declaration in the action above described contained a count based on general negligence of the defendant, two counts under the employers' liability act, G.L.c. 153, Section 1, and a fourth count, based on negligence of the defendant in interstate commerce, under the Federal employers' liability act, 35 U.S. Sts. at Large, Part I, 65, 36 U.S. Sts. at Large, Part I, 291. Assuming that the plaintiff had not waived the fourth count, it was held, that he was barred of recovery under each count both by want of proof of negligence and by the release.
A statement by the plaintiff at the close of the evidence at the trial above described, that he relied on the first three counts in the declaration, was interpreted by this court as a waiver of the fourth count based on the Federal employers' liability act.
It was stated that, notwithstanding the waiver by the plaintiff of the count under the Federal employers' liability act, if the evidence clearly showed that the cause of action arose in connection with the interstate commerce of the defendant, he could not recover on the first three counts; but that mere testimony by a witness for the plaintiff, that the goods which the plaintiff was handling at the time of the accident came from a foreign country and were destined to a town in this Commonwealth, was not binding upon the plaintiff so as to show as a matter of law that the plaintiff then was engaged in interstate commerce: such testimony in effect was renounced by the plaintiff when he waived the fourth count of the declaration.
TORT. Writ dated September 18, 1926. The pleadings, and material evidence at the trial in the Superior Court before C.H. Donahue, J., are described in the opinion. The judge ordered a verdict for the defendant and reported the action for determination by this court.
J.B. Wenzler, for the plaintiff. H. Lawlor, for the defendant.
This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while employed as a freight handler by the defendant through its negligence and that of those for whose conduct the defendant was responsible. There were four counts in the plaintiff's declaration. The first charged as the cause of the plaintiff's injuries general negligence of the defendant, its servants and agents; the second, a defective condition of the ways and works used by the defendant in its business, which had not been discovered and remedied owing to the negligence of the defendant or of some one by it entrusted with duty in that respect; the third, negligence of one in the employ of the defendant exercising superintendence; and the fourth, negligence of the defendant in connection with interstate commerce conducted by the defendant. Thus it appears that the first count was founded on the common law; the second and third counts, on the employers' liability act of this Commonwealth, G.L.c 153, Section 1, and the fourth count, on the employers' liability act enacted by Congress with respect to interstate commerce, Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 U.S. Sts. at Large, Part I, 65, Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 U.S. Sts. at Large, Part I, 291.
The evidence in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff tended to show that he was a freight handler of about eleven years' experience in working "off and on" for the defendant, that he was at work at the time of his injury for the defendant as one of a gang of five men in loading bales of sisal weighing five hundred sixty pounds each from Pier 5 of the Boston Freight Terminal, into a box freight car, and that there had been three bales trucked into the car before the accident. The door of the car through which the bales were trucked was wide open. The plaintiff testified that the back door was half open and half closed, and that when he went to open that door so that there would be plenty of light his leg went through the floor at about a foot and a half from the back door and he was injured; that the floor was made of wood and "looked all right to me"; that he could not say whether "the car was N. & W. #62328 but thought it was a B. & A. car"; that the accident happened at about half past ten in the forenoon of a cool day in January, and that he was fully acquainted with the way the work was being done. There was further testimony introduced by the plaintiff that there was no hole in the floor before the accident, that there was nothing about the floor at that place to attract attention, that on examination of the hole after the accident it was a "ragged hole with rough edges," and that the defendant furnished material with which the hole was repaired either by members of the gang or by the cooper. There was no evidence having a tendency to the contrary.
The defendant introduced in evidence a release under seal of the cause of action set forth in the declaration purporting to be signed by the plaintiff.
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