Griffin v. Prince
| Decision Date | 03 May 1982 |
| Citation | 632 S.W.2d 532 |
| Parties | Anne GRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold PRINCE, Defendant-Appellant. NASHVILLE CITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Interpleader and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Betty Jane PRINCE a/k/a Mrs. Harold E. Prince, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Harold Prince and Betty Jane Prince, Joseph L. Lackey, Nashville, for defendant-appellant.
Edward L. Hiland, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Thomas Trent, Jr., Nashville, for interpleader and third-party plaintiff-appellee.
In this case an individual creditor of a husband, Harold Prince, has attempted to garnish deposits of Mr. Prince and his wife, Betty Jane Prince, in a joint checking account and a joint savings account. The trial court held that the entire proceeds of both accounts were subject to the garnishment. The Court of Appeals held that presumptively only one-half of the amount in each account was subject to the debts of the husband, but remanded to allow the creditor or the wife of the debtor an opportunity to overcome the presumption.
In our opinion the garnishment should be dismissed.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the accounts were not owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. Under governing Tennessee cases, we conclude that they were. There is no contention by the creditor that the garnishment would reach the accounts if they were so owned. It is the insistence of both the creditor and the interpleading bank that these accounts were not so held but that they were held under a contractual arrangement with the bank which created only a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, subject to the individual debts of either spouse.
There was no evidentiary hearing in the trial court. Mrs. Griffin had previously obtained a judgment against Mr. Prince. Upon return of an execution unsatisfied, she caused garnishments to issue to several banks. Nashville City Bank & Trust Company responded to the garnishment indicating that it held a small savings and a small checking account belonging to the debtor. It did not indicate in its initial answer that these were joint accounts. When the debtor filed a motion to require the garnishee to restore the funds to the accounts, the bank was permitted to interplead. It has, however, actively taken a position in support of the rule adopted by the Court of Appeals that all joint accounts are presumed to be held equally by the depositors in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Since the case was disposed of upon motions for summary judgment based upon pleadings and exhibits, there is no information in the record concerning the depositors, other than that they were married, or concerning the accounts, except the signature cards which were exhibited to the pleading of the bank. The savings account, held in the name of "Harold E. Prince or Betty Jane Prince" is designated on the face of the signature card as "Joint" and, in small print to the right thereof, are the words "With Right of Survivorship."
This card bears the signatures of both depositors on its face, and in the lower margin of the front side is the statement that the depositors agree to rules and regulations printed on the reverse side.
These rules and regulations, under the general heading of "Savings Contract" pertain principally to the relationship between the depositors and the bank, stating that the account is held subject to state laws and to all applicable rules and regulations of the banking institution and of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The bank was given a security interest in the account and a right of setoff to secure any obligations of the depositors to it. The card then contains the following provision (which is also consistent with the state's bank protection statute, T.C.A. § 45-2-703, referred to later in this opinion):
On the face of this card there is typed the date "10 05 78," and there is stamped beneath the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Prince the date of October 4, 1978.
The signature card for the checking account bears a stamped date of September 22, 1972, and the handwritten date of September 1, 1972, more than six years prior to the date of the savings account. This account is styled "Mr. or Mrs. Harold E. Prince." The card bears the printed designation "JOINT SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT," and beneath this caption is the following language:
On the reverse side are printed rules and regulations governing the account, but these deal with the relationship between the depositors and the bank and do not give any further information concerning the nature of the account created.
There is no other evidence in the record concerning the depositors or the accounts, except that the total balance in both accounts was $580.32 when the garnishment was served in May, 1980. No witnesses testified nor were there any affidavits filed.
Upon this brief record, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the two accounts were not owned by the spouses as tenants by the entirety. It is insisted by the creditor and by the bank that that estate was not and could not have been created by these signature cards for several reasons:
1. The word "or" was used on both accounts between the names of the spouses rather than the word "and";
2. The signature cards designate both accounts as joint with a right of survivorship and do not contain the words "tenants by the entirety";
3. Each account was subject to complete withdrawal upon the check or order of either of the depositors, and their joint signatures were not required.
It is conceded by counsel for the creditor in his brief in this Court that it is difficult to determine the nature of the account "because the bank accounts have many features of a tenancy by the entirety."
We are of the opinion that an examination of the Tennessee cases on this subject makes it clear that legally the accounts must be deemed to be held in that form of ownership, in the absence of any proof to the contrary. The contentions asserted by both the creditor and the bank have been thoroughly considered and rejected by this Court on numerous occasions over a period of many years.
Tenancy by the entirety is, of course, a form of property ownership unique to married persons. The term "joint" bank account may refer to many different types of relationships between depositors. It is nothing more than a generic term. There may be a "joint account" owned by business partners, joint adverturers, or any two or more individuals or corporations who wish to deposit their funds in such a manner, whether they have any other relationship or not. Only a husband and wife, however, may own property as tenants by the entirety. Marriage is a unique status in the law, having rights, incidents and liabilities unlike any other.
The ability of married people to own property in the special form known as tenancy by the entirety is ancient in its origin but firmly settled in the jurisprudence of this state. It has been referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States as an "amiable fiction of the common law." Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503, 50 S.Ct. 356, 359, 74 L.Ed. 991 (1930).
For many purposes, including taxation, it is frequently convenient to consider that the spouses each own fifty percent of property held by the entirety, but this is not the legal theory of such ownership. Pierce v. Woods, 597 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn.1980); Barry v. Woods, 594 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tenn.1980).
It is well settled in this state that personal property as well as realty may be owned by spouses by the entirety. Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990 (1934); Smith v. Haire, 133 Tenn. 343, 181 S.W. 161 (1915).
Under modern law, as distinguished from the common law prior to the enactment of the statutes emancipating married women, 1 neither tenant by the entirety is dominant over the other. Certain common-law rules giving the husband control of marital property during the joint lives of the spouses have been abrogated. Robinson v. Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn.1974).
Although this form of property ownership was at first held by this Court to have been abolished by the emancipation statutes, it was expressly reinstated in 1919 Tenn.Pub.Acts, ch. 126, now T.C.A. § 36-602, providing that nothing in those statutes "shall be construed as abolishing tenancies by the entirety." See Campbell v. Campbell, supra; Alfred v. Bankers' & Shippers' Insurance Co., 167 Tenn. 278, 68 S.W.2d 941 (1934).
It is, of course, legally permissible for a husband and wife to own either real or personal property in any manner they choose, such as tenants in common, individually, in partnership, as life tenant and remainderman, or any other. See generally First American National Bank v. Evans, 220 Tenn. 393, 398, 417 S.W.2d 778, 780-81 (1967); Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn.App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51 (1956).
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...by the entirety. Marriage is a unique status in the law, having rights, incidents and liabilities unlike any other." Griffin v. Prince, 632 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tenn.1982). In my view the Married Women's Emancipation statutes are not dispositive of this subject. The immunity was not gender-base......
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