Griffin v. Southern Ry.

• Decision Date: 10 January 1903
• Citation: 43 S.E. 445,65 S.C. 122
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. SOUTHERN RY.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

43 S.E. 445

65 S.C. 122

GRIFFIN v. SOUTHERN RY.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 10, 1903

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Edgefield county Buchanan, Judge.

Action by Marvin Griffin, by a guardian ad litem, against the Southern Railway. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

B. L Abney and E. M. Thomson, for appellant.

J. Wm Thurmond and S. McG. Simkins, for appellee.

GARY A. J.

This is an action for both punitive and compensatory damages, alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's train. The answer of the defendant contained substantially a general denial of the allegations set forth in the complaint. So much of the complaint as is necessary to understand fully the questions presented by the exceptions is as follows: "(6) That the last-mentioned train of cars upon which the plaintiff and his said mother were received and were being transported as aforesaid (the same being behind time, as the plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges), soon after it had left the town or station of Trenton, at a point or place about three and one-half miles from the said town or station of Trenton, and at a point of or commencement of a curve in said line of railroad, was wrecked, and the car or coach in which the plaintiff with his said mother was traveling, together with other cars, boxes, or coaches, composing a part of said train, having been derailed, and suddenly, with great force and violence, thrown from the track, and the plaintiff, by reason of the great and sudden force and jar occasioned by said wreck, and the cars, boxes, and coaches being thrown from the track as aforesaid, was seriously shocked and was with great force and violence thrown from the lap of his said mother. *** (7) That the approach on the roadbed of the defendant to and beyond the point where said wreck occurred and said car or coaches were derailed and thrown from the track as aforesaid, is, for a considerable distance, a heavy downgrade, and that the engineer and servant and agent of the defendant company who was running and driving said engine to which said car or coaches were attached, unmindful of his duty and of the safety of this plaintiff and others upon said train, negligently, carelessly, recklessly, wantonly, and willfully ran and was running said engine and train of cars or coaches down said grade, and up to the point and place where said wreck occurred and said cars and coaches were derailed and thrown from the track, at a high, dangerous, and unreasonable rate of speed. That upon information and belief the plaintiff alleges that the roadbed and fixtures composing the same of the defendant company at the point or place and time where and when said wreck occurred and said cars or coaches were derailed and thrown from the track, was defective, out of repair, and in an unsafe and dangerous condition, due to the negligence, carelessness, and wantonness and willfulness of the defendant, its officers, servants, and agents. And, further, upon information and belief, this plaintiff alleges that the rolling stock or trucks of one or some of the cars, coaches, or boxes forming a part of said train was defective, unsafe, and unsound, and in a dangerous condition, due to the negligence, carelessness, recklessness, wantonness, and willfulness of the defendant, its officers, servants, and agents." The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

The appellant's first exception is as follows: "(1) Excepts because the presiding judge erred in overruling defendant's motion for a nonsuit as to so much of the complaint as charged wantonness, willfulness, recklessness, and malice, which motion was made upon the ground that there was no evidence in the case showing or tending to show the same." In 1898 (22 St. at Large, p. 693) an act was passed entitled "An act to regulate the practice in the courts of this state in actions ex delicto for damages," the first and second sections of which provide:

"Section 1. That in all actions ex delicto in which vindictive, punitive or exemplary damages are claimed in the complaint, it shall be proper for the party to recover also his actual damages sustained; and no party shall be required to make any separate statement in the complaint in such action, nor shall any party be required to elect whether he will go to trial for actual or other damages, but shall be entitled to submit his whole case to the jury under the instruction of the court.

Sec. 2. That in all cases where two or more acts of negligence or other wrong are set forth in the complaint as causing or contributing to the injury for which such suit is brought, the party plaintiff in such suit shall not be required to state such several acts separately nor shall such party be required to elect upon which he will go to trial, but shall be entitled to submit his whole case to the jury under the instructions of the court, and to recover such damages as he has sustained, whether such damages arose from one or another or all of such acts or wrongs alleged in the complaint."

The complaint contains but a single cause of action. Before the passage of said act the plaintiff could not properly combine in the same cause of action acts of negligence (which entitled him to recover only...