Griffin v. State, s. 59964
| Citation | 419 So.2d 320 |
| Decision Date | 26 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 59964,60023,s. 59964 |
| Parties | Edmund Dorr GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Scott William LAWRENCE and Charles Axonowitz, Petitioners, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for Griffin.
J. David Bogenschutz of Varon & Stahl, Hollywood, for Lawrence.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Max Rudmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We have for review decisions by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Griffin v. State, 389 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and Lawrence v. State, 388 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)), which pass upon questions that it certifies are of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const.
As part of an October, 1977, drug bust, two undercover agents from the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, police department met with several men, including petitioners Lawrence and Griffin, at the latter's home to complete a previously arranged cocaine purchase. During the transaction one of the agents left the home, ostensibly to get a scale and money from his car, and returned accompanied by several other officers. The agent and policemen did not knock or in any other way announce their presence before entering the house and arresting those involved in the sale, nor did they have arrest or search warrants.
At their trial on various charges stemming from the transaction, petitioners' motion to suppress physical evidence was denied. Petitioner Lawrence pled nolo contendere to delivery of cocaine and was placed on probation for five years with the first year to be spent in jail. On appeal, the fourth district upheld the trial court's judgment and certified two questions as being of great public importance:
1. When an individual invites more than one undercover law enforcement officer into a dwelling or other building in order to transact felonious business and one officer leaves the premises on the pretext of furthering the felonious transaction (but in reality to obtain reinforcements) while another officer or officers remain inside the premises, does the officer who left have an implied invitation to reenter the premises freely or must he comply with the provisions of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), in order to make a lawful reentry?
2. Does the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), prohibit the sort of reentry described in question (1) even though the officer seeking reentry complies with Section 901.19(1)?
Petitioner Griffin pled nolo contendere to criminal conspiracy and was placed on five years probation with the first six months to be spent in jail. The fourth district affirmed that judgment on the authority of Lawrence and on petition for rehearing again certified the two questions above.
The answer to the first question, under the facts in this case, is that the officer that left the house had an implied invitation to reenter and did not have to "knock and announce" pursuant to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes. Several factors convince us so.
First, there is the nature of the transaction involved. Petitioners invited the undercover agents into the home to buy drugs. The deal would not be complete until the drugs were paid for, so when one of the agents went outside to his car under the pretense of getting a scale and the purchase money, his return was doubtlessly expected. In fact, it is probably safe to say that his reentry to the house was eagerly desired by petitioners--those who come to pay off debts seem universally welcome. Although there was no express or verbal invitation to reenter the home, the consent to do so was implicit.
That the agent did not return for the purpose intended by those inside does not vitiate the consent given him. There is no protection in a case like this from mistaken faith in one's associates. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Henry
...in criminal activity in their presence, and officers left apartment to summon backup team to make arrests), aff'd sub nom. Griffin v. State, 419 So.2d 320 (1982). Here, the separate entries can be viewed as components of a single, continuous, and integrated police action and were not interr......
-
State v. Lopez, 89-987
...and Fernandez, the motion to suppress should have been denied. See also State v. Hume, 512 So.2d 185, 189 (Fla.1987); Griffin v. State, 419 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla.1982). Defendant sought to distinguish Fernandez, arguing that Fernandez required the officer to stand at the threshold of the door......
-
State v. Hume
...when an undercover officer re-enters the premises with assistants after having previously been admitted voluntarily. See Griffin v. State, 419 So.2d 320 (Fla.1982); State v. Cantrell, 426 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 434 So.2d 886 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 104 S.C......
-
Fidalgo v. State, 94-615
...the above-stated reasons, the final judgments of conviction and sentences under review are, in all respects. Affirmed. 1 Griffin v. State, 419 So.2d 320 (Fla.1982); State v. Lopez, 590 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); State v. Cantrell, 426 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 434 So.2d 886......
-
A Not-So-Little Problem with Precedent: Intra-district Conflict in Florida District Courts of Appeal.
...R., 387 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Lawrence v. State, 388 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), approved sub nom. Griffin v. State, 419 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1982); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Graham, 404 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA (9) Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the Florida A......