Griffin v. State
| Decision Date | 19 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-15-00398-CR,03-15-00398-CR |
| Parties | Gary Lee Griffin, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
NO. CR-14-0432, HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING
A jury convicted appellant Gary Lee Griffin of the offense of assault on a public servant.1 The district court rendered judgment on the verdict, assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment and a $2,500 fine, and suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Griffin on community supervision for four years. In two points of error on appeal, Griffin asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during trial. We will affirm the judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
The jury heard evidence that on the afternoon of April 9, 2014, firefighters with the Wimberley Volunteer Fire Department responded to a house fire located on Rollingwood OaksDrive. One of the firefighters was Assistant Chief Phil Arbogast, who testified that he had the responsibility that day of driving a tanker truck that would transport water from a nearby water source to the scene of the fire, in order to ensure that the firefighters would not run out of water. Arbogast explained that the closest water source to the location of this fire was a creek with a low-water crossing located within a subdivision approximately three miles away from the fire. According to Arbogast, when he arrived at the low-water crossing and began filling his truck with water from the creek, he was approached by a man, later identified as Griffin, the owner of a local construction company, who told Arbogast, "This is private fucking land, and this is private fucking water." Arbogast testified that he turned toward Griffin and replied, Arbogast explained that Griffin then struck him in the neck with enough force that Arbogast "lost [his] footing" and "toppled over backwards" into the creek, where Arbogast became stuck in "a mass of sticks or root balls." Arbogast testified that as he called out for help, Griffin "looked at me, kind of smirked, turned, and walked up the road." Arbogast recounted that he eventually pulled himself out of the creek and called Hays County dispatch for assistance.
Griffin was subsequently arrested and charged with the offense of assaulting a public servant. Based on the above and other evidence, which we discuss in more detail below, the jury found Griffin guilty as charged. The district court rendered judgment on the verdict and placed Griffin on community supervision as noted above. Griffin then filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied following a hearing. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Evidentiary sufficiency
In his first point of error, Griffin asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Arbogast, a volunteer firefighter, is a public servant as that term is defined in the Penal Code.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, "the standard of review we apply is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"2 "This standard tasks the factfinder with resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts."3 "[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them."4 "On appeal, reviewing courts 'determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'"5 "Thus, '[a]ppellate courts are not permitted to use a 'divide and conquer' strategy for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence' because that approach does not consider the cumulative forceof all the evidence."6 "When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination."7
Additionally, in some cases, "a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue turns on the meaning of the statute under which the defendant has been prosecuted."8 "This is because an appellate court must determine what the evidence must show before that court can assess whether the evidence is sufficient to show it."9 In other words, we must first determine whether "certain conduct"—in this case, assaulting a volunteer firefighter—"actually constitute[s] an offense under the statute with which the defendant has been charged."10 "That question, like all statutory construction questions, is a question of law, which we review de novo."11
"In construing statutes, 'we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.'"12 "Thus, if the meaning of the statutory text, when read using the established canons of construction relating to such text, should have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, weordinarily give effect to that plain meaning."13 Additionally, because we are construing a provision in the Penal Code, we are mindful that the provision is not to be "strictly construed" but instead "shall be construed according to the fair import of [its] terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code."14 "The general purposes of [the Penal Code] are to establish a system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for which state protection is appropriate."15
Griffin was charged with the offense of assaulting a public servant. A person commits the offense of assault if the person "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another."16 The offense is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is a third-degree felony if it is committed against "a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty."17 The Penal Code defines "public servant" as:
Thus, the Penal Code's definition of "public servant" is broad, encompassing not only individuals employed by the government but also, under certain circumstances, private citizens. As this Court has previously explained when construing the definition in the context of a different Penal Code provision incorporating the term:
"[P]ublic servant" encompasses public officials and employees in every permutation of Texas state or local government, without distinction or limitation regarding branch or department (legislative, executive, judicial), level (county, city, district, etc.), or how the position is selected (elected, appointed, etc.). The definition also extends to certain other persons who provide a specific or limited form of governmental service or function—jurors, grand jurors, attorneys and notaries "participating in performing a governmental function," and arbitrators and other private adjudicators of causes or controversies. Even candidates for public office, others not yet having qualified or assumed their official duties, and persons performing a governmental function under a claim of right come within the definition.19
Additionally, the definition of "public servant" includes individuals who are "agents of government."20 "Government" is broadly defined in the Penal Code as "the state; a county, municipality, or political subdivision of the state; or any branch or agency of the state, a county, municipality, or political subdivision."21 "Agent," although not defined in the Penal Code, has a plain and ordinary meaning of "a person or business authorized to act on another's behalf."22 Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, Arbogast would meet the definition of a public servant if there was evidence presented from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that he was acting on behalf of government at the time he was assaulted by Griffin.
We conclude that such evidence was presented here. Arbogast testified that he was the Assistant Chief of the Wimberley Volunteer Fire Department. According to Arbogast, the fire department was "contracted by an emergency services district," which Arbogast testified was a government agency and "taxing entity" that was "responsible for [] collecting a set tax rate and then funding a department." Arbogast also testified that the fire department was funded through taxes and that he was "an agent of the fire department." Arbogast explained that at the time of the assault, the department was responding to a residential fire on Rolling Oaks Drive, which Arbogast testified was located "in the Wimberley area." Arbogast further testified that, in order to ensure that there was enough water to fight the fire, he had transported a tanker truck to a low-water crossing at a creek located in a subdivision also within the Wimberley area and...
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