Griffin v. State
| Decision Date | 07 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9909-CR-647.,49A02-9909-CR-647. |
| Citation | 735 N.E.2d 258 |
| Parties | James R. GRIFFIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Brent Westerfeld, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Timothy W. Beam, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Defendant James R. Griffin (Griffin) appeals the denial of his motion to correct errors and his conviction of carjacking, a Class B felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-5-2.
We affirm.
Griffin raises four issues on appeal, which we restate as:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Griffin's motion to correct errors with respect to the conduct of the alternate juror.
2. Whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony offered by Griffin to impeach a third party's denial during trial of making a confession to the carjacking.
3. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Griffin's motion to correct errors with respect to newly discovered evidence.
4. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support Griffin's conviction of carjacking.
On March 5, 1997, at approximately 2:45 p.m., Clifford Wright (Wright) was driving his 1986 Chevy Cavalier and picked up a woman at the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and College Avenue in Marion County, Indiana. The woman identified herself as Patricia Griffin (Patricia) and asked Wright to take her to her home on Gale Street. Wright and Patricia decided to go on a date that night and Patricia gave Wright her phone number. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Wright attempted to telephone Patricia, however, she was not home. He then decided to stop by the residence on Gale Street where he had dropped her off.
When Wright knocked on the front door to the residence, he was instructed to go around to the back door. Patricia was not present at the house, but Wright was invited in by a man who identified himself as James, and by a woman who identified herself as Twyanna. The group talked for twenty minutes and at some point in the conversation, James left the room and then returned a few minutes later. On his return, Twyanna asked James if he got his pistol. Twyanna, James and Wright then got into Wright's vehicle and left the residence. After driving for about two minutes, Wright was forced to hand over currency in the amount of $33.00, his billfold, and the keys to his vehicle. Wright was then told to exit the vehicle. Wright called the police and reported the incident.
The Police provided Wright with a six person photo array in which Wright was able to identify Griffin as the person named James. Following Wright's identification of Griffin, the State filed an information on March 24, 1997, alleging that Griffin committed carjacking, a Class B felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-5-2. A jury trial was held on February 25, 1999.
The jury found Griffin guilty of carjacking. On April 20, 1999, a sentencing hearing was held. After hearing evidence, the trial court sentenced Griffin to a six-year sentence, three years executed, three years suspended and two years on probation.
On May 20, 1999, Griffin filed a Motion to Correct Errors Regarding Juror Misconduct and Newly Discovered Evidence and Request for Expedited Hearing. In support of this motion, Griffin submitted affidavits of jurors and a newly discovered witness.
On July 29, 1999, the trial court issued an order denying Griffin's motion to correct errors. This appeal of the trial court's denial of the motion to correct errors and of Griffin's conviction then ensued.
After concluding the evidentiary portion of Griffin's trial, the trial court gave the final jury instructions. Final Jury instruction 23 states as follows:
You are instructed that the alternate juror who has been selected in this case and who has been present during the entire course of this trial will be allowed back into the jury room with the regular 12 jurors under strict instruction that the alternate juror is not to participate in any way in the deliberations of the regular jury in this case. In the event that the alternate juror is needed to replace a regular member of the jury, the alternate will be called back into the courtroom and specifically advised that the alternate may then participate in the deliberations. Until such time the alternate may not in any way take part in the deliberations of the jury in this case.
(R. 431-432). The jury returned from deliberations finding Griffin guilty of carjacking. After trial, Griffin filed a motion to correct errors alleging that the jury was improperly influenced by the alternate juror and supported this contention with several jurors' affidavits stating that the alternate juror participated in deliberations. On appeal, Griffin alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct errors based on the alternate juror's participation in the jury deliberations. We are unable to reach the merits of Griffin's argument because we find that the juror affidavits are not admissible under Ind.Evidence R. 606(b)(3) to impeach the jury verdict.
Indiana has followed a long-standing rule that the affidavit or testimony of jurors will not be received to impeach their verdict, whether the jurors' statements be reported first or second hand. Knight v. Parke, 595 N.E.2d 280, 280 (Ind.Ct.App.1992)(additional citations omitted). Our supreme court has stated the following policy reason for the rule:
If this Court were to permit individual jurors to make affidavits or give testimony disclosing ... their version of the reasons for rendering a particular verdict, there would be no reasonable end to litigation. Jurors would be harassed by both sides of litigation.... Such an unsettled state of affairs would be a disservice to the parties litigant and an unconscionable burden upon citizens who serve on juries.
Ward v. St. Mary Medical Center of Gary, 658 N.E.2d 893, 894 (Ind.1995). Indiana case law has recognized one exception to this rule for situations involving the jury's exposure to extraneous influence. Id. In 1994, Rule 606 of the Indiana Rules of Evidence was adopted and states the following with respect to the competence of a juror as a witness:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental process in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify (1) to drug or alcohol use by any juror, (2) on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or (3) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying may not be received for these purposes.
Evid.R. 606(b) (emphasis added). Since its adoption, no reported Indiana cases have addressed the specific exceptions within Evid.R. 606(b).
In the present case the issue is whether an alternate juror's conduct during jury deliberations amounts to an outside influence as contemplated by Evid.R. 606(b)(3). Initially we note that when our supreme court determined that the alternate juror could remain in the jury room during deliberations it found that, "an alternate juror is in every respect a juror." Johnson v. State, 369 N.E.2d 623, 625, 267 Ind. 256 (1977).
trans. denied.
In light of the long standing rule that a jury verdict may not be impeached by the affidavits of the jurors, the public policy concerns over finality of the jury verdict, and the presumption that the jurors followed the trial court's instructions, we do not find that the alternate juror's alleged participation in deliberations is an outside influence as contemplated by Evid.R. 606(b)(3). Since the affidavits of the jurors are not admissible, no evidence of the alternate juror's conduct exists with which to impeach the verdict. We therefore find that the trial court did not err when it denied Griffin's motion to correct errors with respect to the conduct of the alternate juror.
On appeal Griffin alleges his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present evidence of his defense were violated when the trial court excluded Lorinda Youngcourt's (Youngcourt) testimony that William Dulin (Dulin) confessed to the crime for which Griffin was convicted. Specifically, Griffin argues that Youngcourt's testimony was either admissible as a statement against interest exception to hearsay or was not hearsay and admissible under Evid. R. 613(b).
Hearsay is generally defined as an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is not generally admissible as evidence. Evid.R. 801(c) and 802. Hearsay testimony is nevertheless admissible under the statement against interest exception if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, at the time it was made, was "so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to...
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Griffin v. State
...class B felony,1 and the court sentenced him to six years with three suspended. On appeal, Griffin raised four issues. Griffin v. State, 735 N.E.2d 258 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). We address the two contentions noted above, and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on the remainder.2 Ind. Appellate......