Griffin v. State

• Decision Date: 07 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-0101-CR-43.,49S02-0101-CR-43.
• Parties: James R. GRIFFIN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

754 N.E.2d 899

James R. GRIFFIN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49S02-0101-CR-43.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 7, 2001.

Brent Westerfeld, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Timothy W. Beam, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

James Griffin asks for a new trial on his carjacking charges because an alternate juror improperly expressed her belief in his guilt during his jury's deliberations. He also says his former attorney should have been allowed to testify that another man confessed to the crime. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Around 2:45 p.m. on March 5, 1997, Clifford Wright was driving to a hair appointment when he saw Patricia Griffin standing at the corner of Massachusetts and College Avenues in Indianapolis. Although the two had never met, Ms. Griffin accepted a ride home and agreed to see Wright after his appointment, around 5:30. When Wright returned to Ms. Griffin's house, he was invited in by a man who identified himself as James. A woman named Twyanna was also there, but Ms. Griffin was not.

The three chatted for about twenty minutes and at one point James left the room. When he returned, Twyanna asked him if he got his pistol. James and Twyanna asked Wright for "a ride around the corner," and he agreed. (R. at 289.) Minutes after the three left in Wright's car, Twyanna asked Wright if he realized he was being "set up." (R. at 290-91.) Wright reached for his keys but Twyanna jerked his hand away. Wright was forced out of the car after handing over his billfold and $33.

Wright viewed 500 police photographs but did not spot James. When the police learned that Ms. Griffin had a brother named James, they showed Wright another six photos, from which Wright positively identified Griffin. A jury found Griffin guilty of carjacking, a class B felony,¹ and the court sentenced him to six years with three suspended.

On appeal, Griffin raised four issues. Griffin v. State, 735 N.E.2d 258 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). We address the two contentions noted above, and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on the remainder.² Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

I. The Alternate Juror's Statement

After Griffin's jurors deliberated for about two and a half hours, they sent a note advising the judge that they could not agree on a verdict. The judge replied, "Please continue." (R. at 435.)

Griffin asserts, based on juror affidavits submitted with his motion to correct error, that several jurors then sought to break the deadlock by asking the alternate her opinion on Griffin's guilt. This violated the judge's specific instruction prohibiting the alternate's participation in deliberations.³ The alternate answered that she thought Griffin was guilty because the victim's identification was reliable based on his twenty-minute conversation with the carjacker.

One juror stated in her affidavit that the alternate's input "affected my vote." (R. at 164.)

Juror misconduct involving an out-of-court communication with an unauthorized person creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Currin v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (Ind.1986). The trial court nonetheless denied Griffin's motion:⁴

The Court finds that based on the evidence presented, the comments allegedly made by the alternate juror, did not rise to the level of impermissible juror misconduct as there was no showing that if the alternate, in fact, did improperly speak during deliberations, that this affected the decision of any of the twelve regular jurors. In fact, each of the jurors was individually polled after the verdict and each orally said it was their individual and collective verdict.

(R. at 190.)

A threshold question is whether the juror affidavits may be considered at all. Indiana Evidence Rule 606(b), adopted in 1994, says:

Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify (1) to drug or alcohol use by any juror, (2) on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or (3) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying may not be received for these purposes.

Griffin argues that the alternate's opinion was an "outside influence" under the third exception, and we agree. The affidavits are therefore admissible, at least as evidence (which the State did not refute) that the alternate improperly participated in jury deliberations. We therefore proceed to consider the ramifications of this conduct.

A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show that the misconduct (1) was gross and (2) probably harmed the defendant. Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind.1988). We review the trial judge's determination on these points only for abuse of discretion, with the burden on the appellant to show that the misconduct meets the prerequisites for a new trial. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.2000) (citations omitted).

To meet his burden, Griffin relies in part on one juror's assertion that the alternate's opinion affected her vote. (R. at 164; Appellant's Br. at 11.) We must therefore decide whether this statement impeaching the jury's verdict is admissible. In doing so we look to the history and policy behind the general rule that jurors may not later seek to nullify their verdicts via affidavit. See, e.g., Taylor v. Garnett, 110 Ind. 287, 11 N.E. 309 (1887).

This Court has long supported the rule prohibiting jurors from later impeaching their verdicts. The policies underlying this rule are important. Allowing such juror affidavits could defeat the jury's solemn acts under oath, open the door to post-trial jury tampering, and allow dissatisfied jurors to destroy a verdict after assenting. Id.

Moreover, if impeachment were allowed, "[t]he sanctity of verdicts would [ ] be diminished and no verdict could ever be final. Jurymen would forever be harassed." Turczi v. State, 261 Ind. 273, 275, 301 N.E.2d 752, 753 (1973) (citations omitted). For these reasons we have historically been reluctant to open the door to a "contest of affidavits and counter-affidavits and arguments and re-arguments as to why and how a certain verdict was reached. Such an unsettled state of affairs would be a disservice to the parties litigant and an unconscionable burden upon citizens who serve on juries." Stinson v. State, 262 Ind. 189, 198, 313 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1974).

The problem, of course, is how to protect such vital defendants' rights as the right to confront witnesses (which may be violated if a jury considers information that was not in evidence) or the right to an impartial jury, if the best (and often only) witnesses to jury improprieties cannot be heard. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966)

. The U.S. Supreme Court considered that dilemma over a century ago and held that a juror "may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind." Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892) (quoting Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (1871)). This Court adopted the Mattox approach in Fox v. State, 457 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.1984).

Ten years after Fox, we adopted Rule 606(b) as Indiana law on juror impeachment of verdicts. This is our first occasion to decide whether the common law prohibition against a juror testifying about how an outside influence affected his decision still applies when a defendant invokes one of the Rule 606(b) exceptions.

Federal practice may inform our analysis. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is very similar to Indiana's rule.⁵ Federal courts generally continue to follow the rule of Mattox, and will accept juror affidavits stating that deliberations were tainted by improper information or influence, but disregard any statements on the effect of that information or influence on the juror's decision. See 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 905 (7th ed.1998).⁶ As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

In evaluating a claim that the jury was improperly influenced by extraneous material, "a district court must ignore a juror's comment regarding how a particular piece of material disposed the juror toward a particular verdict, and the district court must make an independent determination of the likely effect of the prejudicial material."

United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406, 412 n. 1 (7th Cir.2000)(quoting United States v. Berry, 92 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir.1996)).

This approach would seem to restrain the potential for a losing party to provoke virtual re-enactments of the deliberation through competing affidavits purporting to describe the thought processes of individual jurors. As Judge Allen Sharp observed, one risk in allowing juror impeachment of verdicts is that "[i]t is all too easy for ingenious counsel to prepare carefully worded affidavits to cast doubt on a jury verdict." Lindsey v. State, 282 N.E.2d 854, 861 (Ind.App.1972).

Thus, the fact that one juror says the alternate's input "affected" her decision is not part of the analysis governing the request for a new trial. Rather, the trial court must consider the alternate's conduct in the overall trial context. The alternate did not add any fresh perspective to the...