Griffin v. State
| Citation | 517 So.2d 669 |
| Decision Date | 10 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 67224,67224 |
| Parties | Donna Harris GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
In this cause this Court did review Griffin v. State, 470 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), in which the District Court certified a question of great public importance. In our opinion dated December 5, 1985, Griffin v. State, 479 So.2d 739 (Fla.1985), we answered the certified question, holding that a departure sentence grounded on both permissible and impermissible reasons must be reversed and the defendant resentenced unless the state is able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of the impermissible reason(s) would not have affected the departure sentence. Accordingly, we quashed the district court's decision with directions that the district court remand to the trial court for resentencing.
On remand, it appears that the trial court merely issued in chambers an order confirming that the departure sentence would have been imposed upon the Petitioner based solely on the valid written reasons. The trial judge did not interpret this Court's opinion as requiring a resentencing hearing and, therefore, a hearing was not held and neither Petitioner nor Petitioner's counsel was present or otherwise allowed to be heard.
This Court specifically directed a resentencing in this cause rather than directing the trial court to merely affirm that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the impermissible reasons. By resentencing we mean a full sentencing proceeding which necessarily includes the presence of the defendant and his or her attorney. The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees attach whether the sentence is the immediate result of adjudication of guilt or, as here, the sentence is the result of an order directing the trial court to resentence the defendant. See State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla.1983). The presence of the defendant is as necessary at resentencing as it was at the time of the original sentence so that the defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the sentence if warranted unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Pursuant to the power of this Court to enforce its mandate, the trial court's order, dated February 12, 1986, is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Collins
...violates due process. We hold that it does not. Certainly, due process principles apply to a resentencing. See Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) ("The pronouncement of sentence upon a criminal defendant is a critical stage of the proceedings to which all due process guarantees......
-
State v. Tavares
...trial judge directs. The provisions of R. 3:21-4 regarding sentencing apply. See also R. 3:16, 3:21-1 through -8. See also Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669 (Fla.1987) (holding that trial court was required to conduct a full resentencing hearing upon vacation of original sentence by appellate......
-
Harris v. State, 1D00-898.
...by a written plea agreement was a ministerial act for which there was no requirement that Mr. Harris be present. But see Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) (holding the "presence of the defendant is as necessary at resentencing as it was at the time of the original sentence"); ......
-
Jordan v. State
...of the procedure and thus extending the right to be present to the hearing where the sentence will be reconsidered); Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1987) (finding presence of defendant necessary at resentencing so that defendant has the opportunity to submit evidence relevant to ......