Griffin v. Strong, Civ. No. 86-C-894G.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-C-894G.
• Parties: Steven GRIFFIN and Dorothy Griffin, individually, and as Next Friends for Angie Griffin, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. James R. STRONG and Dennis Gale, and John Does I-V, individually, and in their official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

739 F. Supp. 1496

Steven GRIFFIN and Dorothy Griffin, individually, and as Next Friends for Angie Griffin, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. James R. STRONG and Dennis Gale, and John Does I-V, individually, and in their official capacities, Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-C-894G.

United States District Court, D. Utah, C.D.

May 14, 1990.

Steve Russell, Kathryn Collard, for plaintiffs.

Patricia J. Marlowe, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge.

This matter came on regularly on January 22, 1990 for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against defendant Strong. Plaintiffs were represented by Steve Russell and Kathryn Collard. Defendants were represented by Patricia J. Marlowe. After briefing by the parties and oral argument, the court took plaintiffs' motion under advisement. Now being fully advised, the court sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Steven and Dorothy Griffin, individually, and as Next Friends of their minor daughter, Angie Griffin, instituted this action for general and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against defendant James R. Strong, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, and defendant Dennis Gale, a social worker employed by the State of Utah. This action arises out of alleged unlawful arrest, conviction and incarceration of plaintiff Steven Griffin on charges of sexual abuse of a child.

On February 15, 1986, the mother of nine-year-old Cammie K. reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office that her daughter claimed to have been sexually abused by Mr. Griffin. Detective Strong along with two County deputies went to the K.'s home and conducted a taped interview with Cammie, where she told the officers that on several occasions Mr. Griffin had sexually abused her. After interviewing Cammie, the officers went to Mr. Griffin's home. Mr. Griffin was interviewed by Detective Strong and confessed to the alleged abuse, but only after alleged coercion by Strong. Mr. Griffin was arrested and placed in the Salt Lake County Jail. Two days later, Mr. Griffin was interviewed again by Detective Strong, and he confessed a second time after alleged coercion by Strong. Both of these interviews were tape recorded.

Prior to Mr. Griffin's criminal trial in Utah Third District Court, his attorney filed a motion to suppress the two statements on the ground that they were coerced and that he was denied his right to legal counsel. After a hearing, the motion was denied. At trial, Mr. Griffin and the officers testified about the first interview, but no tape or transcript thereof was offered into evidence. The prosecution moved to play an edited tape of the second interview to the jury, and the defendant stipulated to its admission after initially making an objection. Mr. Griffin was convicted by the jury on two counts of sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to serve two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

On May 16, 1988, after Mr. Griffin had been incarcerated for more than two years, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Griffin's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App.1988). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying Mr. Griffin's motion to suppress his first confession because it considered the confession to have been involuntarily given after coercive questioning by Detective Strong. Id. at 971. However, the Court of Appeals also held that Mr. Griffin's first statement was not taken in violation of his right to counsel. Id. at 969. With regard to the second interview, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting the tape and transcript into evidence because Mr. Griffin did not make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights prior to the interview. Id. at 971.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed June 28, 1989, contains allegations that defendants violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights in the course of arresting and prosecuting plaintiff Steven Griffin on charges of child sex abuse.¹ In the First Cause of Action, plaintiffs allege that Mr. Griffin was denied his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by defendant Strong's refusal to allow Mr. Griffin access to legal counsel before obtaining a confession from Mr. Griffin. The Second Cause of Action is that Mr. Griffin's right against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was violated by defendant Strong's alleged use of "coercion, intimidation and threats ... in order to obtain a confession from plaintiff Steve Griffin." Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action is that defendants Strong and Gale allegedly used threats and intimidation against the plaintiffs which deprived plaintiffs of their "right to family integrity, including their right to preserve the sanctity and continuation of their familial relationships, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Claims I and II are brought solely by plaintiff Steven Griffin, whereas Claim III is brought by all three plaintiffs.²

Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relates to the affirmative defenses asserted by defendant Strong in his Answer to plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Defendant Strong's affirmative defenses sought to be dismissed by plaintiffs are that: (1) plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals reversing Mr. Griffin's conviction does not preclude defendant Strong from litigating similar issues in this action (no collateral estoppel); and (3) defendant is immune from liability in this case under the doctrine of qualified immunity. These three issues will be analyzed separately.

ANALYSIS

I. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Defendant Strong's first affirmative defense on which plaintiffs seek summary judgment is the defense that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In order to determine the validity of this defense each of plaintiffs' three claims must be considered separately.

A. Right to Counsel (Claim I)

Plaintiff Steven Griffin alleges in his First Cause of Action that he was denied the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by defendant Strong's failure to allow Mr. Griffin access to legal counsel during his two custodial interrogations of Mr. Griffin. The law is clear that one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until "formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431-32, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). In this case, adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun at the time of the interviews in question. Therefore, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Strong's defense that claim I fails to state a cause of action is denied. Furthermore, in light of the authorities cited, and due to the fact that plaintiffs concede in their reply brief that the First Cause of Action is not actionable under the Sixth Amendment, that claim is hereby dismissed.

B. Right Against Self-Incrimination (Claim II)

Plaintiff Steven Griffin's Second Cause of Action is that defendant Strong allegedly used coercion in order to obtain his confession and that he was not afforded an opportunity to have legal counsel present during his interviews with defendant Strong, all in violation of Mr. Griffin's right against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

It is alleged in the Amended Complaint that on two different occasions defendant Strong interviewed Mr. Griffin regarding his alleged sexual abuse of a child. Plaintiff claims that during the first interview he requested a lawyer but that defendant Strong nevertheless continued to question him. During the second interview, which occurred two days later in the Salt Lake County Jail, defendant Strong allegedly failed to tell Mr. Griffin of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he allegedly refused Mr. Griffin's request to speak to an attorney, and he allegedly threatened and intimidated Mr. Griffin in order to obtain a confession.

Plaintiff Steven Griffin argues that in Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967, 106 S.Ct. 332, 88 L.Ed.2d 316 (1985), the Tenth Circuit recognized a civil cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for extracting an involuntary confession. Defendant Strong admits that the Tenth Circuit has recognized such a cause of action, but he argues that because this allegation is disputed and because this Court has not determined that he is precluded from making such a claim, he is "entitled to allege that plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim in this regard."

Plaintiffs' motion attacking the affirmative defense of failure to state a claim raises the same issue with which the court would be confronted if defendant had moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. In such cases, "the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint must be taken as true and the complaint may be dismissed only if plaintiffs `can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief.'" Schaefer v. Wilcock, 676 F.Supp. 1092, 1103 (D.Utah 1987) (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Of course, it is one thing to assert a cause of action and another to prove it.

In this case, plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action does state a valid cause of action for violation of Mr. Griffin's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination,...