Griffin v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 21495.,21495. |
| Parties | Joseph GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Morris J. Levin, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Richard R. Paradise, Washington, D. C. (both appointed by his court) was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. James E. Kelley, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Harold J. Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WRIGHT and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant was indicted for second degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon without a license, the former under 22 D.C.Code § 2403 (1967), the latter under 22 D.C.Code § 3204 (1967). He was convicted of both offenses. When the trial had progressed through the testimony of an eyewitness called by the United States, who gave his description of how appellant shot Charles Ballard, the deceased, appellant testified in his own behalf on direct examination. He described a struggle with Ballard over a gun. A shot was fired, the gun fell, and appellant picked it up and left with the deceased apparently unharmed. This testimony conflicted to a considerable degree with the version given by the prosecution's eyewitness. Before appellant's cross-examination the trial was recessed for four days, including a weekend.
As the trial was being resumed counsel for the United States advised the court that Appellant's counsel stated that appellant, "fully understanding the case and the posture of the likelihood of how this case would wind up," desired so to plead.1
In response to inquiry by the court appellant affirmed his wish to plead guilty to manslaughter. He volunteered a short statement about the encounter which resulted in the homicide. The court inquired of counsel whether this version was like the one appellant had given him, asking that appellant tell the court what happened. Appellant's rambling narrative which followed was different from the version told counsel. The court said the difference was sufficient to require continuation of the trial, adding, "if there is any question in the mind of the Court with respect to this defendant fully understanding, or if there are any inconsistencies with which he states in open court, and what he states to counsel in private conversation, I will not accept the plea."
Further recesses, at the instance of the defense, and further colloquies out of the presence of the jury took place. It is difficult to depict clearly all appellant's versions of the encounter. Included, however, was a claim of a knife attack by deceased and appellant's admission that he had not previously told the truth, for which he asked the mercy of the court. As to the "truth," he said, differing from his testimony on direct examination, he took the gun from his own pocket instead of taking it from deceased and shot deceased after he observed him "swinging at him with a knife."
The court was concerned about the existence of an issue of self-defense arising from appellant's versions. Thus, the judge stated:
I want the record to reveal very clearly that we are not in the process of bargaining here. This Court will accept this plea if the Court can be assured that what the defendant states to the Court happened on that day it happened, and I think we should satisfy ourselves, counsel, and I think you should satisfy yourself, as to whether or not the defendant\'s representations to the Court this morning is to the effect that prior to the time that the gun was fired by the defendant there was a knife in the hands of the deceased, and that there was an attempt by the deceased to use the knife on the defendant.
We are nevertheless convinced, upon the record as a whole, that the court's refusal to accept the plea of guilty to manslaughter, as also the plea of guilty to the weapon charge, was because appellant's several exchanges with counsel and court were not consistent.
As matters developed we think the plea of guilty to manslaughter should have been accepted.
Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
North Carolina v. Alford, 14
...with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, see, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 132 U.S. App.D.C. 108, 110, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (1968); Bruce v. United States, supra, 126 U.S.App.D.C., at 342, 379 F.2d, at 119 (1967); Commonwealth v. Cottre......
-
Carter v. U.S., Cr. 93-50024-02.
...testify to his guilt and that a defendant's inconsistencies do not afford good ground for refusing a guilty plea. See Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (1968). In response, Respondent now insists that Petitioner's guilty plea was properly rejected because Petitioner failed to pr......
-
Pettyjohn v. United States
...the transcript that the plea was invalid except insofar as the statements quoted in text may indicate. 2 See Griffin v. United States, 132 U.S. App.D.C. 108, 405 F.2d 1378 (1968); McCoy v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 177, 363 F.2d 306 (1966). For a different aspect of the same problem,......
-
Meyer v. United States, 19678.
...to ask, would the court have taken the plea? See McCoy v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 363 F.2d 306 (1966); cf. Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (1968). To ask this question, one does not have to assess the credibility of Meyer's claim of innocence. Petitioner's conduct here ......