Griffin v. Vandegriff
| Decision Date | 11 April 1949 |
| Docket Number | 16524. |
| Citation | 53 S.E.2d 345,205 Ga. 288 |
| Parties | GRIFFIN v. VANDEGRIFF. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1949.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Article 4, section 4, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of 1945 is in substance the same as article 4, section 2, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of 1877, and its meaning is that fixed by construction by this court in State v. Central Railway Co., 109 Ga. 716, 35 S.E. 37, 48 A.L.R. 351, while it was a part of the previous Constitution, and it does not declare any new principle of law and has the same meaning as the Code, § 20-504.
2. The restrictive clause in the contract of employment in the present case is supported by a sufficient consideration in the form of mutual promises and has been rendered definite by performance of the main contract, and being reasonable as to time and area, is not void under the above-stated clause of the Constitution or section of the Code.
The petition of R. M. Vandegriff, doing business as Superior Laundry, against W. B. Griffin and Lee Kennedy, individually and doing business as Hendricks Laundry, alleged that the petitioner had been injured in the sum of $5000 as a result of the employment of the defendant Griffin by the defendant Kennedy in violation of a contract between the petitioner and the defendant Griffin. The contract relied upon and attached to the petition as an exhibit shows that it was executed on December 17, 1946, by the terms of which contract the petitioner employed the defendant Griffin to call for and deliver laundered and unlaundered goods and to perform such other duties as may be required of him, for a compensation of 'a percentage of all monies collected in his territory the amount to be agreed upon,' for all laundry and dry cleaning brought in, delivered and collected for, and such additional wages, if any, as may from time to time be agreed upon. The contract recited that such employment enabled the employee to discover and acquire the method of doing business and to become skilled in that business, and contained a clause whereby the employee agreed that he would not at any time, while in such employ, or within one year after leaving the same, 'call for, deliver or solicit laundered or unlaundered goods for himself or any other person, persons or company, nor will he directly or indirectly solicit, divert take away or attempt to solicit, divert or take away any of the customers, business or patronage of such customers within such one year after leaving the services of said party of the first part, in the portion of section which he had served while in the service of the party of the first part--Fulton, DeKalb and Gwinnett Counties of Georgia.' The petition alleged that Griffin entered the employment of the petitioner immediately after the date of the contract and continued in his employ until November 6, 1948, at which time he resigned after having given two weeks' notice; and that a partial list of customers furnished to the defendant Griffin upon his entering the employment of the petitioner is attached to the petition as an exhibit. Griffin solicited the business of the customers on behalf of the petitioner from the date of his employment to the date of his resignation. The petitioner has been advised and believes it to be true that on November 8, 1948, the defendant entered into an agreement with the defendant, Kennedy and Hendricks Laundry, whereby Griffin agreed to call for and solicit unlaundered goods and deliver them to Kennedy individually and as Hendricks Laundry. The goods were to be laundered for and on behalf of the defendant Griffin. On November 8, 1948, Griffin contacted the customers of the petitioner listed in Exhibit 'B' attached to the petition, and secured from them unlaundered goods, which he took and turned over to the defendant, Kennedy and Hendricks Laundry, to be laundered. Kennedy and Hendricks Laundry have been advised that Griffin had been employed by the petitioner, and Kennedy advised the petitioner that he would not stop taking unlaundered goods from Griffin but would continue to do so. By such conduct Kennedy and Hendricks Laundry are aiding the defendant Griffin to violate his contract with the petitioner, which contract remains in force until November 6, 1948. The petitioner has no adequate remedy at law.
The prayers were for an injunction against Griffin during the period of one year from November 6, 1948, from soliciting, serving, or catering to any of the customers of the petitioner whom Griffin served during his employment with the petitioner; that Griffin be enjoined from being interested in or connected with any other person soliciting, serving, and catering to any of the petitioner's customers; that the defendant Kennedy be enjoined from aiding the defendant Griffin in violating his contract with the petitioner; and that the petitioner recover a judgment of $5000 and costs of this proceeding.
The exception here is to the judgment overruling the general demurrer filed by the defendant Griffin to the petition.
H. O. Hubert, Jr., Decatur, for plaintiff in error.
E. A. Wright, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
For parties at interest, not parties to record: Herbert J. & Joseph F. Haas, J. Kurt Holland, Hugh Howell, Jr., Morris B. Abram, Gilmer A. MacDougald, and Heyman, Howell & Heyman, and Poole, Pearce & Hall, and MacDougald, Troutman, Sams & Branch, Atlanta.
DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).
1. Article 4, section 4, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of 1945 is as follows: With minor changes in sentence structure the quoted clause was taken from article 4, section 2, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of 1877, which was as follows: 'The General Assembly of this State shall have no power to authorize any corporation to buy shares, or stock, in any other corporation in this State, or elsewhere, or to make any contract, or agreement whatever, with any such corporation which may have the effect, or be intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen competition * * *, or to encourage monoply; and all such contracts and agreements shall be illegal and void.' If this clause of the Constitution is ambiguous, the construction placed thereon, while it was a part of the provisions of the Constitution of 1877, in State v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 109 Ga. 716, 35 S.E. 37, 48 L.R.A. 351, would be controlling as to its meaning in the present Constitution. Thompson, Lieutenant Governor v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883. But if it be unambiguous, we would not be authorized to look beyond its actual verbiage to find its meaning, but would be required to give it that meaning which is expressed. It would neither require nor permit a construction which would cause it to mean anything other than that clearly revealed by its own terms. Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104, 110; Standard Steel Works v. Williams, 155 Ga. 177(2), 116 S.E. 636; State v. Camp, 189 Ga. 209, 6 S.E.2d 299; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. McFarley, 191 Ga. 334, 337, 12 S.E.2d 355; 11 Am.Jur. 678, § 64; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 29, p. 67. Were it permissible under controlling rules of construction to lift from the context the words thereof one at a time, and while thus isolated, attach the full meaning of each word, then it would appear that the verbiage of this clause would render void any contract or agreement which had the effect of defeating or lessening competition of every kind whatsoever, irrespective of the nature of the enterprise or the public welfare or the legitimate interest of the parties or the degree to which such competition is either defeated or lessened. Such an interpretation would manifestly apply to all contests in...
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