Griffin v. Vill. of New Lenox Police Pension Fund
| Decision Date | 05 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 3-19-0557 |
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 626,447 Ill.Dec. 272,2021 IL App (3d) 190557 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | Paul GRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF NEW LENOX POLICE PENSION FUND, the Board of Trustees of the Village of New Lenox Police Pension Fund and the Village of New Lenox, Defendants-Appellants. |
Keith A. Karlson and Raymond G. Garza, of Karlson Garza LLC, of Palos Heights, for appellants.
Thomas W. Duda, of Palatine, for appellee.
¶ 1 The plaintiff, Paul Griffin, applied to the Board of Trustees of the Village of New Lenox Police Pension Fund (Board) for a line-of-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) ( 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2016) ). Alternatively, the plaintiff requested a not-on-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3-114.2 of the Code (id. § 3-114.2). The Board denied his request for a line-of-duty disability pension but granted him a not-on-duty disability pension. The plaintiff sought administrative review of the Board's decision before the circuit court, naming the Village of New Lenox Police Pension Fund, the Board, and the Village of New Lenox as defendants. The court reversed the Board's decision.
¶ 3 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence presented before the Board on June 20, 2018, and the Board's decision and order dated October 22, 2018.
¶ 5 In December 2002, the plaintiff was appointed as a probationary patrol officer for the New Lenox Police Department and received a regular appointment in December 2003. Prior to this employment, he worked for several other municipalities as a police officer. Around November 2011, the plaintiff was promoted to detective. This role required him to handle criminal investigations, make and assist with arrests, respond to emergency traffic accidents, assist officers when dispatched, use necessary force to disarm suspects, testify in a courtroom setting, and assist in the preparation of cases for prosecution.
¶ 6 On September 7, 2016, the plaintiff was working from 8 a.m. until 4 p.m. He was wearing his service revolver, handcuffs, and police radio. The plaintiff reported to the police department at 8 a.m. His supervisor informed him that he was to testify before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena at the county courthouse. The plaintiff drove his vehicle assigned by the police department with his partner, Jeff Furlong, to testify. He parked the vehicle and carried paperwork, police reports, and a subpoena related to his testimony into the courtroom while Furlong waited for him. After testifying, the plaintiff and Furlong exited the building and walked toward the vehicle to return to the police department. While getting into the vehicle, the plaintiff slipped off the curb, hyperextended his knee, and grabbed the door to prevent himself from falling. The plaintiff immediately felt pain in the front and rear of his left knee but returned to the police department.
¶ 7 Following the injury, the plaintiff's knee continued to hurt, and he reported the incident to his supervisor. The next day, he made an appointment with his medical provider because his pain was worse and he could hardly walk. The plaintiff was advised to take ibuprofen
and ice his knee. He returned to work on light duty. The plaintiff continued to seek medical treatment where he received a cortisone injection, arthroscopic surgery for a meniscus tear, and an eventual knee replacement in August 2017. He was unaware of any permanent light duty assignment with the police department. The plaintiff resigned from his position with the police department on October 10, 2017. He admitted that he resigned during an internal investigation unrelated to his testimony and injury that occurred on September 7, 2016.
¶ 8 The plaintiff testified that, as a detective, he was required to perform all duties of a patrol officer, even when driving to and from assigned court appearances. However, at the time of his injury, he was not looking for crimes, no one contacted him on his department phone or radio to respond to any emergency call or service, and he completed all of his duties related to the grand jury at the time he slipped. The plaintiff agreed that, at the time of his injury, he was simply walking back to the car to return to the police station and do some more paperwork. He admitted that any citizen could testify at a courthouse and bring paperwork, and it was not unique to police officers.
¶ 10 The plaintiff was examined by three physicians in accordance with section 3-115 of the Code (id. § 3-115). First, Dr. Junaid Makda, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, examined the plaintiff on March 8, 2018. He stated that the plaintiff reported he was returning to his car from the courthouse while carrying documents in his hand, his vehicle was parked by a curb, and his foot slipped/tripped over the curb when he entered his vehicle, which caused him to hyperextend his knee and grab the car door to prevent himself from falling. He opined that the plaintiff was permanently disabled. Dr. Makda also stated that the disability was a direct result of a permanent aggravation of a preexisting condition (osteoarthritis
of the left knee).
¶ 11 Second, Dr. Leon M. Huddleston, a board-certified physical medicine and rehabilitation physician, examined the plaintiff on March 12, 2018. He stated that the plaintiff reported he was leaving the courthouse when he misstepped on a curb and hyperextended his left knee. Dr. Huddleston opined that the plaintiff was permanently disabled. He found that the plaintiff's explanation of how the disability occurred was consistent with his findings. Dr. Huddleston further opined that the plaintiff had preexisting degenerative changes (osteoarthritis
) in the left knee that were aggravated by the September 7, 2016, accident. He noted that the plaintiff will have difficulty stooping and bending because of limited range of motion and pain in the knee.
¶ 12 Last, Dr. Daniel G. Samo, an occupational and environmental medicine physician, examined the plaintiff on March 15, 2018. He opined that the plaintiff was disabled. He noted that, prior to the September 7, 2016, injury, the plaintiff had been fully functioning and asymptomatic in regard to his underlying preexisting degenerative knee condition. However, the September 7, 2016, injury caused the plaintiff to become symptomatic.
¶ 14 The Board found that the plaintiff was disabled as a result of the September 7, 2016, injury. However, it denied his request for a line-of-duty disability pension and awarded him benefits for a not-on-duty disability pension instead. The Board found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden that he was injured by any act of duty involving special risk not encountered by an ordinary citizen. Specifically, it noted (1) numerous citizens walk to and from buildings with paper in their hands every day, (2) the plaintiff was not on patrol or responding to a call when he misstepped, (3) he had motive to be dishonest in his testimony because he would be unable to return to work if the Board denied him benefits, (4) he only applied for disability benefits after learning he was under investigation and would likely be discharged, and (5) he was less than credible.
¶ 18 On appeal, the parties dispute whether the plaintiff was performing an act of duty within the meaning of the Code when he was injured on September 7, 2016.
¶ 20 In administrative review cases, this court reviews the decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the circuit court. Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board , 226 Ill. 2d 485, 504, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007). The applicable standard of review depends upon whether the issue presented is one of fact where the manifest weight standard applies, one of law where the de novo standard applies, or a mixed question of fact and law where the clearly erroneous standard applies. Merlo v. Orland Hills Police Pension Board , 383 Ill. App. 3d 97, 99-100, 321 Ill.Dec. 890, 890 N.E.2d 612 (2008).
¶ 21 Here, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review. However, they agree that the issue is whether the plaintiff was performing an act of duty within the meaning of the Code. The Board argues that we review its decision under the clearly erroneous standard because the issue involves a mixed question of fact and law. The plaintiff argues for de novo review because the facts are uncontroverted. We agree with the Board that the clearly erroneous standard applies, as this court is being asked to review an administrative decision that "involves an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts," thereby constituting a mixed question of fact and law. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board , 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). Stated another way, "act of duty" is a legal term that required the Board's interpretation, and whether the involved a special risk required the Board to make a factual determination. Gilliam v. Board of Trustees of the City of Pontiac Police Pension Fund , 2018 IL App (4th) 170232, ¶ 23, 421 Ill.Dec. 762, 101 N.E.3d 199. Thus, we proceed with the clearly erroneous standard. Under this standard, the Board's decision is given some deference and reversal is warranted only when the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Merlo , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 321 Ill.Dec. 890, 890 N.E.2d 612.
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