Griffis v. Davidson Cty Metro. Government

• Decision Date: 26 May 2005
• Citation: 164 S.W.3d 267
• Parties: Lillian E. GRIFFIS, et al. v. DAVIDSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT d/b/a Davidson County Board of Education.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

164 S.W.3d 267

Lillian E. GRIFFIS, et al. v. DAVIDSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT d/b/a Davidson County Board of Education.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

February 2, 2005 Session.

May 26, 2005.

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Karl F. Dean, J. Brooks Fox, and John L. Kennedy, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

John W. Barringer, Jr. and Justin D. Wear, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees Lillian E. Griffis, Nellie Wheeler, and Audrey Griffis.

Randall G. Bennett and Vickie P. Hall, Nashville, Tennessee, for amicus curiae Tennessee School Boards Association.

OPINION

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, J.J., joined.

In 1908, a fee simple determinable estate in real property was conveyed to the Davidson County Board of Education and its successors ("Metro"). The deed required the property to be used "for school purposes" and to be "devoted exclusively to the cause of education." The deed further provided that the property would revert to the grantors or their heirs should the property be "abandoned" for these purposes. In July 2000, the defendant Metro ceased using the property for classroom instruction and administration but continued to maintain the property, to use it to store surplus food service equipment, and to hold it in reserve for possible use in the indefinite future. In April 2001, heirs of the grantors brought suit against Metro, claiming that the property had been abandoned for school purposes, thereby triggering reversion to them. Concluding that there had been no abandonment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the limitations "for school purposes" and the "cause of education" are satisfied solely by classroom instruction. The Court of Appeals thus not only held that Metro had abandoned the property for these limitations, but also granted summary judgment in favor of the nonmovants, the heirs of the grantors. We vacate the Court of Appeals' holding that "school purposes" and the "cause of education" require classroom instruction alone. We hold that these limitations permit any use that directly benefits and enhances the process of learning and instruction or that directly advances the objective of instructing, training, and rearing. Further, we hold that in a fee simple determinable where the term "abandon" is not otherwise defined, the common law definition of abandonment applies; a complainant therefore must show both intent to abandon for the stated limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to abandon is effectuated. Whether abandonment has occurred is predominantly a factual determination based upon all the relevant circumstances. In the proceedings below, the parties lacked the benefit of our holding today concerning the legal standard for abandonment; consequently, the factual record relevant to this standard has not been sufficiently developed. We thus vacate both the Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties the opportunity to litigate the case in accord with the legal standard adopted herein.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 3, 1908, George W. Haley and his wife Sarah Haley donated a one-acre parcel of land located in Davidson County, Tennessee, to the Davidson County Board of Education and its successors. In addition to conveying the property, the deed imposed restrictions on its use: (1) that the property "is to be devoted exclusively to the cause of education"; and (2) that "when said property is abandoned for school purposes said land reverts to said Haley or his heirs or representatives." Soon after the conveyance, a facility for Union Hill Elementary School was constructed. Although in their briefs and oral arguments before this Court the parties stated that classes thereafter began to be held in the facility, the appellate record fails to include evidence concerning the property's use from 1909 to February 2000.¹

As shown by minutes from meetings of the Metropolitan Board of Public Education, a subdivision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (collectively "Metro"),² there was discussion in 2000 about whether to close Union Hill due to decreased enrollment. On or about July 13, 2000, Metropolitan Board director Bill Wise announced the closure of Union Hill as an instructional facility. Joe A. Edgens, Executive Director of Facilities and Operations of the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, explained that classes were suspended because of declining enrollment. Since then, no classroom instruction or school-sponsored activities have been conducted on the property, and no teachers, administrators or other employees of Metro have worked or maintained offices in the Union Hill facility.

On April 24, 2001 — approximately nine months after the closure of Union Hill was announced — the plaintiffs Lillian E. Griffis, Audrey Griffis, and Nellie Wheeler brought suit against Metro, claiming that Metro had abandoned use of the property for school and educational purposes and therefore, as the heirs of George W. Haley, that the property had reverted to them. Metro denied that abandonment had occurred.

Subsequently, Metro moved for summary judgment. In support of this motion Mr. Edgens testified that, in his opinion, Metro had never ceased using the property for school purposes. First, he stated that Metro has retained the property in its "school property inventory" and has not formally declared it to be "surplus property" for sale or use by another sector of the Metropolitan Government.³ Second, Metro has continued to maintain the Union Hill facility by retaining utility services and mowing the grass. Third, sometime after classroom instruction was discontinued, Metro began using the Union Hill facility to store surplus food service equipment. Fourth, although Metro has had no definite plans for resuming classroom instruction in the future, Metro asserted that it could possibly do so at some time.

The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of Metro. The trial court agreed with the parties that the deed conveyed a fee simple determinable estate to Metro and reserved in the Haleys and their heirs the future interest of a possibility of reverter. The court held that reverters are disfavored and are strictly construed; a reverter will not be found to have occurred unless "the evidence clearly shows the purpose and spirit of the grant have been violated." Further, the trial court held that in light of McDonald v. Smith County Board of Education, 675 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn.1984), and Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees of Lawrence County, 125 Ill.App.3d 619, 80 Ill.Dec. 870, 466 N.E.2d 322 (1984), "school purposes" means something much broader than "merely instructional purposes" and does not require the actual holding of classes. Finding that Metro's current use of the property did not constitute an "abandonment" for school purposes, the trial court concluded that the property had not reverted.

The Court of Appeals not only reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Metro, but also granted summary judgment in favor of the non-movants, the plaintiffs. Looking to the common definitions of "school" and "education" at the time of the grant and construing the words of the deed as a whole, the Court of Appeals determined that "Mr. Haley's intention in conveying this [p]roperty to Davidson County was served only by the [p]roperty's use as a classroom facility." McDonald was distinguished on the ground that the deed in this case contains additional and more detailed restrictive language than the deed in McDonald. The Court of Appeals concluded that use of the Union Hill facility to store food service equipment did not comport with school or educational purposes. The intermediate court also considered certain post-judgment facts. On February 24, 2004, Metro received a proposal from an organization named "A Better Way to Learn" to lease the Union Hill facility for preschool instruction and to provide a forum for various education-related activities. However, these facts were considered to be moot because the Court of Appeals determined that the reverter had already been triggered "upon the [p]roperty ceasing to be used as a classroom."

We granted Metro's application for permission to appeal. We also granted the plaintiffs' motion to consider the additional post-judgment fact that The City Paper of Nashville reported on September 15, 2004, that the Metro school board had recommended selling the Union Hill facility.

II. Analysis

We must determine whether the property in question has been abandoned by Metro for school and educational purposes. This inquiry is necessarily framed by construction of the awkwardly-crafted Haley deed, which provides in relevant part as follows:

For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar ($1.00) and the interest I have for the education of the children of my neighborhood and community generally, provided however, the same is to be devoted exclusively to the cause of education, I, Geo. W. Haley and wife, and when said property is abandoned for school purposes said land reverts to said Haley or his heirs or representatives, have bargained and sold, and by these presents do transfer and convey unto the said [t]he Davidson County Board of Education, J. Taylor Stratton, Chairman, and their successors in office, a certain tract or parcel of land in Davidson County, State of Tennessee....

In construing a deed, our primary task is to ascertain the grantor's intent from the words of the deed...