Griffis v. Sellars

• Decision Date: 31 December 1837
• Citation: 19 N.C. 492
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ABEL GRIFFIS v. WILLIS SELLARS.

19 N.C. 492

ABEL GRIFFIS

v.WILLIS SELLARS.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DECEMBER TERM, 1837.

An action for a malicious prosecution cannot be sustained where a verdict and judgment of conviction have been had in a Court of competent jurirdiction, although the party was afterwards acquitted upon an appeal to a superior tribunal.

Case for a malicious prosecution, tried before his Honor Judge Saunders, at Orange, on the last Circuit. Plea— Not Guilty.

On the trial the case was, that the defendant had preferred a charge against the plaintiff, and his brother and mother, for mismarking his, the defendant's hogs;that it was found a true bill at the Nov. Sessions, 1833, of Orange County Court; and at the ensuing term the plaintiff and his brother were convicted, and the mother acquitted; that the plaintiff and his brother appealed to the

Superior Court, where they were acquitted. There was much other testimony on both sides, introduced by the defendant to show a probable cause, and on the other a want of it. The case was argued by the defendant's counsel as one for the jury. Authorities were read and commented on to the jury—that in the absence of express malice, the circumstances well justified the defendant in believing the plaintiff guilty of the charge, and the fact that the plaintiff had been found guilty in the County Court ought to satisfy them that the defendant had probable cause for preferring the charge.

"The Court was not called upon to express any opinion "whether the circumstances, if believed, constituted prob-"able cause; and as this was of that class of cases in which "probable cause consists partly of matter of law, and partly "of matter of fact, (29 Eng. Com. Law, 313) the judge "charged the jury, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to "show a prosecution by defendant, and its failure—malice "on the part of the defendant in preferring the charge, and "that it was made without probable cause: that if the plain"tiff had been guilty, it mattered not as to defendant's motives. "So if defendant, from the circumstances, had grounds hon"estly to believe plaintiff guilty, although in fact he was in"nocent, it was a sufficient defence to the action. That if "the defendant had grounds for this belief, then he had prob"able cause for the prosecution, and the verdict should be "for him. That if the circumstances did not justify this be-"lief, and the jury should think the defendant had been in-"fluenced by malice in making the charge—and malice in its "legal sense was not mere ill-will, but an intentional injury to "another, without just cause or excuse—then their verdict "should be for plaintiff." The counsel for the defendant then requested the Court to instruct the jury, that the fact of the parties living near each other, and the hogs being in the mark of the plaintiff, as had been proved in thecourse of the trial, justified the defendant in supposing that the hogs had been marked by the plaintiff. "The Court stated to the jury, that these circumstances were "to be considered by them, and whether they justified the "defendant in the belief of the plaintiff's guilt,—it was for "them to collect, after comparing them with the other circumstances in the case. And the Court, not conceiving

"itself called upon for an opinion as to whether probable "cause had been shown if believed, and no objection being "taken to what was said in reply to the special instruction "prayed for, left the case to the jury." A verdict was returned for the plaintiff; and the defendant appealed.

RUFFIN, Chief Justice: The innocence of the plaintiff, and a bad motive in the defendant, though necessary, are not the sole or sufficient grounds of this kind of action. It is the interest of the public that there should be a fair investigation in every case of reasonable suspicion; and therefore the law, upon its policy, denies to one really innocent an action against him who promoted the investigation of a case of proper suspicion. Hence, the declaration must allege, that the prosecution was preferred without any just and reasonable, or, as it is commonly said, probable cause; and of that there must be proof from the plaintiff.

Waiving the inquiry, whether the question of probable cause be, from its nature, one of law or one of fact, and admitting that there may be cases in which it is a mixed question, and, as partly partaking of both, may be left to the jury under the advice of the Court, yet it is perfectly certain, that, as legal inferences, presumptions of the want of probable cause, on the one hand, and of its existence, on the other, are held to be established by the judicial acts in the various stages of the prosecution.

Similar inferences from the proceedings likewise remain to some extent, after their determination. It is settled in this state, that a discharge by the examining magistrate imports that the accusation was groundless.

Bostick v. Rutherford, 11 N. C., 83. If the magistrate commit, or if the grand jury find a bill, it has never been doubted that, in law, that is evidence of probable cause, and calls for an answer from the plaintiff as to the particular circumstances; which imposes it on the plaintiff to go into the circumstances, in the first instance. It is true, that in these cases the evidence is deemed prima facie only; but nevertheless, it is evidence in that degree, as declared by law,

and the principle is made a part of the law of evidence. After conviction, however, the evidence rises in degree, and is conclusive. This action will not lie under any circumstances, after conviction. Why?...