Griffith v. Arnold & Rasmussen

• Decision Date: 17 December 1927
• Docket Number: 38279
• Citation: 216 N.W. 728,204 Iowa 1216
• Parties: WILLIAM H. GRIFFITH, Executor, Appellant, v. ARNOLD & RASMUSSEN, Appellees
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

216 N.W. 728

204 Iowa 1216

WILLIAM H. GRIFFITH, Executor, Appellant, v. ARNOLD & RASMUSSEN, Appellees

No. 38279

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 17, 1927

Appeal from Audubon District Court.--W. C. RATCLIFF, Judge.

Action at law for money had and received. Defense was in two divisions, the first being a general denial, and the second an affirmative defense. Upon motion of defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court dismissed the petition. The plaintiff has appealed.

Affirmed.

Salinger Reynolds & Meyers and Charles S. White, for appellant.

Tinley Mitchell, Ross & Mitchell and L. L. Ryan, for appellees.

EVANS C. J. STEVENS, FAVILLE, KINDIG, and WAGNER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

EVANS, C. J.

The capacity of the plaintiff as executor and that of the defendant as a partnership are conceded. The plaintiff's purported cause of action is predicated upon three principal allegations:

(1) That, on March 3, 1921, the defendant-partnership procured the plaintiff's decedent, Myron C. Griffith, "to execute a note to E. H. Lougee for $ 14,500 secured by a mortgage on land of decedent."

(2) "That, on May 3, 1921, Lougee paid defendants $ 14,500.00 as the proceeds of said loan, with directions to pay the same to said Myron C. Griffith, after satisfying a mortgage of $ 9,292.25."

(3) "That defendant-partnership paid the mortgage, but has failed and refused to pay over to the said Myron C. Griffith, or to anyone legally authorized to receive same, the balance of said funds remitted by the mortgagee."

The prayer is for judgment for the balance due. The affirmative defense pleaded was that John H. Griffith alone, as son of Myron C. Griffith, conducted all the negotiations with the defendant, and that said John H. Griffith was one of the signers of the note, and collected and received from the defendant all the proceeds of said loan over and above the mortgage described in the petition. Plaintiff's reply to this affirmative defense was that John H Griffith had no authority from the said Myron C. Griffith to receive said funds, and that said Myron C. Griffith was of unsound mind, and incapable of either authorizing or ratifying any act of agency on the part of John H. Griffith. From pleadings and evidence and argument it appears that Myron C. Griffith was a widower, in advanced years, who had three sons, John, William H., and Charles. He had two farms, of 160 acres each, which were occupied respectively by John and William H. The decedent made his home with John. The mortgaged farm was the one occupied by the son John. A reader of the record will naturally surmise that the real intent of the litigation was to contest the authority of the son John to collect from the defendant the proceeds of the loan negotiated through the defendant. But the hearing before the trial court never reached that point. The contest before the trial court, which is said to have lasted for three days, might be likened to a fencing bout between skilled knights of the bar, each seeking to shift to the other the burden of proof. The evident strategy of the plaintiff was to make a prima-facie case upon his petition, and thereby to shift upon the defendant the burden of proving the affirmative defense. When the plaintiff rested, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of his evidence by motion, which was sustained by the court. The contention of the plaintiff, as appellant, is that he made a prima-facie case, and that for that reason alone, in the absence of contrary evidence, he was entitled to judgment. Argument on both sides has been predicated upon elementary principles, without citation of any precedents. The action was at law, and a jury was waived therein by stipulation. The judge who sustained the motion of the defendant was the trier of fact. If we were to hold that plaintiff's evidence made a prima-facie case, would it follow that he was necessarily entitled to a reversal? A prima-facie case is not necessarily a conclusive one before the jury. A plaintiff may make a prima-facie case in a technical sense which entitles him to go to the jury, and yet may lose his case before the jury for want of strength and substance in his evidence. And so in this case, even though the judge believed that the plaintiff had made a prima-facie case in a technical sense, which would have entitled him to go to the jury, yet, if he had believed also that the evidence was not convincing, and that the circumstances...