Griffith v. Brooks, A89A1049

Decision Date16 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. A89A1049,A89A1049
PartiesGRIFFITH v. BROOKS.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Hartley, Puls & O'Connor, Alton G. Hartley, Decatur, Edward F. O'Connor, Jr., for appellant.

Harrison & Harrison, G. Hughel Harrison, Lawrenceville, for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

This is an appeal by the natural father of a 3 1/2-year-old boy, from the order granting adoption of the child to the mother's second husband. The father, Michael Griffith, Jr., is and was at the time of these proceedings serving time in Wayne County Correctional Institute for rape and aggravated sodomy. He previously had been convicted of burglary and assault involving several different incidents. He filed an answer to the petition for adoption and objected to the action.

The appeal centers entirely upon the refusal of the trial court to have Griffith transported to Gwinnett County to be present at the adoption hearing. It appears undisputed in the record that Griffith did not have the $546 which was established to be the cost of transporting him to defend the civil case which would terminate his parental rights. Much discussion was had amongst counsel and the trial court as to whether Griffith's father, Mr. Griffith, Sr., could have afforded to pay the cost of his son's transport; the trial court evidently concluded that while Mr. Griffith, Sr., clearly loved his grandson, his interest in the child was not sufficient to prompt him to pay for transport of his son to protect his parental rights in the suit filed against him, and that even though the evidence showed the grandfather, Mr. Griffith, Sr., had an income of only $675 from Social Security, he owned a house and a mobile home vehicle, and could have funded the transport of his son from prison to these adoption proceedings, or could have intervened in the matter if his interest in the boy had been sufficiently genuine.

In denying appellant's request for funds to be transported to attend the hearing on the adoption of his son, the trial court ruled: "The court feels like [on] the better side of discretion, Mr. Griffith Senior had sufficient assets in order to have gotten [Griffith Jr.] up here if he wanted to. And if the grandfather has all that many assets and is not willing to advance the $500 to get him up here, it's pretty apparent to the court that he doesn't have a lot of interest in whether or not his boy is here to represent himself and testify in this case.... [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would submit that the issue is not the indigency of a person of the father [sic] who is not a party to this action.... [THE COURT]: I agree that that is the rule. However, the court doesn't sit in a vacuum, you know. Even the Supreme Court Justices invite some permanent person down there that's unique in their field to discuss with them, they've had architects and Coach Dooley to keep up with what's going on in the world.... Mr. Griffith Senior is here, and he also had visitation rights, and I just think that the assets are available to Mr. Griffith, Jr. to have been here had they seen fit to do so.... He's had sufficient notice of this, he's been incarcerated by his own willful act, and ... obviously, this trial judge would much, much, much prefer that your client be here. Nothing is harder in this world than to be a trial judge to try a case when one party is not here. But y'all have had ample time to get him here. And I just don't think the evidence warrants the State carrying this expense. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand the court's ruling. I was just merely pointing out that it's the indigency of the defendant in the case that we're talking about, and obviously he is in prison and is not earning any money, does not have the assets to pay for transportation, and that's why we requested that he be brought by the State. [THE COURT]: I agree. But the court's finding is not that Mr. Griffith Senior had any legal right in which to do so, but if Mr. Griffith Senior had wanted to do so, there were funds available."

The adoption hearing proceeded. The evidence showed without dispute that the child, now 3 1/2, had lived with his mother and Mr. Brooks (who the court ruled had at least a common law marriage) since the boy was five months old. Mr. Brooks, age 44, has a stable job earning approximately $40,000 annually. Mrs. Brooks, age 29, has worked for eight years as a bartender, and works three nights each week: on Wednesdays from 7:00 p.m. till 2:00 a.m.; on Fridays from 7:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. and on Saturdays from 7:00 p.m. till 2:45 a.m.

The boy's natural father was ordered in April 1986 to pay $50 per week child support. As of January 1987, he was $1,150 in arrears, having evidently paid $650. He last paid support in December of 1986. The following month, in January of 1987, he was in incarceration on the above-described charge, and has remained so since that time. There was no evidence he earns money while in prison or has any assets. His father, Mr. Griffith, Sr., testified appellant had been in an automobile accident before he was imprisoned and was unable to, or did not, work full time.

The evidence of appellant's relationship with his child came principally from Griffith, Sr., and was essentially undisputed by any competent evidence: he testified that, at least before appellant was in prison appellant visited his son and played with him, whenever the boy visited the grandparents under their visitation privileges--every other weekend, a week at Christmas, and a week in the summer. Appellant had not visited the boy in the boy's home because he was never allowed to do so. Neither was Mr. Griffith, Sr., allowed to visit. Appellant did speak to the child on the telephone from time to time, but appellant could not call the boy at his home because this would necessitate a collect call from prison. The child's mother testified appellant had sent one Christmas card to the boy, but (perhaps because the child was less than three years old) most of it was addressed to her, although appellant signed it with "love" to his son. Mr. Griffith, Sr., testified that the child could not be taken to prison to visit his father, but that when Griffith, Sr., visited or spoke to Griffith, Jr., appellant would ask about his son and ask to see pictures. The stepfather, Mr. Brooks, conceded that, from statements made by the child after visiting his paternal grandparents, evidently the child had spoken to his father on the telephone.

Griffith, Sr., testified that he loved his grandson and that appellant loved the boy; but, when questioned about the sincerity of his own interest in the child in view of that fact that he had not sought to intervene in the proceedings, he testified that he did not know he could intervene. (Following the grant of adoption to Brooks, the child's grandfather did file a belated motion to intervene, contemporaneous with a motion for new trial.) Appellant's attorney was asked by the court if, and how much, he was being paid to represent appellant's interests, and the attorney responded that it was less than the cost of transporting appellant to the hearing would have been.

In his order of adoption, the trial court found that the hearing was originally set for May 1988, but was continued at appellant's request so as to make arrangement to be present at the hearing; but the hearing was set again for September 20, 1988, and that appellant was not present; that his attorney requested another continuance but was denied. The trial court found as fact that the natural father "is incarcerated ... and is serving a sentence of 15 years, to serve 12"; that, underlying that sentence, the father had entered a plea of guilty to the offense of rape and two counts of aggravated sodomy; that that same indictment showed on its face confinement, sentence, and convictions for the following felonies, to wit, four incidents of burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. The court found the natural father and the mother were divorced by decree dated March 27, 1987, "and that [d]ecree required support for the minor child by the natural parent that has not been paid since the grant of the [f]inal [d]ecree."

(Appellant was incarcerated in January 1987. The child was born January 13, 1985; based upon Brooks' testimony that the child had lived with him since the boy was 5 1/2 months old, it must be concluded that Brooks and the mother were living together since about July 1985. The criminal acts of rape and sodomy were shown by the indictment to have been committed by appellant on September 26, 1985. The indictment was returned in April 1986, the same month he was ordered to pay $50 per week child support.)

The trial court also found as fact that despite the April 1986, order to pay $50 per week child support, that as of January 15, 1987 (12 days before he was incarcerated) appellant was $1,150 in arrears, and "has not paid any child support since December of 1986 [and n]either the natural father nor anyone on his behalf has paid any child support since December, 1986."

The trial court also found as fact: "The record shows that the natural father does not care for the child and that no natural bond of parent and child exists between the natural father and the minor child"; and that the best interests of the child would be served by the adoption.

The final order of adoption was prepared in a proposed form by Brooks' counsel, with the court's approval....

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  • S.B.H., In Interest of
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1995
    ...on the part of [the natural father]." Sims v. Sims, 171 Ga.App. 99, 101, 318 S.E.2d 805, supra. See also Griffith v. Brooks, 193 Ga.App. 762, 765(1), 766, 389 S.E.2d 246. Consequently, the termination of the father's parental rights cannot be sustained on the ground that he has abandoned S.......
  • Bateman v. Futch, A98A0911.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 1998
    ...also asserts that there was no evidence that he intentionally abandoned J.R.B. under OCGA § 19-8-10(a). See Griffith v. Brooks, 193 Ga.App. 762, 766(1), 389 S.E.2d 246 (1989); see also Spires v. Tarleton, 225 Ga.App. 117, 119, 483 S.E.2d 337 (1997). However, the trial court did not decide t......
  • Hall v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 2003
    ...146, 147(1), 264 S.E.2d 659 (1980). 9. (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted; emphasis in original.) Griffith v. Brooks, 193 Ga.App. 762, 766(1), 389 S.E.2d 246 (1989). See also Glendinning v. McComas, 188 Ga. 345, 347, 3 S.E.2d 562 (1939). Accord Crumb v. Gordon, 157 Ga.App. 839, 840......
  • Woodall v. Johnson
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 7, 2019
    ..., 264 Ga. App. 650, 653 (1), 592 S.E.2d 120 (2003).10 Marks , 300 Ga. App. at 243 (1), 684 S.E.2d 364. See also Griffith v. Brooks , 193 Ga. App. 762, 766 (1), 389 S.E.2d 246 (1989).11 Smallwood , 292 Ga. App. at 177 (2), 664 S.E.2d 254.12 (Emphasis omitted.) Marks , 300 Ga. App. at 246 (3)......
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