Griffith v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia
Decision Date | 12 July 1940 |
Docket Number | 13219. |
Citation | 10 S.E.2d 71,190 Ga. 578 |
Parties | GRIFFITH v. FEDERAL LAND BANK OF COLUMBIA. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
'A married woman may borrow money for the purpose of paying debts of her husband, and give her note and mortgage therefor, and such a contract will be binding upon her although the lender may know, at the time the loan is made that she is borrowing it for this purpose, if he is not the husband's creditor who is to be thus paid, and is no party to any arrangement or scheme between the husband and wife of which the borrowing of the money by her for such purpose is the outcome.' Braswell v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 165 Ga. 123, 139 S.E. 861.
(a) In the instant case there was no evidence to show that the lender was a party to any arrangement or scheme between the husband and the wife, of which the borrowing of the money by her for such purpose is the outcome.
(b) Accordingly, on application of the foregoing ruling to the pleadings and the evidence, a verdict for the defendant was demanded; and the judge did not err in so directing.
R B. Lambert, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Edwards & Edwards, of Buchanan, and Harry D. Reed and J. S. Averill, Jr., both of Columbia, S. C., for defendant in error.
Mrs. K. H. Griffith brought suit against Federal Land Bank of Columbia in which she sought to enjoin the bank from selling under a power certain lands claimed by her, but which were included in a deed to secure debt executed by her and her husband, A. M. Griffith, to the bank. The gravamen of her complaint was that A. M. Griffith was the sole beneficiary of a loan to secure which the deed was made, and that the inclusion of certain of her property therein had the effect of making her security for her husband's debts. Further allegations of her petition as amended were that the husband owed certain named debts to other persons, to pay which the money was borrowed from the defendant bank, and that M. Bullard was the agent of the Federal Land Bank, had knowledge of the purpose for which the money was borrowed, and persuaded her to sign the deed which included her property. On the trial, the judge directed a verdict in favor of the bank. The plaintiff's motion for new trial was overruled, and she excepted.
While the motion contains special grounds, none of these are referred to in the brief of the plaintiff.
"A married woman may borrow money for the purpose of paying debts of her husband, and give her note and mortgage therefor, and such a contract will be binding upon her, although the lender may know, at the time the loan is made, that she is borrowing it for this purpose, if he is not the husband's creditor who is to be thus paid, and is no party to any arrangement or scheme between the husband and wife of which the borrowing of the money by her for such purpose is the outcome. Chastain v. Peak, 111 Ga. 889, 36 S.E. 967; Rood v. Wright, 124 Ga. 849, 53 S.E. 390; Ginsberg v. People's Bank of Savannah, 145 Ga. 815, 89 S.E. 1086.' Garrett v. Thornton, 157 Ga. 487(3), 121 S.E. 820; Temples v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 100 Ga. 503, 28 S.E. 232, 62 Am.St.Rep. 326; Nelms v. Keller, 103 Ga. 745, 30 S.E. 572; Johnson v. A. Leffer Co., 122 Ga. 670, 50 S.E. 488; Jackson v. Reeves, 156 Ga. 802, 120 S.E. 541.' The foregoing ruling is quoted from the case of Braswell v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 165 Ga. 123, 139 S.E. 861.
Under no view of the case could the plaintiff prevail, without submitting to the jury some evidence having probative value which would have authorized a finding that M. Bullard was the agent of the Federal Land Bank of Columbia. There was positive testimony from a witness for the bank that
It is insisted, however, that the testimony of A. M. Griffith on that subject contradicted that quoted above. Griffith swore as follows: The strongest portion of the foregoing excerpt is the statement of the witness that 'He [Bullard] was the agent of the Federal Land Bank.' Standing alone, the quoted words could be taken as a positive declaration based presumably on the witness' personal knowledge; but they do not stand alone. They are immediately followed by these words: 'That's what he told me.' Fairly construed, this means that the witness is testifying that Bullard told him, the witness, that he, Bullard, was the agent of...
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