Griffith v. Gulf Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. 38566,38566
• Citation: 61 So.2d 306,215 Miss. 15
• Parties: GRIFFITH et al. v. GULF REFINING CO. et al.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 306

61 So.2d 306

215 Miss. 15

GRIFFITH et al. v. GULF REFINING CO. et al.

No. 38566.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 24, 1952.

Howie, Howie & Montgomery, Jackson, for appellants.

Irwin W. Coleman, Gwinnup, Heidelberg & Fontaine, James A. Boone, Jackson, Archie D. Gray, Houston, Tex., for appellees.

HALL, Justice.

In a lengthy suggestion of error appellees vigorously assail our opinion in this case, 60 So.2d 518, which was concurred in by every member of the Court. They state that we have simply brushed aside the authorities upon which they rely and they insist that two of the cases cited by them are directly in point and on all-fours with the present case.

The first of these is Mueller v. Sutherland, Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 801. That case was decided after the enactment of a conservation law in Texas, but nevertheless relied in part upon the earlier Texas case of Japhet v. McRae, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 669, which was decided under the rule of capture prior to the time when Texas had adopted any conservation law. We have held, as necessarily we must, that the conservation law of this state has the effect of discarding the rule of capture. Moreover, the Texas conservation law, unlike that of Mississippi, expressly provides 'it is not the intention of this Act to require repressuring of an oil pool or that the separately owned properties in any pool be unitized under one management, control or ownership.' Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, Article 6014, paragraph (g).

The other case which we are said to have disregarded is Republic Natural Gas Company v. Baker, 197 F.2d 647, from the United States Court of Appeal for the 10th Circuit. That case was decided under the law of Kansas and in the third paragraph of the majority opinion it was specifically pointed out that the rule of capture is applicable in Kansas. Furthermore, Judge Huxman, the only Kansas judge sitting on the case, wrote a dissent which we think is more in accord with principles of justice and equity.

It is our conception that we are free to decide for ourselves all questions arising under the common law or under the statutory provisions of this state, that we are not bound by the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions on similar questions, that it is proper for us to consider them and that we may follow them only if we are satisfied of the soundness of the reasoning by which they are supported. 21 C.J.S., Courts, Sec. 204. Such decisions may have persuasive authority and we may still refuse to follow them if opposed to the public policy of this state. 14 Am.Jur., Courts, Section 85. They may be entitled to respectful consideration if well reasoned and are promotive of justice, but they are not technically of force as precedents and we are at perfect liberty to disregard them. New York Life Insurance Company v. Ware, 171 Miss. 341, 157 So. 359, 894.

The original opinion herein pointed out the public policy of Mississippi as expressly stated in our conservation statutes and we shall not here repear it. We do call attention, however, to some of the things said by us in Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 209 Miss. 687, 48 So.2d 344, 347: 'It is elemental that parties may not contract contrary to expressed public policy so that while the express provision regarding the drilling of offset wells may be upheld, there remains a fundamental principle founded as well in equity as in policy that an owner or lessor is entitled to reasonable protection against the loss of mineral resources in his lands. The express provision here involved absolved the lessee from meeting his duty to the lessee by capturing lessor's oil in situ through wells drilled on lessors' lands. The equitable duty, existing as well under implication, to conserve the mineral resources of lessors or to refrain from depletory act survives unimpaired. * * * There is an implied covenant in a lease of oil property that the lessee willl do nothing to impair the value of the lease, and must use reasonable care to protect lessor from damage or loss by the affirmative act of such lessee. * * * Although oil is a fugacious product and ordinarily belongs to the producer who captures it upon his own lands, yet when such producer is under an obligation to do nothing to destroy or deplete the lands of his lessor, he may not with impunity impair the value of his lessor's property. Such an obligation gains equitable recognition when substantial drainage is caused by the lessee himself.'

Gulf Refining Company's lease covers an undivided one-half mineral interest in the entire 250 acre tract here involved, and Magnolia Petroleum Company's lease covers the other undivided one-half mineral interest therein. Magnolia recognizes its duty to its lessor as above stated and is paying royalties from production to Griffith in proportion to his mineral interest in 90 acres of the 250 acre tract. Gulf refuses to recognize its obligation and refuses to pay any royalties to Griffith because the well was not drilled on the 90 acre tract and argues that this action is justified because Griffith acquired his mineral interest after the execution to Gulf of the lease on the 250 acre tract, yet Gulf's...