Griffith v. Mutual Protective League

Decision Date12 July 1918
Citation205 S.W. 286,200 Mo.App. 87
PartiesHOMER GRIFFITH et al., Respondents, v. THE MUTUAL PROTECTIVE LEAGUE et al., Appellants
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Argued and Submitted June 4, 1918 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike County.--Hon. Edgar B Woolfolk, Judge.

REVERSED.

STATEMENT.

Under date of March 12, 1908, the defendant company issued its benefit certificate to Mrs. Bertie Nicholson, a member of the order, by which certificate it promised to pay, at the time of the death of Mrs. Nicholson, while a member of the corporation or society, the sum of $ 500 to John W Nicholson, her husband, and $ 500 to Howard G. Nicholson, her adopted son, these designated as beneficiaries, upon satisfactory proof of the death of Mrs. Nicholson, the certificate representing a total of $ 1000.

The benefit certificate is attached as an exhibit to the petition and was introduced in evidence and, designating John W. Nicholson, her husband, and Howard G. Nicholson, her adopted son, as beneficiaries, as above, it contains, among other provisions, the following, which are here material:

"That in the event of the death of any beneficiary prior to the death of said member, and upon his failure to have designated another beneficiary, then the amount to be paid under this certificate shall be due and payable to the other surviving beneficiaries, if there be any, and if none survive him, then to the legal heirs of said member."

It is further provided that the certificate is issued and accepted subject to the agreements, privileges and conditions named, among which is this, number 5:

"5. If a member holding this certificate shall be convicted of a felony, or shall be expelled from the Order, or become so far intemperate, or use opiates, cocaine, chloral of other narcotics or poison to such an extent as to impair his health or to produce delirium tremens, or should die in consequence of a duel or while engaged in war, or by suicide, whether sane or insane, intentional or unintentional, except it be committed while the member is under treatment for insanity, or has been judicially declared to be insane or by the hands of beneficiary or beneficiaries named herein, except by accident, or by the hand of justice, or from disease resulting from his own vicious, intemperate or immoral habits, act or acts, or in consequence of the violation or attempted violation of the laws of the State or the United States or any other province of nation, or if any of the statements or declarations in the application for membership and upon the faith of which this certificate was issued shall be found in any respects untrue, this certificate shall be null and void and of no effect; provided that in all such cases of death the amount of money contributed to the benefit fund by such member shall be returned and shall be paid to the beneficiary out of such fund in lieu of the benefit."

The words which we have italicized above are those which are here involved.

The final clause is, "This certificate is issued and accepted subject to all the conditions on the back hereof, and subject to all the laws, rules and regulations of the Mutual Protective League now in force, or that may hereafter be enacted, and shall be null and void if said member does not comply with all of said conditions and with the laws of the Council to which the said member belongs."

There is another provision allowing the member to change the beneficiary by written instrument.

In the application for the benefit certificate, which was put in evidence by the defendant, clause 5, as above set out, is embodied, except that where in the certificate itself the words are, "or by the hands of beneficiary or beneficiaries named herein, except by accident," the words in the application are, "or by the hands of beneficiaries named herein, except by accident."

By the constitution of the Order it is provided:

"The certificates hereafter to be issued shall be in such form as is or may hereafter be determined by the board of directors."

This appears to have been in force at the time of the issuance of this benefit certificate, the certificate bearing date March 12, 1908.

The petition upon which the case was tried avers that the plaintiffs are the surviving brothers of Bertie Nicholson; that she died on June 21, 1913, and that they constitute and are her only heirs at law; that at the time of her death Bertie Nicholson was a member of the defendant corporation, which, it is averred, was organized as such under the laws of the State of Illinois, and whose chief business, it is averred, is the insuring of the lives of its members for a pecuniary profit and consideration, for the benefit of its members and their beneficiaries. It is further averred that John W. Nicholson, a co-defendant, is the surviving husband of Bertie Nicholson and made a party defendant because he refused to join as plaintiff, and is a necessary party to a complete determination of the issues involved. It is further averred that by the benefit certificate issued March 12, 1908, and filed as before stated, defendant promised to pay to John W. Nicholson and Howard G. Nicholson, as beneficiaries, at the time of the death of Bertie Nicholson, while a member of the society, the sum of $ 500 each, or the total sum of $ 1000, upon satisfactory proof being made to the corporation of the death of Bertie Nicholson, and that it was further provided in the certificate, "that the said defendant corporation obliged and bound itself in the event of the death of said beneficiaries to pay said sum of $ 1000 to plaintiffs as legal heirs of said Bertie Nicholson."

It is then averred that on June 20, 1913, John W. Nicholson, then being the husband of Bertie Nicholson, feloniously murdered her by pouring gasoline and kerosene over her body and setting fire to her in that condition, and that after he had set fire to her the other beneficiary named, to-wit, Howard G. Nicholson, the adopted son, in attempting to rescue his mother, was himself burned to such an extent that he died a few minutes before the death of his mother. It is further set out in the petition that the motive of John W. Nicholson in murdering his wife was to collect the insurance money involved in this suit; that on June 27, 1913, an information was filed in the circuit court of Audrain County, charging John W. Nicholson with the murder of his wife; that he voluntarily entered a place of guilty to the charge, a judgment of guilty of murder in the first degree was rendered against him by the circuit court, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for the period of his natural life, from June 30, 1913, and that ever since the entry of the sentence and judgment, he has been incarcerated in the State Penitentiary under that life sentence.

Averring that Bertie Nicholson was a member in good standing in the defendant organization at the time of her death, it is averred that the plaintiffs, as substitute beneficiaries, furnished the required proof of her death.

It is further averred in the petition that John W. Nicholson is civilly dead and that by his conduct and by his crime against his wife, and by his conviction of her murder, and by the judgment of life imprisonment, he forfeited all his rights as the beneficiary named, and on account of his being civilly dead, as aforesaid, plaintiffs were entitled to collect from the defendant, as beneficiaries, the sum of $ 1000, which sum, it is averred, the defendant, by its benefit certificate promised and obligated itself to pay plaintiffs as the legal heirs of Bertie Nicholson. Averring demand and refusal by the defendant to pay this amount, the petition prays the court to adjudicate that John W. Nicholson is entitled to no part of the $ 1000, and that by reason of the premises had forfeited all his right under it, either as original joint beneficiary, or as a survivor of Howard G. Nicholson, and to adjudicate and hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to all the right, title and interest set forth in the benefit certificate as belonging to the beneficiary, and they pray for judgment against the defendant in the sum of $ 1000, with interest at six per cent.

The administrator, appointed on the conviction and sentence of John W. Nicholson, answered, asking the court to determine and to adjudicate as to the proper party to receive the $ 1000, and that if the court found it due and payable to him as administrator, he prays for judgment to that effect.

The defendant corporation answered, after a general denial of all the allegations contained in the petition, except as thereafter expressly admitted, qualified or explained, as a further defense it sets up that it is a fraternal beneficiary society organized and incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois, relating to such societies, set out the Act of the General Assembly of Illinois referred to in full and avers a compliance with the terms of the law; that since its organization and the issue of the benefit certificate it has fully complied with the Act of the State of Illinois, and avers that it now is and was at all the times herein mentioned, and set out in plaintiff's amended petition, a fraternal beneficiary society, as defined by the statutes of the State of Missouri, relating to such societies; that it was formed and carried on for the sole benefit of its members and their beneficiaries and not for profit; that it has a lodge system, with ritualistic form of work and representative form of government, and makes provisions for the payment of benefits in case of death if its members; that the fund from which the payment of benefits is made, and the fund from which the expenses of ...

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1 cases
  • Sprinkle v. Estate of Fleming
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 4 April 1922
    ... ... 368; Matson & May v. Pearson, 121 Mo.App ... 132; Goodman v. Griffith, 155 Mo.App. 582; State ... ex rel. v. Walsh, 67 Mo.App. 348. (7) It is ... 544; Marx ... v. Wooster, 199 S.W. 446; Griffith v. Mut ... Protective League, 205 S.W. 286; Bruer v ... Dunham, 209 S.W. 573; City of DeSoto ... ...

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