Griffith v. Townley

• Decision Date: 31 October 1878
• Citation: 69 Mo. 13
• Parties: GRIFFITH v. TOWNLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

69 Mo. 13

GRIFFITH

v.TOWNLEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1878.

Appeal from Osage Circuit Court--HON. A. J. SEAY, Judge.

Ewing, Smith & Pope, for appellant.

Lay & Belch, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, C. J.

In 1864, one Lewis Welton borrowed of Mrs. Peninah Townley, as representative of the estate of her husband, John M. Townley, deceased, $4,600, giving a note therefor, and securing the note by a deed of trust on certain land, K. W. Townley being the trustee. Welton died without having paid any portion of either principal or interest of the note. His estate was administered by one Jesse Welton, in 1866, who came to K. W. Townley, the trustee and agent for his mother, and induced him to have the note allowed against the estate, saying that if he would do this, he, the administrator, would have the court make an order for the sale of the land, when it would bring much more than if sold under the deed of trust alone.

After this claim was allowed, as well as some others of minor importance, the administrator procured an order of sale for the payment of debts as he had promised, and the sale took place; Townley, as the agent for his mother, becoming the purchaser of the land mentioned in the deed of trust, for the sum of $6,000; purchasing on the faith of the public statements and representations of the administrator at the sale (who acted as auctioneer, and also bid against him, and asked him to bid on the land), that he would “sell a clear title;” that the land would be free from incumbrance; that he would pay Mrs. Townley's note. McCord, attorney for the estate of Welton, also told Townley, who made inquiries of him at the time of the sale respecting the title, that the title would be all right, and to “go on and purchase.”

The testimony is without rebuttal, and conclusive as to these statements of the administrator. There is also uncontradicted testimony to the effect that Welton, just when the land was knocked off, stated “that the land had brought barely enough to pay off the mortgage of Mrs. Townley, and the expenses.” There is also similar testimony to the effect that when inquiry was made, immediately after the land was stricken off, the reply was made, either by Welton, McCord or Townley, that the last named “had got the land to satisfy the mortgage.” $6,000 was all the land, in absolute fee, was worth.

There was nothing in the proceedings in any manner referring to the deed of trust. The order of sale, however, though in usual form in other respects, requires the sale of “ all the right, title and interest of the said Lewis Welton,” in the land mentioned in the order. But the petition for the sale, the order of publication, the certificate of appraisement, the report, the order approving it, and the deed, are in the customary form where the land is sold for the payment of ordinary debts, and give not the remotest indication that anything less than the fee was sold, or intended to be sold. In addition to that, and confirmatory of the indications borne by the probate files and records, one of the county justices stated that some objections were raised to the approval of the report; that the appraisers were sent for, who “ stated that they had appraised the whole value of the land, without reference to the mortgage;” and it was upon this understanding, i. e., that the whole title was appraised and sold, that the county court approved the sale. Upon this approval, and the delivery of the deed, Townley delivered Welton's note, then amounting, with accrued interest, to some $5,040, to the administrator, paid in money the difference between the note and his bid, and acknowledged satisfaction on the record of the deed of trust.

Welton's administrator died, and his administrator, Jacob Hull, administered upon the estate of the deceased administrator, made a settlement of the estate of Lewis Welton, and that estate is now free from debt. The present proceeding, instituted by the public administrator of Osage county, as administrator de bonis non of Lewis Welton's estate, has for its object the cancellation of the entry of satisfaction on the record, the substitution of the public administrator to the rights formerly possessed by Mrs. Townley as creditor of the estate, and that the deed of trust be foreclosed. The prayer of the petition was granted, and a decree as prayed for entered, the debt then amounting to over $10,000. We are now asked to give our sanction to this decree; the plaintiff claiming in support of it, that only the equity of redemption passed by reason of the probate sale; that if any mistake has occurred it was a mistake of law; a mistake of such a fatal character that equity, with all its beneficent and healing powers, possesses no ability to redress.

It must be confessed that this position is in accordance with the general and very salutary rule, and the only inquiry to which we must address ourselves, is whether the circumstances of this case are such as will, in the present instance, prevent that rigid rule from having its customary sway. In the Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, it was said, quoting from Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 15, “whatever exceptions there may be to this rule, they are not only few in number, but they will be found to have something peculiar in their character.” The brief limits of an opinion will not admit of detailed examination of the numerous and often conflicting authorities respecting the extent to which courts of equity proceed in relieving against mistakes of law. If, however, the principle to be deduced from the great current of authority on this vexed question is correctly announced in the case just cited, then the inquiry must be, are there in the present instance such ingredients as entitle it to be placed in the narrow and infrequent list of exceptions to a generally prevalent rule? We cannot doubt that Townley acted, when making the purchase at the administrator's sale, under the confident belief that he was purchasing “ a clear title,” or title in fee; nor can we doubt that, under this belief, he paid the difference between the amount of the note and the bid, surrendered that note and acknowledged satisfaction of the deed of trust. And it is equally beyond question that he was led to this course by the promises and assurances of the representative of the estate, Welton, who, doubtless, as evinced by his contemporaneous declarations, supposed he was selling the land in fee simple absolute. If this was the belief of both parties, then it follows that if Townley did not by his purchase procure the fee as he intended, and as Welton intended he should, then it is a case of mutual mistake: one of so fundamental a character as appeals very strongly for equitable interposition. If, on the other hand, Welton was actuated by no honest purpose in the course which he pursued, and the representations which he made, then the contract of sale was tainted with such fraud as to utterly vitiate its validity. But whether the contract was the result of mistake or fraud, in either event an unconscionable advantage has been obtained by selling a barren and worthless equity of redemption, which the purchaser did not intend to buy, for the full price of a title in fee, which the buyer did intend to buy, and which the administrator, if honest, did intend to sell him.

These are circumstances of such peculiar character, as ought, it seems, to go far towards mitigating the rigor of the general rule. In short, this case may be said to rest, as Mr. Justice Story observes of another, (1 Story Eq. Jur., § 118,) upon “mixed considerations” and not exclusively upon mere mistake or ignorance of the law. Where there was a mutual mistake of parties as to the interest of the vendor in the land sold, the...