Griffith v. Wal–Mart Stores E., L.P., Case No. 2:12–CV–1756–VEH.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:12–CV–1756–VEH.
• Parties: Lola GRIFFITH, Plaintiff, v. WAL–MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

884 F.Supp.2d 1218

Lola GRIFFITH, Plaintiff,

v.WAL–MART STORES EAST, L.P., Defendant.

Case No. 2:12–CV–1756–VEH.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Aug. 10, 2012.

Frank S. Buck, James Brooks Leach, Rachel Catherine Buck, Frank S. Buck PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Marda W. Sydnor, Parsons Lee & Juliano PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion To Remand (Doc. 5) (the “Remand Motion”), filed on May 30, 2012. Defendant responded to the Remand Motion on June 13, 2012. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff elected not to file a reply brief. Therefore, the Remand Motion is under submission and ripe for the court's decision.

Having carefully considered the removal papers (Doc. 1) and briefing by the parties, the court concludes that the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy is not clearly established in the removal papers and, therefore, this case was improvidently removed. Thus, Plaintiff's Remand Motion is due to be granted, and the court will remand this case to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Lola Griffith (“Ms. Griffith”) originally filed her complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, on February 23, 2012. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1 at Ex. 4). Her complaint is styled in two counts, claiming negligence and wantonness against Wal–Mart in relation to a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on July 11, 2011, at Wal–Mart store # 762 in Birmingham, Alabama. Ms. Griffith did not allege the specific nature of her injuries, indicating only that she suffered “serious personal injuries and other damages.” ( Id. ¶ 5).

Moreover, Ms. Griffith did not allege a specific monetary value of her damages. Instead, she made the following general claim for damages:

a. Plaintiff was caused to suffer various injuries;

b. Plaintiff was caused to seek medical treatment in and about her efforts to heal and cure her injuries and will be caused to incur additional bills in the future;

c. Plaintiff was caused to incur medical bills, hospital bills, doctors' bills and prescription expenses in an effort to cure her injuries and will be caused to incur additional bills in the future;

d. Plaintiff was caused to suffer physical pain and discomfort;

e. Plaintiff was caused to suffer mental anguish, distress, and embarrassment.

....

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff demands Judgment against all Defendants, whether named or fictitiously described (# 1–16), for compensatory and punitive damages in an amount that the Plaintiff would legally and justifiably be entitled to recover as determined by the trier of fact, plus interest and costs.

( Id. ¶ 10, Prayer for Relief).

On May 2, 2012, more than thirty days after receipt of the Complaint, but less than one year after commencement of this action, Defendant Wal–Mart Stores East, L.P. (“Wal–Mart”) removed the case to federal court. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 1). The court's jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity of citizenship. ( Id. ¶ 4). Wal–Mart avers that the parties are citizens of different states. ( Id. ¶¶ 2, 4). Further, Wal–Mart contends that “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of Seventy–Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000), exclusive of interest and costs, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” ( Id. ¶ 4). The Notice of Removal relies solely upon Ms. Griffith's responses to a set of requests for admission to establish that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. ( Id. ¶¶ 7–14). Wal–Mart maintains that Ms. Griffith's responses to the requests for admission constitute “other paper” upon which removal can be based under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). ( Id. ¶ 12).

The admissions Wal–Mart requested from Ms. Griffith on March 28, 2012, were stated as follows:

1. That you do not claim in excess of $75,000.00 as total damages in this case.

2. That you do not intend to claim over $75,000.00 as total damages in this case.

3. That you will not seek over $75,000.00 in total damages in this case.

4. That you waive any about of damages ever entered in this case in excess of $75,000.00.

5. That you will not accept any award of damages over $75,000.00 in this case.

6. That you agree that the above-stated limitations on your claim for damages will be binding on you, your heirs, representatives, and assigns with regard to all claims made or ever made in this lawsuit against Wal–Mart Stores East, L.P. or any of its employees.

(Doc. 1 at Ex. 1).

Ms. Griffith's response to each request was stated as follows:

RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this improper request for admission as being completely outside the scope and purpose of Rule 36. Specifically, this request for admission attempts to require Plaintiff to speculate on the course of future discovery and further, the purpose of Rule 36 is to “expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts which will not be disputed at trial,” not to pre-try such issues (See A.R.C.P. 36, committee comments on 1973 Adoptions). Without waiving this objection, request for admission-denied.

(Doc. 1 at Ex. 2) (emphasis added).

III. LEGAL STANDARDSA. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Generally

“It is by now axiomatic that the inferior courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are ‘empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.1994)). “Accordingly, ‘[w]hen a federal court acts outside its statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, it violates the fundamental constitutional precept of limited federal power.’ ” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409 (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212, 92 S.Ct. 418, 425, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971)). “Simply put, once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.

“A necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act without jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.” Id. “Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam)).

Moreover, “[t]he jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court's competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise, a party could ‘work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied them.’ ” Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000–01 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951)) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 411 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)).

Lastly, Congress has decreed and the Supreme Court has confirmed that—with the express exception of civil rights cases that have been removed—orders of remand by district courts based upon certain grounds, including in particular those premised upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are entirely insulated from review. More specifically, § 1447(d) provides:

An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added); see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) (recognizing that “ ‘[w]here the [remand] order is based on one of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand’ ”) (citing Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413 n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977)); Milton I. Shadur, Traps for the Unwary in Removal and Remand, 33 no. 3 Litigation 43 (2007); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 2418, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (holding that when “the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate review is barred by § 1447(d)”).

B. Defendant's Burden on Removal

The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for the purposes of removal to this court is on the removing defendant. See Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.2001) (“Because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court by Best Buy, Best Buy bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists.”). “The court should determine its jurisdiction over the case ‘based upon the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal.’ ” Fowler v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1246 (N.D.Ala.2003).

“[B]ecause the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals favors remand of cases that have been removed where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear.” Lowe's OK'd Used Cars, Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1388, 1389 (M.D.Ala.1998) (citing Burns v. Windsor, 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994)). “In fact, removal statut...